WAR AND VOLUNTARY MILITARY SERVICE:

EXPLORING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OPINION REGARDING WAR AND REGULAR ARMY ENLISTMENT AND RETENTION, 2000–2007

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By

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4th Battalion, 42nd Field Artillery, 4th Infantry Division, Texas and Iraq

Field Artillery Battery Commander, Iraq *April - December 2003*
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ABSTRACT

This dissertation addresses the lack of interdisciplinary research and understanding about how opinions regarding war related to service in the United States' all-volunteer Regular Army during the Afghan and Iraq Wars' early and middle years. Why study the relationship between opinions regarding war and military service? Although a concern at least since the end of conscription in 1973, even the most recent public opinion studies only consider the electoral or political implications of mass opinion regarding war. Some research considers the effects of veteran service or wartime casualties on public opinion, but none studies the relationship between opinions regarding war and military service. Similarly, the most recent civil-military relations research considers differences between military and civilian beliefs and demographics, but none consider the relationship between different beliefs and the population of Regular Army recruits and reenlisting soldiers. This dissertation addresses these significant shortcomings in existing research.

This study draws from prior research on wartime public opinion, person-organization fit, and sociopolitical representation in the armed forces. It includes original empirical analyses of three significant datasets: public opinion regarding war between 2001 and 2008, Regular Army recruitment between January 2000 and September 2007, and Regular Army retention between July 2003 and September 2007. The recruitment and retention sample population is practically the entire

population of Regular Army recruits (over 500,000) and reenlisting soldiers (over 100,000).

This study proposes and tests a model of the relationship between public opinion regarding war and Army service as measured by Army recruitment and retention rates. The literature review and empirical analysis of three datasets builds and tests the model. Person-organization fit theory argues that belief differences between people and organizations explain and predict whether people pursue work with an organization and whether they choose to remain in the organization. Except for the wealthiest counties, the US counties with more people who expressed favorable opinions regarding the Iraq and Afghan Wars also provided the most Regular Army recruits and reenlisting soldiers. The opposite was also true. This study found that opinion differences regarding war should and do predict different Army recruitment and retention rates. This study found a large and significant difference between communities who produced the most and least recruits and reenlisting soldiers, an indication of considerable social distance between much of the nation and its Army.

DEDICATION

To my wonderful wife and love of my life, Darcy,

Our two amazing girls, Ainsley and Avery,

And those who serve.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This work was made possible not only by my wife and daughters but by a myriad of exceptional people. These include the members of my committee, the Ph.D. staff at the Fletcher School, the leadership of the Department of Social Sciences and the Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis at the U.S. Military Academy, the Bates and Wolfe families for hosting me in Boston throughout the writing and research process, and all my friends and family who listened to this research and provided incredibly useful critiques. It was a team effort.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Ten days after terrorists attacked the United States on September 11, 2001, CNN, Gallup, and *USA Today* polled various groups of people to determine if and how they favored or opposed military responses to the attacks.[1] The night prior, President Bush prepared the nation for a lengthy war against terrorism:

> Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists and every government that supports them. Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.[2]

After posing many different questions, sociopolitical demographic groups were broadly supportive of President Bush's intentions; the groups' beliefs were practically indistinct.[3] When asked, "Do you favor or oppose the United States taking direct military action in Afghanistan," only respondents with less than a high school education held significantly

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[1] Gallup, CNN, and *USA Today*, "Terrorism reaction poll #3" (September 21-22, 2001; accessed February 18, 2012); available from http://webapps.ropercenter.uconn.edu.

[2] "President Bush's address on terrorism before a joint meeting of Congress" (September 20, 2001; accessed February 15, 2012); available from http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/21/national/21BTEX.html.

[3] *Sociopolitical* is a nebulous term in social science because of the nature of sociology and politics: Almost any subject has relevant social and political aspects. This study makes use of Morris Janowitz's general use of the term as the interaction between the social and political aspects of the issue at hand. See M. Janowitz, "The social demography of the All-Volunteer Armed Force," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 406 (1973) and Ibid., *Military Conflict* (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1975).

more favorable beliefs than people with post-graduate education.[4] Gender, income, other education levels, ethnicity, and partisan political self-identification did not relate to significantly different beliefs. When asked, "Do you favor or oppose the United States taking direct military action in Iraq," gender, income, education, ethnicity, and partisan political self-identification did not relate to significant belief differences.[5] Finally, when asked, "Would you support or oppose the U.S. continuing a campaign against terrorism if you knew that 5,000 U.S. troops would be killed," only respondents who graduated from college held significantly more favorable beliefs than people with post-graduate education. Gender, income, other education levels, ethnicity, and partisan political self-identification did not relate to significantly greater willingness to tolerate hypothetical military casualties. Shortly after September 11, 2001, practically no demographic factors related to more favorable beliefs regarding the hypothetical Afghanistan and Iraq wars.

Within two years, the Afghanistan and Iraq wars were reality. In January 2004, as the first U.S. Army soldiers deployed to Iraq were returning home, the Kaiser Family Foundation, *The Washington Post*, and Harvard University conducted a poll of soldiers' spouses.[6] No one had previously conducted a similar study, and interest in the Iraq War

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[4] This *p* value was below 0.05, but the model was also very statistically *insignificant* (Probability > Chi^2 = 0.8736), an indication of the broad, emotional impact that the September 11, 2001 attacks had on respondents' beliefs regarding military action.

[5] No *p* values were below 0.05, and the model was also statistically insignificant (Probability > Chi^2 = 0.2897).

[6] Kaiser Family Foundation, *Military Families Survey* (March 2003; accessed March 10, 2012); available from http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/7060.cfm. These different beliefs were all statistically significant with *p* values less than 0.05.

and its effects on soldiers and their families was intense. A brief review of the results demonstrates that the first deployment stressed military families but that the spouses generally reported average to high morale and intentions to stay in the Army (or reenlist). A more detailed review indicates that certain groups of spouses were significantly less satisfied with their life in the Army, the Iraq War, and their spouse's service. Self-identified Democratic spouses were more likely than self-identified Republican spouses to report that their friends did not support their service; that they were not satisfied with the respect the Army showed soldiers, with the Army as a way of life, or with their spouse's military pay; and that their spouse's morale and their personal morale were low. They were also much more likely than Republican spouses to disapprove of President Bush's handling of the Iraq War, state that the Iraq War was not going well, and identify Democrats as best able to take care of military families, the military's budget, and national defense policy.

These belief differences related to significantly different service intentions. Democratic spouses were more likely to state that their spouses would not reenlist, should not reenlist, and should make a different choice than joining the Army if they could start anew. Furthermore, they were more likely to state that another lengthy deployment would decrease the chance their spouses would reenlist and that the Army would soon face major retention problems. Black, non-Hispanic spouses' responses, compared to white, non-Hispanic spouses' responses, were similar. These different beliefs were the canary in the

coalmine: Army recruitment and retention between 2004 and 2007 mirrored these, and other, sociopolitical divisions.

In June 2005, the Army was nearing the end of its most difficult recruitment year, the first year since 2000 that the Army would miss its recruitment goal. President Bush gave a major speech to the nation at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, an effort to articulate clearly the importance of the Iraq War to the United States' security:

> Our mission in Iraq is clear: We're hunting down the terrorists. We're helping Iraqis build a free nation that is an ally in the war on terror. We're advancing freedom in the broader Middle East. We are removing a source of violence and instability and laying the foundation of peace for our children and our grandchildren. The work in Iraq is difficult and it is dangerous. Like most Americans, I see the images of violence and bloodshed. Every picture is horrifying, and the suffering is real. Amid all this violence, I know Americans ask the question: Is the sacrifice worth it? It is worth it. And it is vital to the future security of our country.[7]

Just prior to this speech, an ABC News and *Washington Post* poll revealed how sociopolitical divisions related to beliefs regarding the Iraq War and the war against terrorism.[8] More important, and rarely noted in existing research, the poll also asked whether respondents would advise a young person with whom they were close to join the military. The sociopolitical divisions were numerous and large. The respondents with

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[7] "Transcript of President Bush's speech" (June 28, 2005; accessed February 15, 2012); available from http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/28/politics/29TEXT-BUSH.html.

[8] ABC News and *The Washington Post*, "Bush's Iraq speech" (June 23-26, 2005; accessed February 18, 2012); available from http://webapps.ropercenter.uconn.edu. These differences were all significant with p values less than 0.05.

the lowest advisement rates were self-identified Democrats (26 percent), respondents with post-graduate education (34 percent), black Americans (18 percent), and respondents with annual income over $100,000 (36 percent). The respondents with the highest advisement rates were self-identified Republicans (65 percent), respondents with some college (46 percent), white Americans (46 percent), and respondents with income between $35,000 and $75,000 (about 48 percent). Military advisement rates also differed significantly by respondents' beliefs regarding the Iraq War.[9]

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[9] Ibid. These differences are all significant with *p* values less than 0.05. Percentage of respondents who would advise a young person with whom they were close to join the military:

"All in all, considering the costs to the United States versus the benefits to the United States, do you think the war with Iraq was worth fighting, or not?"

Strongly worth it:	72%
Somewhat worth it:	49
Somewhat not worth it:	28
Strongly not worth it:	18

"Considering everything, do you think the United States did the right thing in going to war with Iraq or do you think it was a mistake?"

Right thing:	67%
Mistake:	19

"Do you think the anti-government insurgency in Iraq is getting stronger, getting weaker, or staying about the same?"

Getting weaker:	69%
Staying the same:	38
Getting stronger:	24

"Do you think of the war with Iraq as part of the war against terrorism, or as separate from the war against terrorism?"

Part of:	56%
Separate from:	22

"Do you think the war with Iraq has or has not contributed to the long-term security of the United States?"

Yes, a great deal:	64%
Yes, somewhat:	51
No, has not:	22

This study. This study's primary objective is to describe and explain the relationship between opinions regarding war and voluntary military service. The study's subsidiary objective is somewhat more ambitious: to offer a prediction of the relationship between opinions and voluntary military service during future wars. The context of this research is both academic and practical. Academically, it builds on the body of scholarly research into the nature of voluntary military service and nature of public opinion regarding war. David Segal's study regarding opinion differences and social distance between civilians and veterans was an early work in this area.[10] Jason Dempsey's *Our Army* and James Krueger's and Francisco Pedraza's study are prime examples of recent research that touches on the same subject.[11] The context is also practical because it seeks to inform contemporary national discussion regarding, for example, the equity of service and sacrifice during war and the allocation of limited national resources to support military veterans.

This study chooses to focus on wartime voluntary military service. The literature demonstrates that foreign policy considerations during periods of war especially influence individuals' opinions and behavior. It also demonstrates that military members, veterans, and civilians generally hold different beliefs regarding war. Because the study is of voluntary military service, it avoids the complicating factors of

[10] D. Segal, "Civil-military relations in the mass public," *Armed Forces and Society* 1, no. 2 (1975).
[11] J. Krueger and F. Pedraza, "Missing voices: War attitudes among military service-connected civilians," *Armed Forces and Society* online edition (2011).

conscription or draft-induced volunteerism seen, for example, during the Vietnam War.[12]

Research approach. This study's approach to its objectives is to examine public opinion regarding war and Regular Army recruitment and retention, specifically between January 2000 and September 2007. The beginning of the analysis pre-dates the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States and the beginning of both the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.

Traditional studies of public opinion regarding war highlight the cause and existence of public opinion differences based on respondents' sociopolitical demographics. Studies do not exist that relate those same factors to wartime Regular Army recruitment and retention differences. This presents a puzzle and creates the general research question: *What was the relationship between Regular Army recruitment and retention and public opinion regarding the Afghanistan and Iraq wars?* Answering this general research question requires the study and use of three distinct literatures: public opinion regarding war, person-organization fit, and sociopolitical representation in the United States Army.

This dissertation progresses in the following manner. Chapter Two is the literature review. Chapter Three identifies the likely contemporary relationship between sociopolitical factors and recruiting and retention. Chapters Four and Five analyze the opinion and recruitment and retention evidence between 2000 and 2008. The chapters are organized according to the model's specifications, which are introduced following

[12] Ibid.; also Segal and others, "The civil-military interface in a metropolitan community," *Armed Forces and Society* 4, no. 3 (1978).

the literature review. Specifically, Chapter Four is the study of opinion regarding war. It identifies the factors that divided opinion regarding the wars. Finally, Chapter Five analyzes Regular Army recruitment and retention rates. Chapter Five uses the previous chapters' products to determine the relationship between opinion regarding war and Regular Army service, the puzzle that motivates this dissertation.

This study's general finding is that the factors that divided public opinion regarding the Afghanistan and Iraq wars were nearly the same factors that divided Regular Army recruitment and retention rates. Numerous demographic factors consistently structured opinions and service rates between 2000 and 2007. Finally, social distance between the Regular Army and society decreased following the September 11, 2001 attacks but increased about a year after the beginning of the Iraq War through September 2007, the end of this study.

Chapter Two

Explaining the Relationship Between Opinion Regarding War and Regular Army Recruitment and Retention

What explains the relationship between opinion regarding war and Army recruitment and retention? Three literatures combine to provide a potential, interdisciplinary answer: different personal beliefs regarding war (public opinion regarding war), the recruitment and retention effects of different personal and institutional beliefs (person-organization fit theory), and patterns of military service (sociopolitical representation in the Army). This chapter reviews these three literatures and the explanations they offer regarding beliefs or military service. Each literature contributes to understanding part of the puzzle, but none sufficiently explains the entire puzzle. However, a model that combines the explanatory power of all three literatures provides a more complete explanation, and even a prediction, of the relationship between beliefs regarding war and military service. Because these three literatures have not been combined in research—public opinion regarding war, person-organization fit, and sociopolitical representation in the United States Army—analysis of the existing literature is both broad and detailed. Conclusions and expectations about the relationship between public opinion and Army service support the hypotheses stated at the end of this chapter and tested in later chapters.

The literature on public opinion regarding war includes studies of the sources of and differences between individuals' expressed beliefs regarding war. The literature explains how and why this study should

expect between-group differences in expressed beliefs regarding the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Second, the person-organization fit literature examines how and why organizations recruit and retain different types of workers. This literature provides the strongest explanatory and predictive link between differences in expressed beliefs and recruitment and retention rate differences. Third, the literature on sociopolitical representation in the Army describes sociopolitical differences between those who choose Army service and the society they serve. The literature describes how studies have examined and reported between-group differences between military members and society. Sociopolitical differences include many measurable factors, such as income, ethnicity, political partisanship, and community connections to military service.

The three literatures combine to build a simple model: Personal beliefs influence personal work choices. Specifically, individuals are more attracted to and are more likely to remain with organizations that best reflect their personal beliefs. In this study, individual expressions of public opinion regarding the Iraq and Afghan wars represent personal beliefs about war. The literature review on sociopolitical representation in the Army adds information about personal attitudes and historical trends regarding Army service generally. People express and demonstrate different propensity to serve in the Army, regardless of an ongoing war. During war, people further understand that soldiers fight and die in the wars about which they hold different personal beliefs. The Army should recruit and retain fewer people whose personal beliefs are unfavorable regarding war and military service. The Army should recruit and retain

more people whose personal beliefs are relatively favorable regarding military service and war. Survey results make easy the identification of demographics of individuals with relatively negative and positive beliefs regarding military service and war. Community demographics are simply an aggregate of the individuals living in the community. Communities with higher and lower values on theoretically relevant demographic factors should also reveal trends of lower and higher active-duty United States Army recruitment and retention rates.

Literature Review: Public Opinion Regarding War

The literature on United States public opinion regarding war focuses primarily on answering one broad question: What influences domestic support for war? Studies within the literature propose and test many potential determinants of public support for war. These studies identify which factors may influence between-group differences in public opinion regarding war. This review provides theoretical and practical support for selecting factors that relate to between-group differences in expressed public opinion regarding war. In later chapters, the factors that relate to differences in expressed public opinion regarding war are compared to factors that relate to between-group differences in active-duty United States Army recruitment and retention rates.

Multiple factors affecting public opinion regarding war. Early research regarding the American public's foreign policy attitudes generally argued that the public was ill-informed, held seemingly disjointed beliefs, and did not rely on foreign policy attitudes in determining their vote choice, implying that much of the public held

weak, changeable beliefs.[13] The policy implication of these findings was that political leaders could act to strengthen the public's resolve—the "rally 'round-the-flag" effect—and pursue war with few real constraints.[14] Over the next few decades, researchers built a consensus that the United States public is more rational than not.

The public is capable of making decisions based on the foreign policy information it receives. It is also capable of changing those decisions based on new information.[15] Flexibility in expressed personal

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[13] G. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1950); W. Lippmann, *Essays in the Public Philosophy* (New York: Macmillan, 1955); A. Campbell, P. Converse, W. Miller, and D. Stokes. *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960); R. Lane, *Political Ideology: Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does* (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1962); P. Converse, "The nature of belief systems in mass publics." In *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. David Apter (New York: Free Press, 1996); H. McClosky, "Consensus and ideology in American politics," *American Political Science Review* 58, no. 2 (1964); D. Stokes, "Some dynamic elements of contests for the presidency," *American Political Science Review* 60, no. 1 (1966); R. Lane, *Political Man* (New York: Free Press, 1972); and D. Driver, "The military mind: A reassessment of the ideological roots of American military professionalism," in *American Civil-Military Relations*, ed. S. Nielsen and D. Snider (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press).

[14] S. Verba and others, "Public opinion and the war in Vietnam," *The American Political Science Review* 61, no. 2 (1967); and K. Waltz, *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and British Experience* (New York: Little, Brown, 1967).

[15] J. Hurwitz and M. Peffley, "How are foreign policy attitudes structured? A hierarchical model," *The American Political Science Review* 81, no. 4 (1987); Ibid., "The means and ends of foreign policy as determinants of presidential support," *American Journal of Political Science* 31, no. 2 (1987); R. Shapiro and B. Page, "Foreign policy and the rational public," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 32, no. 2 (1988); E. Wittkopf, *Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990); S. Popkin, *The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); B. Page and R. Shapiro, "Changes in Americans' policy preferences, 1935-1979," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 46, no. 1 (1992); Ibid., *The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans' Policy Preferences* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); M. Peffley and J. Hurwitz, "Models of attitude constraint in foreign

opinion does not mean that individuals respond to survey questions irrationally. Rather, individuals consider numerous factors before expressing a personal opinion belief.

Public opinion regarding war responds to a wide range of factors. *Time* is a factor in every war. The literature concludes that it is possible that time combined with the costs of war has a negative, "war-weariness" influence on public opinion, whether casualties and financial costs are high or low. No study, however, argues that time alone is a factor. Even in a long war, the length of the conflict is not as important as one or more of the factors discussed below. The literature cites seven factors, beyond time, that condition public support for war: the stakes involved; the principal policy objective; domestic elite consensus; multilateral support; sociopolitical demographics; judgments of success; and perceived costs. Complementary and competing research finds each factor having some level of independent effect on individual expressions of public opinion regarding war.

The stakes involved. A commonly cited factor is the *stakes involved* in the war, with stakes used to define how vital an effort an individual views the ongoing war. The argument is that individuals will maintain their support for war if they believe vital stakes are involved in the war. In Feaver's, Gelpi's, and Reifler's analysis of public support for

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affairs," *Political Behavior* 15, no. 1 (1993); P. Sniderman, "The new look in public opinion research," in *The State of The Discipline II*, ed. A. Finifter (Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association, 1993); O. Holsti, *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy* (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 1996); R. Lau and D. Redlawsk. "Voting correctly," *American Political Science Review* 91, no. 3 (1997); and A. Lupia and M. McCubbins, *The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know?* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

war and casualties, they state that this argument borders on tautology, since one way to be certain that the public views the war or mission as vital is the level of casualties the public is willing to tolerate.[16] Stakes involved is still a useful factor: A model should expect that the correlation between an individual's belief about the stakes involved and the number of casualties he or she is willing to tolerate is strongly positive—as perceived stakes increase, willingness to tolerate casualties increase. If the correlation was anything but strongly positive, it would raise an interesting issue for further research: How and why does an individual believe that the stakes involved are low but also express a willingness to tolerate high casualty counts (and vice versa)? The stakes factor remains a useful factor if it is considered one of a number of factors the public uses to determine its level of support—strong, moderate, or weak—for a war.

The principal policy objective. A second factor is the *principal policy objective* pursued in the war, which can range from the more traditional "foreign policy restraint" to "internal political change."[17] Foreign policy restraint missions include coercion to stop hostile or adversarial actions and missions viewed as traditional uses of military force and related closely to the protection of vital United States interests.

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[16] C. Gelpi and others, *Paying the Human Costs of War: American Public Opinion and Casualties in Military Conflicts* (Princeton: The Princeton University Press, 2009): 11.

[17] B. Jentleson, "The pretty prudent public: Post post-Vietnam American opinion on the use of military force," *International Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 1 (1992); B. Jentleson and R. Britton, "Still pretty prudent: Post post-Vietnam American public opinion on the use of military force," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no. 4 (1998); and R. Eichenberg, "Victory has many friends: U.S. public opinion and the use of military force, 1981-2005," *International Security* 30, no. 1 (2005).

Because of this connection to protecting vital interests, the research argues that individuals are very supportive of war related to foreign policy restraint objectives. Individuals view internal political change such as efforts to establish a democracy in place of an autocracy as risky ventures tangentially related to vital United States interests, the research argues.[18] Accordingly, public support falls rapidly, especially with casualties. The problem with the principal policy objective factor is that the military mission's objective is subject to framing by multiple and often competing actors. Research shows that how a mission is framed—as foreign policy restraint or internal political change—strongly influences individuals' opinions about the mission. Research also shows that the first frame adopted is exceedingly difficult to change regardless of facts that could encourage adoption of a new frame. For these reasons, the principal policy objective could be used as one factor in the analysis, but it would vary according to the individual's chosen definition of the objective.

Elite consensus. Third, some researchers have found that *elite consensus* can sway public opinion regarding war.[19] Some studies refer to the effect that elite consensus has on public opinion as elite cue

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[18] *Americans on Promoting Democracy* (Menlo Park: Knowledge Networks, 2005).

[19] E. Larson, *Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for U.S. Military Operations* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996); Ibid., "Ends and means in the democratic conversation: Understanding the role of casualties in support of U.S. military operations" (Ph.D. diss., RAND Graduate Institute, 1996); and Ibid., "Putting Theory to Work: Diagnosing Public Opinion on the U.S. Intervention in Bosnia," in *Being Useful: Policy Relevance and International Relations Theory*, ed. M. Nincic and J. Lepgold (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000).

theory. In studies of domestic war support, domestic politics includes the nature of government, public opinion, the media, and domestic social change. The most important factor associated with the nature of government is elite political consensus concerning the war at hand. The argument is straightforward: Under elite consensus, public support is robust and broad; under elite division, casualty sensitivity is high but fractured.[20] Eric Larson finds that domestic elite consensus, primarily among United States Congress politicians, can sustain high public support for war even during costly wars. On the other hand, disagreement and even relatively few casualties caused public support to fall quickly.

Studies label elite political consensus differently, such as patterns of elite conflict[21] and partisanship.[22] However, every study focusing on elite consensus argues that almost every expression of public opinion or potential influence on public opinion is moderated by partisan projection effects. It is now widely accepted that individuals are highly sophisticated and that they form rational and coherent foreign policy attitudes reflected in public opinion polls.[23] Especially relevant to this study is the

[20] Larson, *Casualties and Consensus*; and J. Burk, "Public support for peacekeeping operations in Lebanon and Somalia," *Political Science Quarterly* 114 (1999).
[21] A. Berinsky, "Assuming the costs of war: Events, elites, and American public support for military conflict," *The Journal of Politics* 69.
[22] J. Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
[23] J. Aldrich, C. Gelpi, P. Feaver, J. Reifler, and K. Sharp, "Foreign Policy and the Electoral Connection," *Annual Review of Political Science* 9 (2006).

finding that one's political ideology strongly conditions individual opinions and voting choices ultimately made.[24]

The theoretical argument for the influence of elite consensus and discourse over domestic war support is simple.[25] The volume of elite discourse interacts with an individual's political awareness and predispositions. The interaction compels individuals to favor the elite political position that coincides with their predisposition. If elite discourse is in consensus supporting war, then the broad public will support war. If elites do not broadly support war, then a political polarization pattern will form.

Even when political awareness is low or absent, the public still follows the lead of politicians with whom they identify.[26] If elite discourse is one-sided, with one political elite from one party very vocal and the other relatively silent, the public still receives a strong cue about the position the silent elites are taking.[27] The result remains a polarized pattern of opinion concerning support for war.

Burden sharing. A fourth factor is *burden sharing or multilateral support*.[28] Multilateral support can serve as a cue that a wider range of

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[24] M. Fiorina, *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981).
[25] Zaller.
[26] A. Lupia, "Shortcuts versus encyclopedias: Information and voting behavior in California insurance reform elections," *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 1 (1994); Popkin; and P. Sniderman, R. Brody, and P. Tetlock, *Reasoning and Choice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
[27] A. Berinsky, "Assuming the costs of war: Events, elites, and American public support for military conflict," *The Journal of Politics* 69 (2007).
[28] S. Kull, I. Destler, and C. Ramsay, *The Foreign Policy Gap: How Policymakers Misread the Public* (University of Maryland: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, 1997); S. Kull and I.

elites support the ongoing war. It can signal that the United States is not alone in determining the war's importance and bearing the war's costs. Signals of international support can increase domestic support for war.

Sociopolitical demographics. Fifth, a range of *sociopolitical demographics* affect the public's support for war. Consistently, a respondent's race and gender relate to support for war and casualty sensitivity. White, non-Hispanic Americans are more supportive of war and less sensitive to casualties than African-Americans.[29] Men are less sensitive to casualties than are women and express greater support for war.[30]

Social distance is a concept that relates to different levels of sociopolitical demographics across communities or groups of people. Social distance is the frequency and intensity of interactions and feelings of mutual understanding between communities. Social distance, generated by sociopolitical demographic differences, affects public

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Destler, *Misreading the Public: The Myth of a New Isolationism* (Washington, District of Columbia: Brookings, 1999); and S. Kull and C. Ramsay, "A rejoinder from Kull and Ramsay," *International Studies Perspectives* 1, no. 2 (2000).

[29] Verba and others, "Public opinion and the war in Vietnam"; S. Gartner and others, "All politics are local: Local losses and individual attitudes toward the Vietnam War," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41, no. 5 (1997); M. Nincic and D. Nincic, "Race, gender, and war," *Journal of Peace Research* 39, no. 5 (2002); P. Feaver and C. Gelpi, *Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004); Eichenberg, "Victory has many friends"; and S. Gartner and G. Segura, "All politics are still local: The Iraq War and the 2006 midterm elections," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 41, no. 1 (2008).

[30] M. Bendyna and others, "Gender Differences in Public Attitudes toward the Gulf War: A Test of Competing Hypotheses," *Social Science Journal* 33, no. 1 (1996); Gartner and others, "All politics are local"; Nincic and Nincic, "Race, gender, and war"; Feaver and Gelpi, *Choosing Your Battles*; Eichenberg, "Victory has many friends"; and Gartner and Segura, "All politics are still local."

opinion regarding war.[31] The more socially removed a respondent is from the war and its costs, the more robust the respondent's support for an ongoing war will be. Studies have shown that respondents from counties with higher casualty rates were more opposed to the Vietnam War than respondents from counties with lower casualty rates. Other studies discuss the absence of elites and their children from military service. These studies generally juxtapose service and casualties before and during the Vietnam War with contemporary service and casualties.[32]

The concept of the social distance factor is that increased social distance between society and the military makes those not connected to the military through active military service either indifferent to or more supportive of war. A person may oppose an ongoing war, but not strongly or actively enough to physically protest the war. Another person, because he or she has no close social relationship to the war and its costs, may

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[31] D. Rugg and H. Cantril, "Analysis of poll results: War attitudes of families with potential soldiers," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 4, no. 2 (1940); E. Bogardus, "Measurement of personal-group relations," *Sociometry* 10, no. 4 (1947); C. Moskos, "Grave decision: When Americans accept casualties," *Chicago Tribune* (December 12, 1995): 25; Ibid., "Casualties and the will to win," *Parameters* 26, no. 4 (1996); Gartner and others, "All politics are local"; C. Rangel, "Military conscription: Mandatory service might make hawks think twice," *Atlanta Journal-Constitution* (January 14, 2003): 21A; S. Gartner, "Making the international local: The terrorist attack on USS Cole, local casualties, and media coverage," *Political Communication* 21, no. 2 (2004); D. Karol and E. Miguel, "The electoral cost of war: Iraq casualties and the 2004 U.S. presidential election," *The Journal of Politics* 69, no. 3 (2007); Gartner and Segura, "All politics are still local"; and N. Karakayali, "Social distance and affective orientations." *Sociological Forum* 23, no. 3 (2009).

[32] K. Roth-Douquet and F. Schaeffer, *AWOL: The Unexcused Absence of America's Upper Class from Military Service—and How It Hurts Our Country* (New York: Harper, 2006); M. Shields, *American Elite: AWOL from U.S. War in Iraq* (Accessed December 15, 2010); available from http://www.creators.com/opinion/mark-shields/american-elite-awol-from-u-s-war-in-iraq.html; and Kriner and Shen, *The Casualty Gap*.

express greater support for war than if he or she had a close relationship with those fighting the war.

Judgments of success. Sixth, *judgments of success* condition support for war.[33] When judgments of success are low, public support for an ongoing war decreases quickly, especially with casualties. When judgments of success are high, even significant casualties have little effect on public support for war. Judgment can be either prospective or retrospective, depending on the survey question wording and the individual's own frame. The judgment could rest on a forecast of how the war will continue or end. It could be a hindsight appraisal of any other factor such as casualties incurred or recent successes or setbacks. Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler (*Paying the Human Costs of War*) identified expectations of future success as more important than retrospective judgments, but no consensus exists across the literature.

Perceived costs. Seventh, the *perceived costs* of war, including casualties, condition public support for war. There is clear contention among politicians, academics, and the media concerning the public's cost tolerance. Some argue that the public is not willing to tolerate more than very few military casualties in military operations. The conventional wisdom is that the public's unwillingness to tolerate even minor

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[33] S. Kull, "Review of Eric Larson's casualties and consensus," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 61, no. 4 (1997); P. Feaver and C. Gelpi, "How many deaths are acceptable? A surprising answer," *Washington Post* (November 7, 1999): B3; Ibid., *Choosing Your Battles*; P. Feaver, "To maintain support, show us what success means," *Washington Post* (October 7, 2001): B1; J. van der Meulen and M. de Konink, "Risky missions: Dutch public opinion on peacekeeping in the Balkans," in *Public Opinion and The International Use of Force*, ed. P. Everts and P. Isernia (London: Routledge, 2001); Eichenberg, "Victory has many friends"; and Gelpi and others, *Paying the Human Costs of War*.

casualties has historically been manifested in civic action, such as protests or elections; in the media; and in politicians' speeches. A study of the United States Civil War found that the electoral results for incumbent politicians from higher-casualty counties were significantly lowered by those casualties,[34] and similar results have been found in studies of the 2004 election. The presidents who led the United States into the Korean War and escalated the Vietnam War each lost political support and failed to serve a second term. Some claim that the United States' withdrawals from Lebanon following the Beirut barracks' bombing and from Somalia following the fighting of October 1993 highlighted the United States' unwillingness to bear the political costs of many casualties. It is likely that a host of foreigners recently based their political strategies on this conventional wisdom, including Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosevic, and Osama bin Laden.[35]

The media frequently reports on casualty aversion in the United States or the negative implications of ongoing casualties, whether the Pentagon's, politicians', or the public's generally.[36] The media reported

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[34] Carson and others, "The impact of national tides and district-level effects on electoral outcomes: The U.S. Congressional elections of 1862-1863," *American Journal of Political Science* 45, no. 4 (2001).

[35] O. bin Laden, *Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places* (accessed January 19, 2011); available from http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html; D. Zucchino, "In the Taliban's eyes, bad news was good," *Los Angeles Times*, June 3, 2002, A1; R. Lacquement, "The casualty-aversion myth," *Naval War College Review* 37, no. 1 (2004); and T. Shanker, "Regime war thought unlikely, Iraqis tells U.S," *New York Times* (February 12, 2004): A1.

[36] J. Brown, "Risks of waging only risk-free war," *Christian Science Monitor* (May 24, 2000): 1; M. Kilian, "A question of casualties in Iraq, " *Chicago Tribune* (December 30, 2002): 1; E. Schmitt and T. Shanker, "U.S. refines plan for war in cities," *New York Times* (October 21, 2002):

frequently on Iraq War casualties and the killing of Pat Tillman in Afghanistan and explicitly or implicitly addressed the casualties' potential political costs.[37] Observers did suspect that President Bush would suffer at the ballot box, but he won reelection and served a second term, defying the Korean and Vietnam War examples.

The conventional wisdom concerning public opinion regarding casualties and their effect on elections has been challenged strongly within the last decade by studies arguing that the public uses a cost-benefit analysis in determining whether to support a costly conflict or not. That analysis considers more than casualties. Individuals choose the weights they apply to each factor before expressing an opinion. The public is also quite aware of the general level of casualties suffered, if not the exact number.[38] The public does not support war without a decent understanding of the war's costs. Accordingly, the public is more perceptive or shrewd than some assume. Because the public is shrewder than assumed, politicians may not be as constrained by looming or actual casualties in conflict. The public is capable of supporting costly

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A1; B. Knickerbocker, "Pentagon's quietest calculation: The casualty count," *Christian Science Monitor* (January 28, 2003): 1; D. McManus, "Public's high expectations might lead to a hard crash," *Los Angeles Times* (March 24, 2003): A7; T. Ricks, "Duration of war key to U.S. victory," *Washington Post* (March 19, 2003): A19; Ibid., "U.S. casualties expose risks, raise doubts about strategy," *Washington Post* (March 24, 2003): 1; and P. Boyer, "The new war machine," *New Yorker* (June 30, 2003): 54.

[37] L. Klarevas, "How many deaths can Americans take?" *Newsday* (November 12, 2003): 23; R. Morin and C. Deane, "Support for Bush declines as casualties mount in Iraq," *Washington Post* (July 12, 2003): A1; and M. Matthews and T. Bowman, "Fears of another Somalia stir," *Baltimore Sun* (April 1, 2004): A1.

[38] S. Bennett and R. Flickinger, "Americans' Knowledge of U.S. Military Deaths in Iraq, April 2004 to April 2008," *Armed Forces and Society* 35, no. 3 (2009).

military operations. The electorate does not necessarily punish the president.

An example of other factors being more important than costs is that "the public's expectation of whether the mission will be successful trumps other considerations" in determining robustness of support.[39] Further, an analysis of presidential voting results showed that "expectations of success still matter, but the most important factor appears to be whether the public views the initial decision to start the war as correct."[40] The implications are powerful. The strongest predictor of an individual's support for war is the individual's determination of whether the war is "right" or not. Casualties do not automatically collapse public support. With robust but falling public support, the president can prosecute a war as casualties accumulate.

Expectations and opinion regarding war. In review, the literature proposes seven general factors individuals may consider when determining their support for war. Individuals may include other factors in their voting and opinion calculus, such as their economic circumstances.[41] However, the literature also details that foreign policy evaluations have just as strong or stronger influence on presidential

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[39] Gelpi and others, *Paying the Human Costs of War*, 2.
[40] Ibid.
[41] D. Kinder and D. Kiewet, "Economic grievances and political behavior: The role of personal discontent and collective judgments in congressional voting," *American Journal of Political Science* 23 (1979); Ibid., "Sociotropic politics: The American case," *British Journal of Political Science* 11 (1981); and D. Kiewet, *Macroeconomics and Micropolitics: The Electoral Effects of Economic Issues* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983).

approval ratings and vote choices during wartime.[42] The seven general factors—possible dependent variables—are stakes involved, principal policy objective, elite consensus, burden sharing or multilateral support, sociopolitical demographics, judgments of success, and perceived costs. This study considers these seven factors when producing the measurable variables used to analyze the relationship between public opinion regarding war and active-duty United States Army recruitment and retention rates.

This research does not conduct a contemporary public opinion survey but relies upon completed surveys to determine which factors were most clearly related to support for or opposition to the Iraq and Afghanistan wars between 2001 and 2008. Because the surveys were not written to clearly test each of the seven factors, only a few of the factors listed immediately above are clearly represented in public opinion questions, their answers, or the individuals' expressed sociopolitical demographics requested at the end of each survey interview. The factor most clearly present in public opinion survey data is the sociopolitical demographics factor.

A few questions hint at the other six factors, and this study discusses results related to those factors; however, it is up to the individual researcher to determine how well they reflect any of the other

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[42] J. Aldrich, J. Sullivan, and E. Borgida, "Foreign affairs and issue voting: Do presidential candidates waltz before a blind audience?" *American Political Science Review* 83, no. 1 (1989); C. Wilcox and D. Allsop, "Economic and foreign policy as sources of Reagan support," *Western Political Quarterly* 44, no. 4 (1991); and M. Nickelsburg and H. Norpath, "Commander-in-chief or chief economist? The President in the eye of the public," *Electoral Studies* 19, nos. 2-3 (2000).

six factors. It is not clear, especially without controlling the order of questions asked in the survey or obtaining details about the root of the respondent's answer, that responses to these questions definitively represent, for example, a singular expression of the individual's opinion regarding the wars' costs or the respondent's belief about elite consensus. Ultimately, the public opinion trends discussed later in this study tend to make detailed consideration of the other six factors less important (but not less interesting): *Between-group differences in expressed public opinion regarding these wars were clearly related to certain sociopolitical factors, were expressed early in the wars, and remained the trend throughout, regardless of the type of question asked.* Chapter Four presents a review of trends in public opinion regarding the Afghan and Iraq wars. The trends help infer how the sociopolitical demographic and other factors relate to between-group differences in expressions of public opinion regarding war and active-duty United States Army recruitment and retention.

The next section is a review of the person-organization fit literature. The literature studies the relationship between individual and organizational beliefs and recruitment and retention. The review builds another part of the study's model. It helps explain and predict the likely relationship between expressed public opinion regarding war and active-duty United States Army recruitment and retention.

Literature Review: Person-organization Fit

Career-oriented military personnel hold generally distinct values compared to both civilian counterparts and non-career-oriented military

personnel.[43] Studies have consistently shown that military personnel generally express more patriotic, nationalistic, conservative, and traditional feelings or beliefs than the average citizen or politician.[44] Belief differences exist between military and civilian elites[45] and between military career-minded high school seniors and other students.[46] These value and belief differences are numerous, and many relate to national security. The literature regarding organizational recruitment (from here on, selection) and retention explains why belief differences are not surprising. The literature helps predict what this study should expect regarding the relationship between public opinion regarding war and active-duty United States Army service.

For about one hundred years, sociologists and psychologists have built a substantial body of evidence that individuals recruited into and desiring to remain in different occupations and organizations also tend to hold different beliefs.[47] Along with selection and retention, there is also substantial evidence that organizational socialization influences how

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[43] e.g., J. Bachman and others, *The All-Volunteer Force: A Study of Ideology in the Military* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977).
[44] J. Dorman, "ROTC cadet attitudes: A product of socialization or self-selection?" *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 4 (1976).
[45] Bachman and others, *The All-Volunteer Force*; O. Holsti, "A widening gap between the U.S. military and civilian society? Some evidence, 1976-96," *International Security* 23 (1998); and Ibid., "Of chasms and convergences: Attitudes and beliefs of civilian and military elites at the start of the new millennium," in *Soldiers and Civilians*, ed. Feaver and Kohn.
[46] J. Burk, "Patriotism and the all-volunteer force, " *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 12 (1984) and J. Bachman and others, "Self-selection, socialization, and distinctive military values," *Armed Forces and Society* 20 (1987).
[47] A. Kristof-Brown and others, "Consequences of individuals' fit at work: a meta-analysis of person-job, person-organization, person-group, and person-supervisor fit," *Personnel Psychology* 58 (2005).

attractive an organization is to different employees based on those employees' beliefs and the beliefs the organization promotes through formal or informal socialization processes. Throughout, employees perceive how well their own beliefs "fit" with organizational beliefs.

When prospective workers and organizations possess similar values, beliefs, or attitudes, attraction between the person and organization is highest.[48] This is the similarity-attraction effect based on social psychology research. Social psychology research has found that people with similar personalities are more attracted to each other than people with different personalities.[49] People feel this attraction because similar personalities tend to predict that people will hold similar beliefs regarding a variety of important issues.[50] At the organizational level, when personal and organizational characteristics match, people believe that the organization values the same beliefs they personally value.

Other measurements and relationships between entities other than the individual worker and employer may influence perceived fit. People take into account their perceptions of how well they would fit in

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[48] e.g., D. Cable and T. Judge, "Person–organization fit, job choice decisions, and organizational entry," *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes* 67, no. 3 (1996) and Ibid., "Interviewers' perceptions of person-organization fit and organizational selection decisions," *Journal of Applied Psychology* 82, no. 4 (1997).

[49] D. Byrne, *The Attraction Paradigm* (New York: Academic Press, 1971) and A. Kristof, "Person-organization fit: An integrative review of its conceptualizations, measurement, and implications," *Personnel Psychology* 49, no. 1 (1996).

[50] R. Montoya and R. Horton, "On the importance of cognitive evaluation as a determinant of interpersonal attraction in the similarity effect," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 86 (2004) and E. Kausel and J. Slaughter, "Narrow personality traits and organizational attraction: evidence for the complementary hypothesis," *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes* 114 (2011).

certain jobs. Studies measure this fit in a couple of ways: first, how well the person's skills, abilities, and knowledge match the job's requirements; and second, how well the job fulfills the person's individual needs and preferences.[51] People also make decisions about perceived fit based on their supervisors and coworkers. If people perceive they belong—willingly or unwillingly—to an outgroup, perceived fit and attraction are lower. When perceiving fit, people make a very direct calculation of the compatibility between their personal beliefs and the organization's. For example, people report how well their beliefs match the organization's beliefs with respect to teamwork, ethics, respect, necessity of shared sacrifice, and goals and missions.[52]

Perceptions of fit matter to both individuals and organizations. When prospective workers perceive similarities to an organization, they expect a supportive relationship with the organization. Conversely, dissimilarities cause people to believe they will receive less organizational support.[53] Strong similarities also have significant effects on job offers, job acceptance, and retention.[54] Fit is also significantly related to worker

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[51] Kristof-Brown and others, "Consequences of individuals' fit at work" and W. Vandenabeele, "Government calling: public service motivation as an element in selecting government as an employer of choice," *Public Administration* 86, no. 4 (2008).

[52] B. Pfieffelmann and others, "Recruiting on corporate web sites: perceptions of fit and attraction," *International Journal of Selection and Assessment* 18, no. 1 (2010).

[53] D. Cable and D. DeRue, "The convergent and discriminant validity of subjective fit perceptions," *Journal of Applied Psychology* 87 (2002); D. Cable and J. Edwards, "Complementary and supplementary fit: A theoretical and empirical integration," *Journal of Applied Psychology* 89 (2004); and Kausel and Slaughter, "Narrow personality traits and organizational attraction."

[54] B. Schneider, "The people make the place," *Personnel Psychology* 40 (1987); J. Chatman, "Matching people and organizations: selection and

longevity, performance, happiness, and commitment, as well as organizational effectiveness, productivity, and cohesion.[55] Individuals' differences in perceived fit are widely recognized to have differential selection and retention effects. The following sections review relevant selection and retention studies. Each section includes a discussion of effects seen in previous studies of military samples.

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socialization in public accounting firms," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 36, no. 3 (1991); D. Turban and T.L. Keon, "Organization attractiveness: An interactionist perspective," *Journal of Applied Psychology* 78 (1993); Cable and Judge, "Person–organization fit, job choice decisions, and organizational entry"; Kristof, "Person-organization fit"; Cable and Judge, "Interviewers' perceptions of person-organization fit"; B. Schneider and others, "Personality and organizations: A test of the homogeneity of personality hypothesis," *Journal of Applied Psychology* 83 (1998); A. Van Vianen, "Person-organization fit: The match between newcomers' and recruiters' preferences for organizational cultures," *Personnel Psychology* 53 (2000); K. Ehrhart and J. Ziegert, "Why are individuals attracted to organizations?" *Journal of Management* 31, no. 6 (2005); and D. Coldwell and others, "The effects of person-organization ethical fit on employee attraction and retention: towards a testable explanatory model," *Journal of Business Ethics* 78 (2008).

[55] R. Burke and E. Descza, "Preferred organizational climates of Type A individuals," *Journal of Vocational Behavior* 21 (1982); R. Bretz and others, "Do people make the place? An examination of the attraction-selection-attrition hypothesis," *Personnel Psychology* 42 (1989); C. Ostroff, "The relationship between person-environment congruence and organizational effectiveness," *Group and Organization Management* 18 (1993); Turban and Keon, "Organization attractiveness"; R. Bretz and T. Judge, "Person–organization fit and the theory of work adjustment: Implications for satisfaction, tenure, and career success," *Journal of Vocational Behavior* 44 (1994); B. Schneider, "The ASA framework: An update," *Personnel Psychology* 48 (1995); Kristof, "Person-organization fit"; B. Schneider and others, "Attraction-selection-attrition: Toward a person-environment psychology of organizations," in *Person-Environment Psychology: New Directions and Perspectives*, eds. B. Walsh and K. Craig (Mahwah, New Jersey: Erlbaum, 2000); M. Verquer and others, "A metaanalysis of relations between person–organization fit and work attitudes," *Journal of Vocational Behavior* 63 (2003); and Pfieffelmann and others, "Recruiting on corporate web sites."

Selection. No mechanism arbitrarily assigns people to different employers; people self-select into the organizations for which they desire to work, and organizations select them (institutional selection).

> Self-selection, put simply, is the process by which people select their environments. This could entail, for example, a college student selecting his or her major, a recent graduate deciding which company to work for, or a seasoned professional choosing among his or her most recent job offers. … [The] organizational and vocational literature … suggests that people tend to select environments that "fit" their work-related values. … [People] tend to select environments that 'fit' their sociopolitical views.[56]

People determine organizational attraction because of their perception of the fit or similarity between their own beliefs and the organization's.[57] Because attitudes and beliefs are essential and generally persistent aspects of peoples' perceptions of themselves, they strongly influence individual behavior. "Past research and even simple intuition suggest that when our values and priorities match the values and priorities of a particular organization, we are happier and more likely to maintain an association with that organization."[58] Attitudes and beliefs are also a fundamental element of organizational culture,[59] and even though studies do not broadly use a single definition of organizational culture,

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[56] H. Haley and J. Sidanius, "Person-organization congruence and the maintenance of group-based social hierarchy: a social dominance perspective," *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations* 8, no. 2 (2005): 192.
[57] Schneider, "The ASA framework" and Cable and Judge, "Interviewers' perceptions of person-organization fit."
[58] Chatman, "Matching people and organizations," 60.
[59] S. Barley and others, "Cultures of culture: Academics, practitioners, and the pragmatics of normative control," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 33 (1988).

all of them agree that organizational culture influences how well people perceive their fit with the organization.

People self-select into organizations, and organizations (usually their recruiters) use their perception of the people's fit with their organization's values and needs to offer jobs to potential workers.

> Just as people appear to be drawn toward organizational environments that "match" their basic values, so too do organizations seem inclined to recruit and select attitudinal "matches." It is posited that institutions will be inclined to do this because they will function most smoothly and effectively when their own values are mirrored in their employees.[60]

Organizations also perceive belief fit and attempt to select people who possess attributes the organization finds desirable. Organizations place higher values on potential employees who "fit" the organization, and assessments of fit are a common measure used to calculate the possible employee's potential value to the organization.[61]

Selection studies. Studies exploring selection effects are perhaps the most numerous of all studies examining the various effects of personal fit with organizations. These studies include examinations of recruitment policies and outcomes and values or attitudinal convergence between those attracted to certain organizations and those who are not attracted. Many studies find that perceptions of fit have statistically significant effects even when many control variables are included in models, such as socioeconomic background, ethnicity, parental demographics, gender, and prospective pay and benefits. Numerous

[60] Haley and Sidanius, 193.
[61] Haley and Sidanius; and van Vianen, 115.

studies exist of cadets', young enlisted personnel's, officers', and career military personnel's beliefs, values, and attitudes.[62] These and other studies directly and indirectly touch on the selection and retention effects of perceived person-organization fit. This section will review the studies that illuminate selection effects.

Many studies note that "soldier" is a unique and specific occupation, into which people enter knowing that they will receive at least a minimal amount of training to prepare them to kill another human being and knowing that they may possibly die in combat. Both the minimal training requirement and the possibility of death are more salient during a time of war, such as the period this study covers. Rosenberg was one of the earliest scholars to connect different values and attitudes to different occupations.[63] These studies, to paraphrase, view soldiers and cadets "as preparing for a specific occupation, the profession of arms, which some analysts have seen as characterized by conformity [among other values], and for attendance at an educational institution [or location] mandated to train people for that profession."[64]

Belief studies include that of Bachman, Sigelman, and Diamond, who studied the attitudes of high school seniors toward military

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[62] e.g., Dorman, "ROTC cadet attitudes"; Bachman and others, "Self-selection, socialization, and distinctive military values"; G. Stevens and others, "Military academies as instruments of value change," *Armed Forces and Society* 20 (1994); and J. Hammill and others, "Self-selection and parental socioeconomic status as determinants of the values of West Point cadets," *Armed Forces and Society* 22 (1995).
[63] M. Rosenberg, *Occupations and Values* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957).
[64] Hammill and others, "Self-selection and parental socioeconomic status as determinants of the values of West Point cadets," 112.

service.[65] They found a distinct difference between those not expecting to serve, those expecting to serve but not for a career, and those expecting to serve for a career:

> With each higher level of commitment to service, there are correspondingly more positive views of military job opportunities and fair treatment, greater desires for increased military spending and influence, more support for military intervention and supremacy, and greater endorsement of unquestioning military obedience.[66]

They argued that the distinctive values espoused by high-propensity high school seniors were so common amongst that group that self-selection rather than any socialization mechanism, including their parents, could have produced them. In short, value and belief similarities between high-propensity high school seniors and soldiers are evidence that the primary source of similarity is a result of "those who chose to join the armed forces rather than from events (screening and/or socialization) that occur thereafter."[67]

Stevens, Rosa, and Gardner studied a group of Coast Guard Academy cadets and also argued that self-selection resulted in a common group of values.[68] Again, they rejected the argument that the academy caused the consistency in values. They also noted that the academy reinforced values the academy viewed as favorable to Coast Guard service: "Military academy socialization … may not 'create' a new value

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[65] Bachman and others, "Self-selection, socialization, and distinctive military values."
[66] Ibid., 177.
[67] Ibid., 171.
[68] Stevens and others, "Military academies as instruments of value change."

set for the individual … as much as it clarifies and solidifies those values that the new cadet brings to the academy."[69]

Hammill, Segal, and Segal studied the values of freshman cadets in the West Point class of 1992.[70] They included numerous control variables in their regression analysis, including parental socioeconomic status and whether the cadet came from a military family. They found strong evidence that cadets valued conformity over independence and self-direction and that no control variable had a significant influence on cadet values. This means that coming from a military family and varying socioeconomic background had no statistically significant relationship to cadets' preferred values. This also meant that cadets held beliefs similar to career military personnel, as careerists clearly value conformity over independence. This study provided strong evidence of self-selection at work because of the existence of such a consistent group of beliefs among very young cadets.

Snider, Priest, and Lewis studied survey responses of 1,602 academy cadets, 155 Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) cadets, and 52 Duke University students for the purpose of determining how the groups differently conceived of civil-military relations and professional military norms.[71] Because they found distinct value differences between the three groups, they argued that self-selection must have an effect on

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[69] Ibid., 480.
[70] Hammill and others, "Self-selection and parental socioeconomic status."
[71] D. Snider and others, "The civilian-military gap and professional military education at the precommissioning level," *Armed Forces and Society* 27, no. 2 (2001).

who attends the military academies or ROTC instead of civilian university. They point to the importance of values:

> … The tendency of people (not just those in the military) to choose an occupation [is] based on how well its values and perspectives harmonize with those they already hold and have inculcated from family and peers. Thus, it is expected that cadets hold similar views, and that these values differ from those in society who did not choose to pursue a military career. This would occur regardless of whether the cadet had exposure to the military prior to an academy (through prior service or a relative who served in the military) or not.[72]

Bachman and others (2000) produced a study of the distinctive military attitudes of soldiers serving the armed forces between 1976 and 1997.[73]

Bachman and others present a study of change in attitudes between high school seniors who later enlisted in the United States military, entered college, or began working in the civilian sector. Their study illuminates differences in attitudes based on self-selection and socialization. Rohall, Ender, and Matthews note that the studies' authors

> show that what little divide exists between military and civilian attitudes is promulgated via socialization and self-selection, depending on the issue. The authors use survey data from the Monitoring the Future project, comparing male responses to surveys just before high-school graduation [self-selection] and again one or two years later [socialization]. As a result, differences between

[72] Ibid., 253.
[73] J. Bachman and others, "Distinctive military attitudes among U.S. enlistees, 1976-1997: Self-selection versus socialization," *Armed Forces and Society* 26, no. 4 (2000).

time one and time two can be attributed to socialization.[74]

Differences in attitudes that the three sets of high school seniors held when they were seniors and prior to enlistment, college, or joining the workforce is good evidence of self-selection, "differences that precede, and may contribute to, entrance into the military," college, or workforce.[75] Differences in attitudes the three sets held after one or two years along their different paths is good evidence of socialization, "differences that follow, and may result from, joining the armed forces," college, or workforce.[76] The study included responses to surveys between 1976 and 1995 of about 2,000 males total across the three groups.

Their study is unique because the follow-up questions were asked of the former seniors after they entered and had some significant time in their chosen pursuits, whether in the armed forces, college, or the civilian workforce. The surveys asked the same people the same questions before and after the possible treatment effect of years in their chosen pursuit. These before-and-after responses provide evidence for attitudinal differences based, initially, on self-selection and, a year or two later, on socialization, if differences exist. Significant differences, separately attributable to self-selection and socialization, consistently existed between the three groups.

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[74] D. Rohall and others, "The effects of military affiliation, gender, and political ideology on attitudes toward the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq," *Armed Forces and Society* 33, no.1 (2006): 62.
[75] Bachman and others, "Distinctive military attitudes among U.S. enlistees," 563.
[76] Ibid.

For evidence of self-selection, when they were all high school seniors and compared to the seniors who later entered college or joined the workforce, the seniors who later joined the armed forces expressed more preference for military influence in the United States; more preference for increased military spending; more preference for military supremacy over other nations; less preference for unilateral disarmament; more preference for war to protect potentially less-than-vital interests (to protect economic interests, to protect other nations' rights, or not clearly defending against an attack on the United States); and more preference for unquestioning obedience to orders. These statistically significant attitudinal differences existed before the seniors enlisted in the armed forces, entered college, or joined the civilian workforce. The study, therefore, provides strong evidence of self-selection at work when seniors decide to either join the armed forces or enter college.

Trainor studied the attitudes and values expressed by incoming naval academy midshipmen (new recruits), senior academy midshipmen (existing employees), and high school seniors.[77] Trainor found "[significant] differences in the orientations of incoming midshipmen and civilian peers …, indicative of the self-selection and anticipatory socialization effects associated with organizational entry."[78] Incoming midshipmen with the consistently best value congruence with the academy "possessed a strong personal identity associated with work and

[77] S. Trainor, "Differential effects of institutional socialization on value orientations in Naval Academy midshipmen" (Ph.D. diss., University of Maryland, College Park, 2004).
[78] Ibid., 1.

military service. The most significant predictors of this identity or 'professional military career orientation' were strong work beliefs, high officer role identity, and the belief that military service is important."[79] Trainor's study is yet another that finds significant self-selection effects based on individuals' different values, beliefs, or attitudes.

Kleykamp studied the post-graduation activity of 2,074 Texas male high school students who graduated high school in 2002.[80] The study surveyed these males once during high school and again between one and two years later. The surveys included questions about their academic aspirations and post-high school plans. The respondents were placed into four categories: those who enlisted into the military, entered college, joined the workforce, or pursued another activity (a catchall category for anything other than the military, college, or work). This study, much like that of Bachman and others (2000), is very useful because it tracks a single group across time and is able to compare attitudes and beliefs in a baseline period with future action; thus, it is capable of finding evidence of self-selection effects, if they exist.

Kleykamp explored three areas that could influence different military enlistment rates: personal education goals, local military presence, and racial and socioeconomic status. Kleykamp's study is also interesting because it was conducted shortly after the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, a period that this study also covers. There is a trade-off between joining the military, entering college, and

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[79] Ibid.
[80] M. Kleykamp, "College, jobs, or the military? Enlistment during a time of war," *Social Science Quarterly* 87, no. 2 (2006).

entering the labor market. The trade-off could be affected by "the increased number of military deployments and the danger involved, changes in college costs, and changes in the likelihood of youth coming into contact with the military."[81] These changes should have different effects on enlistment rates between different groups of high school students. If they did have an effect, they "altered the propensity of youth to join the armed forces by changing the relative attractiveness of the military compared with other alternatives."[82]

Many high school students plan to attend college, and more would like to attend college given the opportunity. The military competes to attract and retain the same population that seeks to attend college.[83] However, the cost of attending college has grown more rapidly than family income, including potential grants. When students do attend college, they take on more and more debt.[84] Because the GI Bill exists as an alternative way to fund college, and because military members earn income and certain skills during their service, Kleykamp believed that students aspiring to enter college would be more likely to join the military than enter the labor force.[85]

Indeed, Kleykamp's analysis found that:

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[81] Ibid., 274.
[82] Ibid.
[83] Bachman and others, "Distinctive military attitudes among U.S. enlistees" and J. Bachman and others, "Who chooses military service? Correlates of propensity and enlistment in the U.S. Armed Forces," *Military Psychology* 12, no. 1 (2000).
[84] National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education, *Losing Ground: A National Status Report on the Affordability of American Higher Education* (San Jose, California: National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education, 2002).
[85] Kleykamp, 275.

> Educational aspirations exert a significant influence on the decision to join the labor force versus enlist in the armed forces. Young men who aspired to a four-year college degree were roughly half as likely to go to work than to join the military compared with their counterparts who were satisfied with a high school diploma.[86]

Furthermore, Kleykamp found that students who aspired to a four-year college education but did not yet enter college were 50 percent less likely to join the labor force or pursue another activity than join the military. These findings imply that the military is a very attractive initial alternative to college among graduates with high educational goals. One of Kleykamp's respondents stated that "the military is the 'next best thing to college.'"[87]

Kleykamp's study is unique because it included military institutional presence as a possible independent variable affecting enlistment rates. According to Kleykamp, the institutional presence variable:

> … captures the notion that military-enlistment decisions may be affected by exposure to the institution of the military and those who serve on active duty. Because of the significant number of base closings and the reduced size of the military, this exposure has decreased since the early 1990s.[88]

Kleykamp argued that students learn much about the military if they are exposed to those who are familiar with it. Those familiar with the military institution "are a major source of transmission of information and norms

[86] Ibid., 283.
[87] Ibid., 286.
[88] Ibid., 274.

and values regarding military service."[89] These studies found that children from families with an active-duty or veteran parent are significantly more likely to enlist than a random citizen and are significantly more likely to reenlist than are other military members without that prior connection.

Some combination of exposure to the military and parents transferring values and norms to their children likely causes these statistically significant relationships. What Kleykamp finds clearly important, though, is "the declining military service among influencers, suggesting that this circumstance may contribute to declining propensity to enlist among youth."[90] Kleykamp's argument is:

> that low military presence, as measured by the concentration of military members (current or former), would be associated with less social contact with the institution, and that diminished contact with military culture results in little or no knowledge about the reality of military life. With little knowledge, individuals should be less likely to enlist… I expect that lower military presence in a community reduces the propensity to enlist.[91]

Kleykamp operationalized military presence as the county's percentage of total employment that was military employment. This is the same

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[89] Ibid., 275. See also J. Faris, "The All-Volunteer Force: Recruitment from military families," *Armed Forces and Society* 7, no. 4 (1981); Ibid., "Economic and noneconomic factors of personnel recruitment and retention in the All-Volunteer Force," *Armed Forces and Society* 10, no. 2 (1984); R. Kilburn and J. Klerman, *Enlistment Decisions in the 1990s: Evidence from Individual-Level Data* (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1999); and D. Segal and M. Segal, "America's military population," *Population Bulletin* 59, no. 4 (2004).
[90] Kleykamp, 275.
[91] Ibid., 276.

measure this study uses to examine the relationship between military presence and enlistment and reenlistment.

Kleykamp found that military presence has a strong influence on enlistment rates. When military employment increased by one percentage point, the odds of entering college and the odds of entering the labor force both dropped by about 25 percent.[92] Military presence had a statistically significant effect even when controls for having an active-duty or veteran parent were included in the model. The study also found that military presence influenced white, Hispanic, and "other" racial category enlistment rates but not African-American enlistment rates.[93] Two findings are particularly important. First, proximity to military service measured in at least two ways—local military employment and parental service—positively influenced enlistment rates. Second, although they had lower overall propensity to serve than African-Americans, military presence positively influenced enlistment rates among the lowest-propensity racial categories. These two findings combined imply that military presence had a very strong, broad, independent effect on enlistment rates.

The study also found that socioeconomic status, in the presence of many controls including race, influenced enlistment rates. This confirmed other studies' findings that family income, family size, and parental education influenced enlistment rates.[94] Kleykamp notes that

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[92] Ibid., 283.
[93] Ibid., 286.
[94] B. Asch and others, *Attracting College-Bound Youth into the Military: Toward the Development of New Recruiting Policy Options* (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1999); Kilburn and Klerman; and M. Kilburn and B.

the military did not appear to actively target socioeconomically disadvantaged people. Although high-quality high school students (high Armed Forces Qualification Test [AFQT] score, grade point average [GPA], or class rank) were more likely to enter college than the military, they were also more likely to join the military than pursue other work. Many young men did not express that the military was the option of last resort.[95]

These studies detailed different selection effects across groups of people sorted by different characteristics. A consistent finding was that people who feel that they best fit organizations' values, norms, and beliefs select into those organizations at significantly higher rates than those who do not feel the same fit. Kleykamp's findings are that different groups of people—college aspirants not entering college, socioeconomically disadvantaged people, and people likely to be most familiar with the military—enlisted at significantly higher rates. College aspirants and disadvantaged people appeared to use the military as many have suggested previously: The military fit a need or desire for social mobility and an opportunity to attend college. Those most likely to be familiar with the military, as defined by higher levels of veteran presence or military employment, were likely influenced by the feeling that they would also fit into the organization.

Retention – socialization and attrition. The previous section presented a body of evidence regarding differential selection effects.

Asch, *Recruiting Youth in the College Market: Current Practices and Future Policy Options* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003).

[95] Kleykamp, 277.

Furthermore, the review of extant literature found that no peer-reviewed studies claim individual differences have no effect on selection rates into different organizations. This section continues the analysis by turning to employee retention, a process that includes socialization and attrition. Examples in this section include socialization and attrition effects reported in previous studies of the armed forces.

Socialization. Socialization is the shaping of organizational members' values and attitudes by organizational leadership, rules, incentives, norms, and peer pressure.[96] Studies that attempt to discern socialization effects rather than selection effects are attempting to determine how feelings of person-organization fit are an outcome in addition to an antecedent condition.[97] Socialization changes perceptions of fit, while selection is a function of perceptions of fit.

Socialization is an important organizational process, whether it is a formalized process or not.[98] Organizations socialize their newest members through established programs and through daily contact with

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[96] Haley and Sidanius, 194. "Institutional socialization can be defined as the process by which people's values and attitudes are shaped by forces like institutional rules, institutional incentives, and peer pressures.
[97] Chatman; E. Grant and A. Bush, "Salesforce socialization tactics: Building organizational value congruence," *Journal of Personal Selling and Sales Management* 16, no. 3 (1996); D. Cable and C. Parsons, "Socialization tactics and person-organization fit," *Personnel Psychology* 54 (2001); Haley and Sidanius; Kristof-Brown and others.
[98] J. Van Maanen and E. Schein, "Toward a theory of organizational socialization," in *Research in Organizational Behavior*, ed. B. Straw (Greenwich: JAI Press, 1979); G. Jones, "Socialization tactics, self-efficacy, and newcomers' adjustments to organizations," *Academy of Management Journal* 29 (1986); T. Bauer and others, "Organizational socialization: A review and directions for future research," *Research in Personnel and Human Resources Management* 16 (1998); and T. Kim and others, "Socialization tactics, employee proactivity, and person-organization fit," *Journal of Applied Psychology* 90, no. 2 (2005).

new peers and leaders. It is fundamental to organizational stability and persistence "because it helps ensure the continuity of central values and it gives new employees a framework for responding to events in their work environment."[99] Regardless of formality, the socialization process communicates to new members what the organization and its existing members believe to be the norms, values, and attitudes most congruent with the organization's past and future successes. Through the socialization process, new members can readily determine the ingroups and outgroups within the organization and identify with the group with which they have the most in common.[100] Socialization affects perceptions of person-organization fit.

Socialization studies. Institutional selection studies found that potential employers were more likely to find employees with higher degrees of sociopolitical fit attractive. Consistently, the reason deduced in these studies was that people who fit sociopolitically were more effective employees. Although a paramilitary example,[101] it was clear that politically conservative soldiers and policemen in Israel better adapted to and were regarded as more effective than politically liberal soldiers and policemen.

Numerous studies of police officers found similar socialization effects. As police officers' time in service increased, they held increasingly anti-egalitarian views, such as increased xenophobia and hostility toward

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[99] Kim and others, 351.
[100] L. Festinger and others, *Social Pressures in Informal Groups: A Study of a Housing Community* (New York: Harper, 1950) and Chatman.
[101] G. Rubenstein, "Authoritarianism among border police officers, career soldiers, and airport security guards at the Israeli border," *Journal of Social Psychology* 146, no. 6 (2006).

blacks.[102] Leitner and Sedlacek found a statistically significant relationship between police officers' racist views and positive evaluation reports.[103] Christopher and others reviewed the personnel files of the forty-four officers in the Los Angeles Police Department who received the most civilian complaints.[104] They found that the officers' supervisors filed very positive performance reviews and expressed positive expectations regarding the officers' potential success in the department.

Two studies of Canadian military cadets found that anti-egalitarian attitudes significantly increased over their four-year education.[105] Specifically, the cadets became more conservative, less favorable toward outgroups, and less likely to believe that external

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[102] J. McNamara, "Uncertainties in police work: The relevance of police recruits' backgrounds and training," in *The Police: Six Sociological Essays*, ed. D. Bordua (New York: Wiley, 1967); J. Teahan, "A longitudinal study of attitude shifts among black and white police officers," *Journal of Social Issues* 31 (1975); H. Carlson and M. Sutton, "The development of attitudes as a function of police roles," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 1 (1974); Ibid., "The effects of different police roles on attitudes and values," *Journal of Psychology* 91 (1975); J. Genz and D. Lester, "Authoritarianism in policemen as a function of experience," *Journal of Police Science and Administration* 4 (1976); M. Hageman, "Who joins the force for what reasons: An argument for the new breed," *Journal of Police Science and Administration* 4 (1979); R. Wortley and R. Homel, "Police prejudice as a function of training and outgroup contact: A longitudinal investigation," *Law and Human Behavior* 19 (1995); and G. Chin and S. Wells, "The 'blue wall of silence' as evidence of bias and motive to lie: A new approach to police perjury," *University of Pittsburgh Law Review* 59 (1998).

[103] D. Leitner and W. Sedlacek, "Characteristics of successful campus police officers," *Journal of College Student Personnel* 17 (1976).

[104] W. Christopher and others, *Report of the Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department* (Los Angeles, California, 1991).

[105] S. Guimond, "Attitude change during college: Normative or informational social influence?" *Social Psychology of Education* 2 (1999) and Ibid., "Group socialization and prejudice: The social transmission of intergroup attitudes and beliefs," *European Journal of Social Psychology* 30 (2000).

circumstances are determinative of peoples' economic condition. The cadets became less egalitarian and more anti-egalitarian.

Priest, Fullerton, and Bridges studied the values and personalities of cadets in the West Point class of 1979.[106] The study covered their four years at the academy, 1975–1979. In addition to expressing an increase in self-confidence and commitment to groups, these cadets expressed decreasing admiration for kindness, social skill, loyalty, academic achievement, status, honesty, religiousness, and self-control. Because of significant diversity in values related to their expressed values in 1979, the authors argued that academy socialization processes must play a significant role in developing such broadly uniform value changes. Priest and Beach expanded the study to include cadets in the classes of 1981, 1991, and 1992.[107] All four cohorts expressed the same broad value changes.

Studies of cadets' political beliefs also deduced strong socialization effects. Cummings, Dempsey, and Shapiro's study included cadets' political beliefs and their estimation of their parents' political beliefs.[108] Cadets with Republican parents were significantly more likely to consider themselves Republican (83 percent of these cadets) than cadets with Democratic parents were likely to consider themselves Democrats (55 percent). According to the authors, "the fact that cadets whose parents

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[106] R. Priest and others, "Personality and value changes in West Point cadets," *Armed Forces and Society* 8, no. 4 (1982).
[107] R. Priest and J. Beach, "Value changes in four cohorts at the U.S. Military Academy," *Armed Forces and Society* 25, no. 1 (1998).
[108] C. Cummings and others, "Partisan pressure: Political ideology and party affiliations of West Point cadets" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois, April 7, 2005.)

are Democrats are more likely to defect from their parents' party affiliation than cadets whose parents are Republicans suggests that there are other influences upon a cadet's party affiliation."[109] The "other influences" they found were cadets' peers and superiors, both significant indicators that socialization rather than selection caused the difference in defection rates.

In an attempt to determine whether socialization effects may account for broad convergence of sociopolitical views amongst the cadets, the authors asked about the existence of pressure to identify with any, not just Republican, political party at the academy. Their findings were quite striking:

> Among all cadets who do not identify with the Republican Party, almost two out of three, 65 percent, believe there is pressure to identify Republican. Among those who identify as Democrats, the proportion who feel pressure to identify as Republican jumps to 79 percent.[110]

In terms of the literature, significantly more cadets who identify as Democrats, a small outgroup, felt pressure to identify with the majority ingroup. In contrast, a significantly lower proportion but majority of the majority group, the ingroup in terms of the literature, felt that cadets are pressured to identify Republican. Among the "many cadets" who commented on political identity pressures at the academy, a cadet who self-identified as a Democrat stated, "I feel discriminated against and threatened by my fellow cadets because of my political views." A self-identified

[109] Ibid., 13.
[110] Ibid., 14.

Republican cadet stated, "Democrats are more likely to speak their mind on a survey because their opinion cannot be expressed well amongst a strongly Republican and intolerant Corps."[111] It is likely that a version of these socialization effects occurs within the larger United States Army.

Bachman's and others' study of change in attitudes between high school seniors who later enlisted in the United States military, entered college, or began working in the civilian sector, discussed earlier in the self-selection section, provided evidence of socialization processes at work.[112] For evidence of socialization, compared to their attitudes when they were high school seniors, seniors who entered college expressed less support for military influence in the United States, less support for military spending, and less support for United States military supremacy. Seniors who joined the armed forces also showed potential socialization effects: They expressed even more support for military influence in the United States, more support for military spending, more support for military supremacy over other nations, and less support for unilateral disarmament.[113] College students became less pro-military, and military members became more pro-military after one to two years in their chosen pursuit.

The authors present two more interesting findings regarding potential socialization effects. First, seniors who joined the armed forces

[111] Ibid., 14.
[112] Bachman and others, "Distinctive military attitudes among U.S. enlistees."
[113] Ibid., 570.

expressed significantly less support for unquestioning obedience to orders than they had in high school. In fact, they later expressed, statistically, the same level of support for unquestioning obedience as the other two groups. This reduction in preference for unquestioning obedience could be a good thing: As the authors argue, "military doctrine maintains that service personnel are responsible to obey only lawful orders and to judge whether orders are lawful before following them."[114] The latitude to question potentially unlawful orders could help service members maintain personal responsibility for their actions.

Second, seniors who joined the armed forces expressed no statistically significant increase in preference for war compared to their already greater preference in high school. Other than preference for war, any potential socialization effects in the armed forces worked to strengthen self-selection effects. Socialization effects also appeared to strengthen self-selection effects among those seniors who chose to enter college rather than join the military.

It is important to note that other processes related to the recruitment-retention cycle work in concert with institutional socialization to increase convergence of employees' views over time. Cable and Parsons found that organizations with highly institutionalized socialization programs, programs that systematically reduce ambiguity for employees through designed activities, feature employees with greater feelings of fit with the organization over time.[115] Beginning with highly structured early work experiences, organizations encourage their

[114] Ibid., 574.
[115] Cable and Parsons, "Socialization tactics and person-organization fit."

employees to accept established norms and values, which reinforces the organizational status quo over time.[116] However, people make institutions, so institutional socialization includes interactions between new and current employees. Numerous studies have found that current employees play an important role in the organizational socialization process.[117] New employees tend to seek information and network with current employees as a way to identify norms and culture and then fit those norms and culture.

Attrition. Feelings of organizational fit, particularly belief congruence, influence individuals' tenure decisions. Individuals perceive belief congruence between themselves, other employees, and their organization.

> [People] who share the values of their organizations are more satisfied, more committed, and less likely to quit or drop out than are their incongruent counterparts.[118]

When individuals feel their personal beliefs fit with other employees' and the organization's, individuals express greater intentions to remain with

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[116] Kim and others.
[117] E. Morrison, "Learning the ropes: information acquisition during socialization," *Journal of Applied Psychology* 78, no. 2 (1993); S. Ashford and S. Black, "Proactivity during organizational entry: The role of desire for control," *Journal of Applied Psychology* 81 (1996); T. Bauer and S. Green, "Testing the combined effects of newcomer information seeking and manager behavior on socialization," *Journal of Applied Psychology* 83 (1998); A. Griffin and others, "Newcomer and organizational socialization tactics: An interactionist perspective," *Human Resource Management Review* 10 (2000); and C. Wanberg and J. Kammeyer-Mueller, "Predictors and outcomes of proactivity in the socialization process," *Journal of Applied Psychology* 85 (2000).
[118] Haley and Sidanius, 198.

the organization.[119] Fit and differential attrition research has found that "individuals in cognitive misfit are likely to be less motivated [and] less committed and experience more work-related stress and job dissatisfaction than those in fit."[120] This state of cognitive misfit makes it likely that the misfit individual "will suffer when it comes to salary, promotion, and layoff decisions."[121] Furthermore, when individuals express strong belief congruence with an organization, their social identities tend to become one with their organizational membership. This identity dynamic affects differential attrition rates from organizations.[122]

Attrition studies. Differential attrition directly relates to belief convergence cited throughout this chapter. Those with greater perceptions of belief congruence with the organization and coworkers are more likely to remain in the organization than are those with the lowest perceptions of belief congruence. Hence, over time, expressed beliefs will display convergence, featuring more consensus and weaker minority views. People grouped by different but relevant factors will remain with organizations at significantly different rates.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) report on soldier recruitment and retention highlighted the importance of perceived value congruence to boosting satisfaction and reducing attrition:

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[119] Coldwell and others, "The effects of person-organization ethical fit on employee attraction and retention."
[120] D. Chan, "Cognitive misfit of problem-solving style at work: A facet of person–organization fit," *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes* 68 (1996): 199.
[121] Haley and Sidanius, 198.
[122] B. Ashforth and F. Mael, "Social identity theory and the organization," *Academy of Management Review* 14 (1989) and F. Mael and B. Ashforth, "Loyal from day one: Biodata, organizational identification, and turnover among newcomers," *Personnel Psychology* 48 (1995).

> … Acknowledging the significance of values within the military context, it is expected that values congruence/incongruence is likely to play a more critical role in the development of turnover intentions in the military, especially through its effects on attitudes known to be critical in the process. Although there are post-hire means to increase the fit of the members in terms of values (such as through training programs or the job experience itself) as emphasized above, recruitment and selection activities allow for the use of more direct means to assure values congruence between the members and the organization.[123]

The NATO report notes the importance of recruitment and selection activities in reducing later attrition of poorly fit soldiers. In their study of United States Army recruits, Mael and Ashford found that identification with Army values significantly predicted attrition across two years of study data.[124] They found that prior experiences were strong predictors of adopting the Army identity and continuing in service.

In a comparison of 1999's and 2003's Army recruits, Putka and Strickland found that the 2003 recruits tended to express significantly stronger institutional reasons—desire to serve the country, support for the core Army values, satisfaction with the Army, preference for a military rather than civilian life—for joining the Army and also stronger intentions to remain in the Army for a career.[125] RAND Corporation and Army Behavioral Research Institute studies confirm these findings. In 2009, Urben studied political partisanship and ideology in the officer

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[123] Research and Technology Organisation, *Recruiting and Retention of Military Personnel* (France: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 2007): 3J-16.
[124] Mael and Ashford.
[125] D. Putka and W. Strickland, *A Comparison of the FY03 and FY99 First Term Attrition Study Cohorts* (Arlington, Virginia: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 2005).

corps by surveying 4,248 active-duty officers.[126] She addressed a significant weakness in Dempsey's (2010) study by asking officers to declare their political partisan identity and ideological orientation, each using a seven-point scale from strong Democrat or very liberal to strong Republican or very conservative. As Urben notes, those who self-identify as weak or leaning political partisans are "largely closet Democrats and Republicans."[127]

While the responses to Urben's survey were similar to those that Dempsey reported, she usefully included junior officers who were leaving the Army as a comparison category. The junior officers numbered about 100 and were mostly lieutenants and captains, but all had served fewer than ten years. The data she reported were quite striking: Junior officers separating from the Army were much more likely to self-identify as Democrats or liberal than junior officers as a whole.[128] Furthermore, although 28.2 percent of junior officers separating from the Army considered themselves liberal, they responded that 0 percent of the officer corps was very liberal or liberal and that only 1.02 percent was slightly liberal.[129] These responses are not surprising, given what Dempsey found in his study of West Point cadets, cited earlier in this dissertation. Individuals grouped by relevant sociopolitical demographic

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[126] H. Urben, "Civil-military relations in a time of war: Party, politics, and the profession of arms" (Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, 2010).
[127] Ibid., 16, citing B. Keith and others, *The Myth of the Independent Voter* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992): 4.
[128] Self-Identification as Democrats (percent): Junior Officers Separating 37.4, Lieutenants 23.7, Captains 21.4, and Majors 16 percent (see Urben, 39). Self-Identification as Ideologically Liberal (percent): Junior Officers Separating 28.2, Lieutenants 18.3, Captains 15.2, and Majors 12 percent (see Urben, 41)
[129] Urben, 48.

and other factors display different retention rates. These studies highlight the interaction between selection, socialization, and attrition in the overall model regarding perceived fit between personnel and organizations.

Expectations regarding person-organization fit. This review provides substantial evidence that perceptions of fit and misfit have differential selection and retention effects. People perceive differences between their own beliefs and those of potential or current employers. When these beliefs closely align, people perceive a good fit. When they are out of alignment, people perceive a misfit.

This study is capable of revealing strong selection, socialization, and attrition effects in recruitment and reenlistment outcomes. This study includes information about recruitment decisions and soldiers'—those former recruits'—reenlistment decisions. The retention data should be considered follow-up data, which highlights factors that relate to retention. A limitation of this study is that it does not include new recruit or soldier interviews. Therefore, this study cannot claim definitively that differences between sociopolitical demographic factors are the specific source of self-selection into the Army and attrition from the Army. Such a survey could illuminate the various impacts of self-selection and socialization on individual decisions to join and remain in the Army. Future research can build population survey using this study's analysis of different enlistment and reenlistment outcomes. Regardless, the data this dissertation uses provide support for applying ecological inference to its major findings. Trends identified across communities that provide

nearly the population of recruits and soldiers eligible for retention are likely trends existing among those recruits and soldiers.

The all-volunteer force has attracted officers and enlisted careerists, and an increasing proportion of those careerists come from military families. During the debate on whether the United States should transition to an all-volunteer force, President Nixon's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force considered that volunteer service would breed a "separate military ethos," a military caste increasingly different from the average American citizen.[130] No study finds a great number of common beliefs and values held by military careerists and their respective civilian cohort. Studies that do find commonalities between civilian and military personnel find the strongest are between civilians and young, non-careerist military service members. The review of many selection, socialization, and attrition studies strongly suggests that this study of recruitment and reenlistment outcomes should find distinct between-group differences in outcomes based on many relevant sociopolitical demographic factors.

Literature Review: Sociopolitical Representation in the U.S. Army

The civil-military relations literature includes studying the relationship between society and its military forces. Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* is one of the great American works in this

[130] T. Gates, *The Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force* (Washington, D.C., 1970).

literature.[131] He stated two significant concerns: that the field of civil-military relations lacked a unifying theory and that the United States faced a significant policy concern in the Cold War. The policy concern was restated by Nielsen and Snider:

> Would the United States be able to sustain the large professional military establishment it would need to succeed in the Cold War? Would it be able to preserve a military that was democratically appropriate, fulfilling what he called the societal imperative, and was at the same time militarily effective, fulfilling what he called the functional imperative?[132]

Huntington argued that the Cold War elevated the importance of the functional imperative, the state's ability to effectively deter violence and make war, and devalued the traditional question of how to make the military best conform to the American liberal tradition, the societal imperative.

Huntington proposed that civil-military relations is "system composed of interdependent elements,"[133] which Nielsen and Snider summarize as five sets of interdependent relationships: civilian elites and military leaders, military institutions and American society, military leaders and their professions, civilian elite interactions, and influential civilian elites and American society.[134] Military institutions depend upon American society for manpower and funding, and American society upon military institutions for its security; this study clearly applies to this

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[131] S. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957).
[132] S. Nielsen and D. Snider, eds. *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era* (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009): 1.
[133] Huntington, viii.
[134] Nielsen and Snider, 2-4.

interdependency. Whether manpower and funding are sufficient in quality and quantity to meet the military's demand and are representative of American society are two areas of research in this relationship. The functional and societal imperatives interact strongly in this relationship. Huntington argued that the relative balance between these two imperatives could determine whether a society is capable of securing itself and whether the military threatens society. In the relationship between civilian elites, including politicians and the news media, and American society, the formation of public opinion regarding the military and the use of force is widely studied. This study is well suited for discussing the relationship between the military and society.

Named after Morris Janowitz, the Janowitzean approach to civil-military relations research focuses on sociopolitical questions. Although not the first to focus primarily on these sociopolitical questions, he did so with methodological rigor in his book, *The Professional Soldier*, to match Huntington.[135] Janowitz argued that a sustained sociopolitical gap is harmful if the military does not adapt to the democratic society it represents. He believed that the military should adapt to a liberal society rather than vice versa. Post-World War II warfare emphasized the controlled, narrow use of force. The increasingly technological demands of post-World War II warfare reduced the importance of maneuver warfare, which Huntington emphasized belonging to the military rather than civilian realm. According to Janowitz, if the military fails to respond to society's demands to better reflect its values and norms, society will

[135] M. Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960).

stop supporting the military's efforts to effectively man and maintain its forces and greatly distrust the military's advice and reporting.

The civil-military relations literature since 1960 effectively examines Huntington's and Janowitz's arguments using contemporary data and reflects changes in military manning and organization policy, including the abolishment of the draft in 1973.[136] The literature contains a number of arguments potentially related to this study. First, does the civil-military gap increase over time?[137] Second, does the military appropriately represent society rather than a separate elite?[138] Third, does society's respect for the military make the civil-military gap unimportant?[139] Thomas Ricks' work on civil-military relations proposed numerous hypotheses related to these arguments, including: society's

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[136] P. Feaver, "The civil-military problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the question of civilian control," *Armed Forces and Society* 23 (1996).
[137] P. Maslowski, "Army values and American values," *Military Review* 70, no. 4 (1990); J. McIsaac and N. Verdugo, "Civil-military relations: A domestic perspective," in *U.S. Civil-Military Relations: In Crisis or Transition*, ed. D. Snider and M. Carlton-Carew (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995); A. Bacevich and R. Kohn, "Grand Army of the Republicans: Has the U.S. Military become a Partisan Force?" *The New Republic* 217 (1997); T. Ricks, "The widening gap between the military and society," *The Atlantic Monthly* 280 (1997); and Holsti, "A widening gap between the U.S. military and civilian society?"
[138] J. Webb, "The war on military culture," *The Weekly Standard* (January 20, 1997); Ibid., "Interview: James Webb," *Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute* 126 (2000); J. Hillen, "The civilian-military gap: Keep it, defend it, manage it," *Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute* 124 (1998); Ibid., "Must U.S. military culture reform?" *Orbis* 43 (1999); W. Murchison, "Boomer ethic is hostile to military," *Dallas Morning News* (February 24, 1999); J. Kitfield, "The pen and the sword," *Government Executive* 32 (2000); J. Dempsey, "Our Army: Soldiers, politics, and American civil-military relations" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 2008); Ibid., *Our Army: Soldiers, Politics, and American Civil-Military Relations* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010); and Urben, "Civil-military relations in a time of war."
[139] C. Maynes, "The perils of (and for) an imperial America," *Foreign Policy* 111 (1998).

ignorance about the military following the end of conscription was growing; the military was politicized in a partisan manner (Republican Party self-identification); and in the absence of a significant national threat, the civil-military gap was widening.[140] Research into these hypotheses significantly increased after Ricks' work. This review found two interdependent themes in the literature on sociopolitical representation in the Army applicable to this study: sociopolitical differences between the Army and society, and social distance between the Army and society.

Sociopolitical differences between the Army and society. Numerous studies focus on better understanding the sociopolitical demography of the Army's officers and enlisted members. Sociopolitical representation studies commonly find that sociopolitical factors relate to different recruitment rates or gaps. The political partisan gap has been the tendency of military members to self-identify at different and usually higher Republican rates than civilians. The self-identification tendency has steadily increased since the end of conscription. Holsti's analysis showed increasing military identification with the Republican Party: Republican self-identification between 1976 and 1996 increased from 33 percent to 67 percent, whereas Democratic self-identification fell from about 30 percent to 7 percent. This change was quite significant, as national self-identification with Republicans during the same period

[140] T. Ricks, "Duke study finds sharp rightward shift in military," *The Wall Street Journal* (November 11, 1997): A20; Ibid., *Making the Corps: Sixty-One Men Came to Parris Island to Become Marines, Not All of Them Made It* (New York: Scribner, 1997); and Ibid., "The widening gap between the military and society."

increased from 25 percent to 34 percent, and Democratic self-identification remained constant at 40 percent, with Independents bearing the losses to increasing partisanship in general.[141] The analysis demonstrated that the increasing proportion of self-identified Republicans in the military occurred steadily over time and was not the result of a short-term increase in civil-military conflict during President Clinton's tenure.

Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS) surveys conducted between fall 1998 and spring 1999 showed nearly the same split in party identification. Almost 64 percent of military leaders identified themselves as Republicans, whereas 29 percent of the general public non-veterans did.[142] Although younger Americans were less Republican than older Americans, younger officers were slightly more Republican than their senior officers,[143] completely opposite of the national partisan political self-identity trend. Holsti also found that "liberals appear to be an endangered species among the military and active reserves": 4.4 percent of military leaders identified themselves as somewhat or very liberal, whereas 28.5 percent of the general public non-veterans did.[144]

Driver and Dempsey conducted surveys in the 2000s to determine the nature and extent of changing political partisan identification. Driver found that 62 percent of military respondents to his survey self-identified

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[141] Holsti, "A widening gap between the U.S. military and civilian society."
[142] O. Holsti, "Of chasms and convergences: Attitudes and beliefs of civilian and military elites at the start of the new millennium," in *Soldiers and Civilians*, ed. Feaver and Kohn (2001).
[143] Ibid., 28-29.
[144] Ibid., 33.

as Republican or conservative, close to the TISS results.[145] Dempsey studied civilians and all Army ranks except for the newest privates and Army generals. He found that partisan political self-identity and ideology were highly structured by rank:

	Self-Identification Rate (Percent)	
Officer Rank	**Republican**	**Democratic**
Colonel	65	11
Lieutenant Colonel	64	12
Major	50	13
All Officers	51	13
Lieutenant	44	19
Warrant / Enlisted Rank	**Republican**	**Democratic**
Warrant Officer	54	7
Senior Sergeant	36	8
Sergeant	21	12
Junior Soldier	18	9
	Republican	**Democratic**
Civilian	31	33
Civilian Student	30	35

Table 2-1 – Partisan Political Self-identification Rates

Increasing rank related to increasing Republican self-identification, and lower rank related to greater Democratic self-identification.[146] Only the most junior enlisted ranks self-identified as Republican at lower rates than civilians did; however, these ranks self-identified as Democrats at even lower rates than civilians, especially civilian students, a cohort with comparable ages.

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[145] D. Driver, "The military-mind and the military profession: A reassessment of the ideological roots of American military professionalism" (Chapter manuscript delivered at Senior Conference, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, 2007).
[146] See Dempsey 2010, 101-105, especially 104-105 for rates of "strong" identification.

Dempsey did not provide as much detail regarding ideological identification, but the data presented in Table 2-2 are sufficient to discern trends similar to partisan political self-identification.[147]

	Self-Identification Rate (Percent)	
Officer Rank	**Conservative**	**Liberal**
All Officers	63	14
Lieutenant	53	24
Warrant / Enlisted Rank	**Conservative**	**Liberal**
Warrant Officer	69	12
All Enlisted	32	23
	Conservative	**Liberal**
Civilian	37	24
Civilian, 18-24	29	32

Table 2-2 – Ideological Self-identification Rates

As rank increased, conservative self-identification increased and liberal self-identification decreased. The average liberal self-identification rate of all enlisted ranks was just under the overall civilian rate but significantly less than the young civilian cohort. In total, the youngest soldiers were much less Democratic and less liberal than civilian students and society's young population. As the person-organization fit literature identified, different rates of self-identification upon joining the Army are strong indicators of self- and institutional-selection mechanisms. Increasing and decreasing rates of self-identification related to longevity in an organization are strong indicators of formal and informal socialization and attrition mechanisms.

Dempsey's and other studies showed that political participation and identification increased with age, income, education, and if the

[147] Ibid., 75-79 and 165.

person is ethnically white. Officers, predominantly white and well-educated, identified with a political party at higher rates than enlisted soldiers, much like other well-educated, older, white Americans. Cadets were more white and male than the average college student, and 55 percent of 2007 West Point graduates came from top income quintile (highest 80th–100th percentile) neighborhoods. Furthermore, 8 percent of cadets reported that they grew up in a big city versus the suburbs or a small city.[148] Cadets also came from predominantly Republican families and stay or became Republican: 61 percent of cadets reported having Republican parents, and 55 percent of cadets from Democratic families reported that they were Republican. Only 1 percent of cadets from Republican families reported that they were Democratic.[149] Cummings, Dempsey, and Shapiro's earlier examination of the same survey results provided strong evidence of self-selection:

> … the majority of cadets, 61 percent, think of their parents as affiliated with the Republican Party. Only 16 percent of cadets report that their parents are affiliated with the Democratic Party, 7 percent are independent or other… These numbers point toward a self-selection effect, in that West Point appears to attract students from Republican families. We should expect young people to share many of the same political views as their parents.[150]

Different races or ethnicities are highly related to Democratic or Republican self-identification. In the Army, being Hispanic, black, or

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[148] Ibid., 163-4.
[149] Ibid., 169.
[150] Cummings and others, 13; also discussed in Nielsen and others, "Taking people seriously: How the U.S. Army has been shaped by the all-volunteer force policy" (Paper prepared for presentation at the Citizen-Soldiers and the State Conference, Syracuse University, New York, 2006).

female did correspond to lower rates of Republican self-identification.[151] However, Hispanics, blacks, and females in the Army self-identified as Republicans at much higher rates than civilians. They identified as Democrats at much lower rates. Dempsey did not publish overall statistics by race and gender, but he stated: "Of note are the very few numbers of any Army subgroup who choose to identify with the Democratic Party—the exception being black officers."[152] Thirty-three percent of black officers identified with the Democratic Party, only matching the percent of all Democratic Party identifiers among civilians.[153]

The studies demonstrated that the Army's current and future leaders – its senior non-commissioned officers (NCO), warrant officers, and officers – clearly and substantially identified themselves socially and politically with the Republican Party, even minorities and females. It is the junior enlisted, the least likely to have developed clear opinions, the least politically inclined, and almost one-half of the Army's total personnel,[154] whose leanings made the average Army view appear to be closer to the average United States citizen.

Davis moderated the results of the TISS survey by claiming that military leaders are fiscally conservative and are as socially liberal as the average liberal civilian elite. Dempsey made similar claims regarding the data in his study.[155] Davis' major conclusion was that the military elite

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[151] Dempsey 2010, 104.
[152] Ibid.
[153] Ibid., 101.
[154] Ibid., 36.
[155] Ibid., 85-94.

tended to simultaneously identify with the Republican Party and hold socially liberal values and beliefs.[156] His construction of the variable meant to measure social liberalism was flawed. He failed to include answers to revealing questions about an individual's social liberalist nature—among them, allowing homosexuals to teach in public schools and serve in the military and allowing women to serve in combat. Dempsey constructed a similar measure and also stated that his measure was "somewhat arbitrary."[157] Dempsey also avoided including the most contentious social issues, such as gay marriage or rights, school prayer, abortion, or torture. These failures weakened his conclusion that military elite were socially liberal.

The weakness could be addressed in future research by conducting the analysis with the most contentious social issues included. For example, a recent study of West Point cadets, ROTC cadets, and civilian college students relates to this point. Ender and others studied these young adults' opinions regarding barring homosexuals from serving in the military.[158] They found that agreement with barring homosexuals from serving in the military was structured by partisan political self-identification and gender.[159] This study was an example of

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[156] J. Davis, "Attitudes and opinions among senior military officers and a U.S. cross-section, 1998-99," in *Soldiers and Civilians*, ed. Feaver and Kohn (2001): 122 and 127-128.
[157] Dempsey 2010, 88.
[158] M. Ender and others, "Civilian, ROTC, and Military Academy undergraduate attitudes toward homosexuals in the U.S. military: A research note," *Armed Forces and Society* 38, no.1 (2011).
[159] Ibid., 6. Percent agreeing that homosexuals should not serve openly in the military: Male, Republican cadets 69.8; Male, Republican civilians 47.4; Female, Republican cadets 43.8; Male, Democrat cadets 41.2;

belief cleavages between those who had chosen military service and civilians. It also highlights how political partisan identity related to different beliefs regarding a contentious social issue.

The Republicanization of the South has been partially responsible for the overrepresentation of self-identified Republicans in the military.[160] Military officers of Southern origin were more numerous than their proportional representation in society.[161] The Democratic Party lost the South during and following the civil rights movement.[162] Because the South went Republican and Southerners are overrepresented in the military, more military members are self-identified Republicans.

The Democratic Party has also been labeled as the anti-military party. The 1972 and 1976 elections showcased Democratic candidates desiring deep cuts in military forces and influence. In the 1980s, President Reagan led a buildup of military forces and equipment that many credit with helping create the competent military force of the 1990s. President Clinton pushed to allow homosexuals to serve the nation openly in the military. Compared to the late 2000s, the military viewed open homosexual service even less favorably in the early 1990s.

Female, Democrat cadets 19.7; Male, Democrat civilians 14.4; Female, Republican civilians 13.4; and Female, Democrat civilians 4.5 percent.

[160] M. Desch, "Explaining the gap: Vietnam, the Republicanization of the South, and the end of the mass army," in *Soldiers and Civilians*, ed. Feaver and Kohn (2001): 290.

[161] Ibid., 297 and Huntington.

[162] A. Lamis, *The Two Party South* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); J. Glaser, *Race, Campaign Politics, and Realignment in the South* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1996); and R. Radosh, *Divided They Fell: The Demise of the Democratic Party, 1964-1996* (New York: Free Press, 1996).

Filling the military's ranks also meant that the military had to compete for workers in the labor market through the military wage. When military wages are low, the size and social and political complexion of the recruitment pool changes. As military pay relatively decreases, individuals "with a low aversion to military life (a high propensity to serve)… are more likely to be overrepresented among recruits."[163] Citizens identifying with the Republican Party also tend to have the lowest aversion to military life, so as military wages fall relative to civilian wages, the percentage of military service members identifying with the Republican Party significantly increases.[164] Falling military wages mean that the benefits of military service are falling relative to the costs of military service. Increasing the costs of service—costs could include numerous combat deployments, time away from family, or the stress of combat itself—also decreases benefits relative to costs. In this way, individuals with a low aversion to likely combat service should also be more likely to be overrepresented among recruits.

Many authors study diversity measures as a means of determining how representative the military is of the society it serves. In their view, diversity has included values, socioeconomic status, and ethnicity.[165] Studies argue that minorities and those of low socioeconomic status are attracted to the military because of its less discriminatory atmosphere and excellent wages and benefits, especially compared to low-skill civilian

[163] Desch, 294.
[164] Ibid., 295.
[165] e.g., Bachman and others, *The All-Volunteer Force*.

sector jobs. Furthermore, GI Bill benefits are an excellent benefit for those who could not otherwise afford college.[166]

A common argument concerning the post-draft military is that it draws recruits disproportionately from disadvantaged sections of society, and a common measure of whether this is true is the socioeconomic status of individuals, their parents, or their home communities.[167] Studies of disproportionate service and sacrifice are not new. Studies of Vietnam and Korean War service found that men exposed to combat were from lower socioeconomic class families or areas than men not exposed to combat.[168]

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[166] M. Binkin and M. Eitelberg, *Blacks and the Military* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1982); R. Mare and C. Winship, "The paradox of lessening racial-inequality and joblessness among black-youth: Enrollment, enlistment, and employment, 1964–1981," *American Sociological Review* 49, no. 1 (1984); D. Segal, "Recruiting for Uncle Sam: Citizenship and military manpower policy" (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1989); J. Butler, "Affirmative-action in the military," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 523 (1992); R. Bryant and others, "The effect of military service on the subsequent civilian wage of the post-Vietnam veteran," *Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance* 33, no. 1 (1993); M. Seeborg, "Race, poverty and enlistment: Some evidence from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth," *Journal of Economics* 20, no. 1 (1994); C. Moskos and J. Butler, *All That We Can Be: Black Leadership and Racial Integration the Army Way* (New York: Basic Books, 1996); J. Angrist, "Estimating the labor market impact of voluntary military service using Social Security data on military applicants," *Econometrica* 66, no. 2 (1998); and Kilburn and Asch.

[167] e.g., M. Eitelberg, "American youth and military representation," *Youth and Society* 10 (1978).

[168] A. Mayer and T. Hoult, "Social stratification and combat survival," *Social Forces* 34, no. 2 (1955): 155-9; M. Zeitlin and others, "Death in Vietnam: Class, poverty, and the risks of war," *Politics and Society* 3, no. 3 (1973); G. Badillo and G. Curry, "The social incidence of Vietnam casualties: Social class or race?" *Armed Forces and Society* 2, no. 3 (1976); A. Barnett and others, "America's Vietnam casualties: Victims of a class war?" *Operations Research* 40, no. 5 (1992); and T. Wilson, "Vietnam-era military service: A test of the class-bias thesis," *Armed Forces and Society* 21, no. 3 (1995).

In a recent study of disproportionate service, MacLean and Parsons studied how socioeconomic class related to enlistment into the U.S. armed forces between the late 1970s and early 1980s.[169] They found that young adults with higher academic ability entered college. They also found that the military excluded more men of lower academic ability, but the military then assigned more men of lower academic ability to combat specialties than non-combat specialties. Lower family educational background was positively related to military enlistment but not to combat versus non-combat specialty assignment.

Social distance. Large between-group sociopolitical demographic differences create social distance between these groups. Social distance is the distance between different social groups, commonly differentiated by factors such as age, class, education, partisanship, culture, and language. As social distance between society and the military increases, sociopolitical gaps between civilian society and the military will also increase. Some gaps are partisan politicization; concentrated recruitment, retention, and wartime casualties; distinct opinion differences concerning military, economic, or social issues; and views regarding the relative value of civilian and military culture.

Indicators of increasing social distance include:

- The officer corps' increasingly regional homogeneity
- The enlisted corps' increasingly regional and cultural homogeneity

[169] A. MacLean and N. Parsons, "Unequal risk: Combat occupations in the volunteer military," *Sociological Perspectives* 53, no. 3 (2010).

- Significant changes in the location of ROTC programs and their program of study
- The diminishing proportion of ROTC graduates in the officer corps compared to service academy and Officer Candidate School (OCS) graduates
- Realignment and closure of military bases in more liberal states
- Migration of veteran populations based on proximity to military healthcare and other privileges near or on military bases
- Declining return of first-term soldiers to civilian society as soldiers are less likely to leave the service
- Differences in expressed opinion regarding military, social, and economic issues[170]

Janowitz argued that the All-Volunteer Armed Force's recruitment base had already changed dramatically enough to create a separate ideological caste in the military that would eventually cause a significant political cleavage from society.[171]

Researchers have found strong indicators of social distance between the military and society in recent research. After controlling for many demographic characteristics, differences between military and civilian responses remain, "suggesting that the military may selectively attract and promote a certain profile of officer, those with more

[170] Desch, especially 320; Dempsey 2010.
[171] M. Janowitz, *Military Conflict* (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1975).

conservative values than the civilian elite and those with more education than the general public."[172] Gronke and Feaver found that "mutual respect (between the military and society), while high, is not uniform across the population," and specifically that "contact or experience with the military" was significantly related to a person's expressed support for military culture.[173] Krueger and Pedraza sorted survey respondents by their connection to military service and found that civilians more connected to military service held significantly more favorable opinions regarding war than civilians with fewer connections to the military.[174] Fordham found that "people who have greater social contact with the military are more likely to support both military spending and military service."[175] Dempsey found similar results in his study. Many statistically and substantively significant social, economic, and foreign policy opinion differences existed between Army soldiers, officers, and civilians and also between likely Republicans and likely Democrats within the Army.[176]

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[172] P. Feaver and R. Kohn, "Conclusion: The gap and what it means for American national security," in *Soldiers and Civilians*, ed. P. Feaver and R. Kohn (2001): 463.
[173] P. Gronke and P. Feaver, "Uncertain confidence: Civilian and military attitudes about civil-military relations," in *Soldiers and Civilians*, ed. P. Feaver and R. Kohn (2001): 131-2.
[174] Krueger and Pedraza, 3. They sorted civilians by the following connection to military service: veteran, immediate family member of an active duty member, immediate family member of a veteran, civilian employee of military installation, employee of military contractor, resides near a military installation, all other civilians.
[175] B. Fordham, "Military interests and civilian politics: the influence of the civil-military 'gap' on peacetime military policy," in *Soldiers and Civilians*, ed. P. Feaver and R. Kohn (2001): 358.
[176] Percent who favor increasing defense spending: senior officers 51, Army overall 48, civilians 29, and civilian elites 15 percent. Percent who favor increasing foreign economic aid: senior officers 7, Army overall 3, civilians 8, and civilian elites 61 percent. Percent who favor increasing homeland security spending: senior officers 57, Army overall 65, civilians

The historical legacy created by the Vietnam War also clearly influenced the civil-military gap. Vietnam-era military leaders thought that Vietnam was a winnable war, Democrats got the United States into the war, and Democrats were responsible for Vietnam's fall when they withdrew United States funding.[177] In the aftermath of Vietnam, fewer elites sought to serve in the military,[178] ROTC programs closed at elite universities and opened in the South and West,[179] and fewer veterans were sought as professors while fewer national security classes were offered in universities.[180] Following the draft's abolishment, propensity to

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51, and civilian elites 39 percent. Percent who favor a government guarantee of a job and a good standard of living: officers 16, soldiers 35, and civilians 34 percent (Dempsey 2010, 54-66).

[177] R. Gabriel and P. Savage, *Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978); and J. Bachman and M. Jennings, "The Impact of Vietnam on trust in government," *Journal of Social Issues* 10 (1975).

[178] Bachman and Jennings; P. Converse, "The enduring impact of the Vietnam War in American public opinion," in *After the Storm: American Society a Decade after the Vietnam War* (Taipei, Republic of China: Academia Sinica Institute of American Culture, 1987); and A. Waldman, "Strangers in uniform," *Utne Reader* (March/April 1997).

[179] W. Snyder, "Officer recruitment for the All-Volunteer Force: Trends and prospects," *Armed Forces and Society* 10 (1984); M. Peck, "Assessing the career mobility of U.S. Army officers: 1950-1974," *Armed Forces and Society* 12 (1994); and A. Coumbe and L. Harford, *ROTC history (unofficial)* (Unpublished manuscript, 1998).

[180] Janowitz, *Military Conflict*; P. Nailor, "Military strategy," in *Approaches and Theory in International Relations*, ed. Trevor Taylor (London: Longman, 1978); F. Pinch, "Military manpower and social change: Assessing the institutional fit," *Armed Forces and Society* 14 (1981); V. Davis, "The Vietnam War and higher education," in *Democracy, Strategy, and Vietnam: Implications for American Policymaking*, ed. George K. Osburn, et al. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1987); S. Walt, "The renaissance of security studies," *International Studies Quarterly* 35 (1991); E. Coffman, "The course of military history in the United States since World War II," *The Journal of Military History* 61 (1997); S. Haber and others, "Brothers under the skin: Diplomatic history and international relations," *International Security* 22 (1997); J. Sharlet, "Why diplomatic historians may be the victims of triumphalism," *The Chronicle of Higher Education* (September 24, 1999): A19.

serve played a stronger role in determining who served than it did during the Vietnam War, when propensity worked alongside the draft to build military manpower.

In the 1970s, Army Chief of Staff Creighton Abrams led the reorganization of the Army into a Total Force, which placed many vital combat support and combat service support units and functions in the reserve and National Guard forces, making their mobilization more likely in the case of any large-scale or long-duration war. It may have been the case that the Army pursued this reorganization to force its civilian leaders to mobilize more of society in order to fight a potential war, which theoretically would force the civilian leadership to more carefully consider domestic political costs of the potential war.[181] Betts states that the large and multiple deployments of reserve and National Guard forces to Iraq since 2003 did not in fact either require the mobilization of society or exact an intense domestic political cost on the Bush administration:

> The war became highly unpopular in public opinion polls but provoked nothing like the mass demonstrations and unruly active opposition of the Vietnam antiwar movement. … The integrated active-reserve organization did limit the president's options but in a way that allowed him to fight an unpopular war and failed to prevent him from doing so with underwhelming force.[182]

Another study found "support for the argument that conscription decreases mass support for war" and the relationship between conscription and decreased mass support for war was "driven by

[181] R. Betts, "Are civil-military relations still a problem?" in *American Civil-Military Relations*, ed. S. Nielsen and D. Snider (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).
[182] Ibid., 34-5.

concerns about self-interest."[183] Similar studies of World War I and the U.S. Civil War support the same argument.[184] These findings relate to the public opinion discussion regarding social distance. Increased social distance between society and the military makes those not connected to the military through active military service possibly indifferent to or more supportive of war.

The end of conscription significantly influenced the social distance between the armed forces and society. Measurable cultural and political differences existed between conscripts and recruits.[185] Technology-intensive duties in the military soared after 1973, increasing calls for career-oriented soldiers (more than five years of service) versus single-term soldiers. Eleven percent of soldiers and 21 percent of Army officers have a career military parent, while 39 percent of all Army personnel and 41 percent of West Point cadets have at least one parent who served in the military.[186] According to the United States Census Bureau, there were approximately 293 million people living in the United States in 2004 and approximately 25 million veterans, according the United States

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[183] M. Horowitz and M. Levendusky, "Drafting support for war: Conscription and mass support for warfare," *The Journal of Politics* 73, no. 2 (2011): 524.
[184] J. McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); and D. Rowe, "Globalization, conscription, and anti-militarism in pre-World War I Europe," in *The Comparative Study of Conscription in the Armed Forces*, eds. L. Mjoset and S. Van Holde (New York: JAI, 2002).
[185] E. Shils and M. Janowitz, "Cohesion and disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 12 (1948); D. King, "Yep, the generation of trust: Public confidence in the U.S. military since Vietnam" (Paper presented to the Defense Science Board. Arlington, Va., July 22, 1999); and P. Feaver and R. Kohn, "The gap: Soldiers, civilians, and their mutual misunderstanding," *National Interest* 61 (2001).
[186] Dempsey 2010, 40-1 and 163.

Department of Veterans Affairs. Therefore, veterans made up at least 8.5 percent of the population, but 39 percent of all Army personnel had a veteran parent. Career-oriented soldiers represent about 50 percent of the military compared to 20 percent at the end of the Vietnam War.[187] The military is increasingly a career as well as a calling.[188]

America mobilized to fight World War II and then used conscription to fill the military's ranks during the Cold War when volunteers were insufficient. A period of some fifty years of volunteer and conscripted service brought society and military institutions very close, with much of society represented within the military ranks, its wartime casualties, and aspects of military service and life well known to many. Patterns of service and sacrifice have changed significantly since the end of World War II.

The Department of Veterans Affairs tracks the United States veterans' population. The department's statistical analysis center, the National Center for Veterans Analysis and Statistics, has reported a dramatic shift in the veterans' population between United States regions:

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[187] M. Eitelberg, *Manpower for Military Occupations* (Washington D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel, 1988).
[188] C. Moskos, "From institution to occupation: Trends in military organization," *Armed Forces and Society* 4 (1977).

Population by Region, U.S. Population and Veterans Percent of Total

	2010	2010	2010	2000	1990	1980	1970	1960
	U.S. Population	Gulf War and Later	All Veterans					
South	37%	47%	41%	38%	35%	32%	29%	27%
West	23%	23%	22%	21%	21%	20%	18%	17%
Midwest	22%	19%	22%	23%	24%	26%	28%	29%
Northeast	18%	11%	15%	18%	20%	22%	25%	27%

Source: http://www.va.gov/vetdata/index.asp

Table 2-3 – U.S. Veteran Population

The plurality of America's veteran population gradually shifted to the South from the Midwest region since 1960. The largest decrease in veteran population proportion occurred in the Northeast. As shown in Table 2-3, in 2010 the Northeast had 11 percent of veterans who served in the armed forces in the Gulf War or later. The South, which had a bit over double the Northeast's population in 2010, had over four times (47 percent) the proportion of veterans in its population. The shift in military service was consistently in the same direction over fifty years.

Patterns of sacrifice have also changed significantly since the end of World War II. That the most educated and wealthiest populations provide the fewest soldiers and fewest wartime casualties is not universally accepted as fact. It is, quite to the contrary, a most contentious issue. Two recent studies help illuminate the probable truth.

Watkins' and Sherk's 2008 study of sociopolitical representation in the armed forces included an analysis of armed forces (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines) enlisted recruitment and ROTC and United States

Military Academy (USMA) cadets.[189] They found that the wealthiest communities provided a greater share of the armed forces' recruits than their proportion in society. Their study used recruit data from 2006 and 2007 to assign sociopolitical demographics from United States Census Bureau tracts. Census tracts are subdivisions of counties, with each tract containing up to about 4,000 individuals.

The fact that tracts are subunits of counties, which this dissertation uses to study Army recruitment and retention, could make comparison between Watkins' and Sherk's study and this dissertation useful. It could inform a discussion about ecological inference, or whether the same recruitment and retention trends this study found at the county level were present among county subunits, the census tracts. However, the studies cannot be directly compared because the studies analyze vastly different populations. Watkins and Sherk considered all recruits for every branch of the armed forces, while this study analyzed only Army recruits. Furthermore, this dissertation's literature review supports the argument that the populations providing recruits to the other branches of the armed forces are significantly different than the population providing the Army's recruits.

Kriner's and Shen's analysis of the sociopolitical demographics of Iraq War casualties provides strong support for this dissertation's

[189] S. Watkins and J. Sherk. *Who Serves in the U.S. Military? Demographic Characteristics of Enlisted Troops and Officers* (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2008).

methodology and findings.[190] Their study assigned sociopolitical demographic values to individuals from county subunits and found that Iraq War deaths came disproportionately from populations living in the poorest American communities.[191] The poorest 20 percent of the population incurred almost 27 percent of all Iraq War casualties, while the richest 20 percent of the population incurred 15 percent of all casualties.[192] The difference in casualty rates is strikingly similar to the difference in recruitment rates that this dissertation found between the richest and poorest counties' populations. For example, the poorest population provided 26 percent of recruits between January and December 2000, and the richest population provided 13.3 percent of recruits.

To test that a fallacy of ecological inference was not responsible for the difference in representation of casualties across counties, Kriner and Shen conducted an analysis of 400 Iraq War casualties at the census block group level, a level below Watkins' and Sherk's census tract level.[193] Each census block group contains about 1,100 individuals on average. They analyzed every casualty from the largest cities (New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, and Philadelphia), the poorest places, the richest places, and a random sample. They found in every

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[190] D. Kriner and F. Shen, *The Casualty Gap: The Causes and Consequences of American Wartime Inequalities* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
[191] Badillo and Curry, "The social incidence of Vietnam casualties," studied Vietnam War casualties from Cook County, Illinois and found that social class was a stronger predictor of disproportionate casualty burden than race.
[192] Kriner and Shen, *The Casualty Gap*, 28.
[193] Ibid., 44-7.

case that the median casualty came from neighborhoods within communities that had lower education attainment than the community as a whole. Regarding economic status, the median casualty came from neighborhoods within communities that had lower median income in every case except for Houston and Philadelphia.

Kriner's and Shen's study demonstrated that war casualties since World War II have become increasingly unrepresentative of American society as a whole. During World War II, high-casualty communities had a higher median income and a higher percentage of residents with college degrees than low-casualty communities. The trend reversed during the Korean War and was worse during the Iraq War than any war since World War II. With differential selection, socialization, and attrition effects, social representation among the nation's recent war casualties is narrower than it has been in any previous war.

Occupations have differing values and attitudes.[194] Occupations attract individuals with compatible values and attitudes, regardless if they are military or civilian occupations. Abrahamsson identified values and attitudes compatible with the military occupation as nationalism, political conservatism, and pessimistic views about human nature and the probability of war.[195] Every military professional could not be expected to hold these specific values and attitudes. These values and attitudes also exist in society, but it is clear that self-identification with

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[194] Rosenberg; M. Kohn and C. Schooler, *Work and Personality: An Inquiry into the Impact of Social Stratification* (Norwood, N.J.: Ablex, 1983).

[195] B. Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalization and Political Power* (London: Sage Publications, 1972).

the Republican political party increased over time. This dissertation expects that "on average, the distributions on these dimensions among the military would be different than among civilians."[196] This suggests different distributions with different mean values, focused in this dissertation on sociopolitical factors, not a singular conservative military mind.

The military seeks to be a profession. Professionals use standards, norms, and values to distinguish their work and ensure consistent, high-quality outcomes. Certain occupations, "because of the expertise they possess and the important social functions that they fulfill, are afforded the socially privileged and relatively autonomous status of being regarded as professions."[197] Professions act to protect their members and unique standards, norms, and values.

> One element of the culture of the military that may have changed is its politicization. … In the current era, our data suggest that people going into the armed forces as enlisted personnel are politically engaged. Again, this is not surprising. The American military, as it has become increasingly career-oriented, has also become increasingly professionalized. One aspect of professionalization is political mobilization in pursuit of collective interests.[198]

The military, however, is a unique profession. Ultimately, it applies violent force to achieve outcomes that may be unachievable by other methods. Force can be effective domestically as well as internationally,

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[196] D. Segal and others, "Attitudes of entry-level enlisted personnel: Pro-military and politically mainstreamed," in *Soldiers and Civilians*, ed. Feaver and Kohn (2001): 166; and J. Burk, "Military culture," in *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace and Conflict*, ed. Lester Kurtz (San Diego, Calif.: Academic Press, 1999).
[197] Segal and others, "Attitudes," 166.
[198] Ibid., 210.

which inherently increases the importance of drawing correct conclusions about the nature of any civil-military gaps.

Research approach. The three literatures each contribute an important piece to a model that explains how expressions of public opinion regarding the Iraq and Afghanistan wars should relate to Army recruitment and retention. The model, graphically, is:



First, the literature on public opinion regarding war proposes that several factors combine to influence how individuals feel about war and how they express those feelings in opinion surveys. Chapter Four considers these factors and discusses which factor or factors most clearly relate to opinion differences.

Second, the person-organization fit literature provides extensive support for the idea that individuals are more attracted and more likely to remain with organizations that best reflect their personal beliefs. The interdependent processes of selection, socialization, and attrition work to recruit and retain more employees who feel a fit with the organization than employees who do not. When people express an opinion regarding

war, they express a personal belief. People understand that soldiers fight the war about which they hold a personal belief and that soldiers are wounded or killed in war. When personal beliefs are negative, those people should be less inclined to join the Army; when positive, they should be more inclined to join the Army.

Third, the literature on sociopolitical representation in the Army provides some understanding about that organization's recruitment and retention of different groups of soldiers—employees—both before and during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Because this study is primarily concerned with the relationship between public opinion regarding the Iraq and Afghan wars and Army recruitment and retention, it is important to note the recruitment and retention trends that existed before the wars began. The literature reviews provide theoretical and practical support for numerous between-group cleavages in expressed opinion and recruitment and retention. The model predicts that numerous, distinct between-group Army recruitment and retention differences related to the same factors that divided public opinion regarding war. This study examines that relationship between many thousands of cases over many years.

Research questions and hypotheses. The Afghanistan and Iraq wars are the chronological and analytical starting point of this analysis. This approach to solving the puzzle is unique. While many studies examined opinions regarding the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan or military recruitment, few studies explicitly attempt to explain the

relationship between opinions regarding war and Army recruitment. No studies exist that include retention.

Three specific research questions provide the analytical foundation: Between 2000 and 2007, (1) what sociopolitical factors related to different opinions regarding war? (2) What recruiting and retention issues did the Army face? (3) How did different opinions regarding war relate to Army recruitment and retention rates? Two hypotheses guide the analysis, both built on theoretical support from the three literatures.

Hypothesis 1: Many sociopolitical factors related similarly to different opinions regarding the Afghanistan and Iraq wars and different active-duty U.S. Army recruitment and retention rates. This assertion recognizes that different sociopolitical factors will relate differently to opinion and recruitment and retention differences. The literature reviews identified potential sociopolitical factors related to different opinions or different service rates. These sociopolitical factors comprise the sub-hypotheses developed and tested fully in the following chapters:

- *Subhypothesis 1: Ethnicity*
- *Subhypothesis 2: Exposure to military service*
- *Subhypothesis 3: Rural population proportion*
- *Subhypothesis 4: Educational attainment*
- *Subhypothesis 5: Personal income*
- *Subhypothesis 6: Political partisanship*

Hypothesis 2: The difference in recruitment rates between communities with different measurements on the Hypothesis 1 factors

changed between 2000 and 2007. Following September 11, 2001, the nation may have exhibited a rally-round-the-flag effect, a distinct increase in favorable beliefs regarding the President and military service. The war in Afghanistan began shortly after September 11, 2001, so favorable beliefs regarding that war should have been very high if the nation rallied after the attacks on the United States. However, the literature reviews identified factors that could divide personal opinions regarding war, especially as the rallying effect decreased and elite, partisan conflict increased regarding war. This comprises two subhypothesis:

- *Subhypothesis 1: Recruitment rate differences narrowed following September 11, 2001.*
- *Subhypothesis 2: Recruitment rate differences expanded in response to the Iraq War.*

Domain and methods. These main hypotheses and subhypotheses are examined in the empirical domains of public opinion regarding the Afghanistan and Iraq wars (Chapter Four) and Army recruitment and retention (Chapter Five). Principal focus is on the subcases of thousands of respondents' beliefs regarding war and hundreds of thousands of new Army recruits and retention-eligible soldiers.

The analysis of respondent cases determines how respondents' beliefs regarding war varied by the respondents' self-reported sociopolitical demographics. The respondent study includes 243 questions regarding Afghanistan, including fifteen regarding President

George W. Bush, his administration, and the Afghan War. It also includes 1,254 questions regarding Iraq, including 1,176 regarding President George W. Bush, his administration, and the Iraq War. Public opinion survey data that included 51,133 individual respondents' sociopolitical demographics were available from CBS News/*New York Times* polls conducted between April 8, 2004 and December 10, 2006. The ICPSR (Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research) provided the data. Individual-level response data from polls conducted earlier or later than these dates were not available at the time of this study. These individual-level responses remain very useful for examining the interactive effect that respondents' sociopolitical demographics had on respondents' beliefs.

The analysis of Army recruitment and retention follows the analysis of opinion differences. The recruitment and retention analysis determines whether and how the different sociopolitical demographics that related to opinion differences also related to different Army recruitment and retention rates. This study's sample population includes 517,786 recruits who began Army service between January 2000 and September 2007 and 193,572 soldiers eligible for retention between July 2003 and September 2007. Those numbers represent 96.55 percent of all recruits and 93.07 percent of all soldiers eligible for retention. The sample population is nearly the actual recruit and soldier population. It only excludes those recruits and soldiers without hometown ZIP code data or with hometown ZIP codes outside of the fifty states in the U.S. Researching nearly the actual recruit and soldier population has great

theoretical significance. Trends observed in this study were undoubtedly trends that existed in Army recruitment and retention. The identified trends were representative of the actual population that provided the Army its recruits and soldiers eligible for retention.

The main method in this study is "congruence procedure," which compares observations across different cases to infer and test hypotheses.[199] The method requires identification of relatively average levels of both the dependent and independent variables and then tests hypotheses using the study variables' extreme variation. This study's available data and analysis meet this requirement. The congruence procedure method works well because of the extreme values on this dissertation's main dependent variables—Army recruitment and retention rates—and independent variables. The available extreme values across a very large number of cases demonstrate whether and how sociopolitical demographics covaried between opinion and recruitment and retention differences.

Chapter Three is an examination of reported Army recruitment and retention issues. It provides additional support for the selection of this study's hypotheses and sufficient background to begin the analyses of opinion regarding war and Army recruitment and retention between 2001 and 2007. The study's result is a significant contribution to the

[199] S. Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997): 58-63. Furthermore, the study's number of cases is so large that it includes nearly the population of new Army recruits and retention-eligible soldiers. Accordingly, the study enjoys the attractive methodological and statistical characteristics of a large-n analysis. See Ibid., 63-64.

existing literature on public opinion regarding war, person-organization fit, and sociopolitical representation in the Army.

Chapter Three

Examination of Reported U.S. Army Recruitment and Retention Issues and Trends, 2000–2007

This chapter presents an analysis of recruitment and retention issues and trends the United States Army faced from 2000 through 2007. It uses an extensive survey of contemporary news articles and published analyses regarding recruitment and retention. The purpose of this chapter is to build an accurate and comprehensive picture of the recruiting and retention environment throughout the period. It builds an understanding of the United States Army's struggles and successes in filling its ranks between 2000 and 2007. This analysis provides significant support for the falsifiable hypotheses introduced in the next chapter. Noting the literature review's discussion regarding sociopolitical gaps between the Army and society, this analysis of recruitment and retention issues also helps identify the likely recruitment and retention trends explored in the next chapter.

Pre-September 11, 2001. The Army was only moderately successful in filling its ranks with new recruits in the years prior to September 11, 2001. The Regular Army—one of three components, including the National Guard and the Army Reserve—met its recruiting goal about a month ahead of the end of the 2001 fiscal year. A fiscal year runs from October to September, so the 2001 fiscal year ended September 30, 2001. The previous three years had not been an easy recruiting environment. In 1998, the Army missed its recruitment goal by 800 recruits. In 1999, it missed the goal by 6,300 recruits, and in 2000,

it made the goal by 113 recruits. The percentage of total recruits with prior-service is a good measure of how difficult it is to recruit new soldiers. In late August 2001, the Army offered prior-service soldiers $5,000 if they would report for duty by September 25, 2001, and some were eligible for bonuses up to $20,000.[200] In response to recruiting difficulties, the Army tailored programs to increase recruitment just prior to September 11, 2001.

In 2001, Department of Defense advertising costs were above $270 million, more than double its 1995 advertising costs. Of that total, the Army spent $98.5 million.[201] The Commanding General of United States Army Recruiting Command (CG, USAREC), Major General (MG) Dennis Cavin stressed the availability of programs designed to attract Hispanics to the Army, including GED Plus. GED Plus helped recruits earn their General Educational Development (GED) certificate if they enlisted in the Army.[202] GED Plus was not limited to Hispanics, and it was in response to troubling youth trends. Young adults exhibited lowering educational achievement. Fewer young adults were eligible for enlistment due to health and criminal misconduct issues. The Army faced increasing competition from the private sector to hire the dwindling proportion of high-quality potential recruits.

The Army commissioned studies of young adults' propensity to enlist into the services, and recruiting commanders often discussed

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[200] Rick Maze, "Prior-service recruiting has larger role in manning mix," *Army Times* (September 3, 2001): 22.
[201] Suzanne Vranica, "U.S. military alters its approach in ads," *Wall Street Journal* (September 20, 2001): B10.
[202] Jane McHugh, "Army recruiters push to lure more Hispanics," *Navy Times* (August 6, 2001): 34.

propensity to serve. According to studies and commanders, a good economy, which includes high wages and low unemployment, and good educational opportunities make it difficult for the services to attract the highest-quality recruits in the quantities the services require to meet both congressional quality mandates and service recruitment goals. Lieutenant General (LTG) Timothy Maude, Army deputy chief of staff for personnel;[203] Secretary of the Army Thomas E. White; and MG Dennis Cavin[204] all projected before September 11, 2001 that recruitment in fiscal year 2002 would be difficult due to an improving economy and the relative ease of beginning a college education. David S.C. Chu, undersecretary of defense for personnel and readiness, cited the importance of influencers such as parents, teachers, and coaches in determining whether young adults would enlist.[205] Before September 11, 2001, young black and Hispanic adults expressed a higher propensity to serve than did young white, non-Hispanic adults:

> According to the August (2001) poll, 16 percent of white men said they would serve, compared to 31 percent of Hispanic men and 38 percent of African-American men. Among women, 8 percent of white women said they would serve, while 23 percent of both Hispanic and African-American women said they would serve."[206]

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[203] Rick Maze, "Recruiters focus on changing anti-military mind-set," *Army Times* (August 6, 2001): 31.
[204] Jane McHugh, "Recruit goal met," *Army Times* (September 17, 2001): 10.
[205] Maze, "Recruiters focus on changing anti-military mind-set."
[206] Vince Crawley, "Sept. 11's impact on recruiting minimal," *Navy Times* (January 14, 2002): 7.

The higher propensity to serve of young black adults was apparent in the proportion of black Americans in the Army.[207] Prior to September 11, 2001, black Americans were overrepresented in the Army's enlisted ranks. Black Americans were and are underrepresented in the officer corps. Hispanics were and are underrepresented across the Army's ranks.

Prior to September 11, 2001, the Army faced the issue of increased operational tempo or the number of deployments the Army supported throughout the 1990s. Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera at the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) conference in December 2000 called for a larger Army, arguing that because the Army was the nation's key strategic force for humanitarian and peacekeeping missions, more soldiers were needed in the force:

> One: You can't be a people force without the people. You have to ensure you have the people. If you're going to use them the way we've been using them, then we need a larger Army. Two: You have to give the soldiers the tools they need to do the job both in peace and wartime.[208]

Although the Army was smaller in the 1990s than the Cold War period, the Army deployed more frequently and deployed a larger percentage of the active-duty force than it had in many decades. Prior to September 11, 2001, Army leadership was already pressuring Congress to increase the Army's authorized end strength, the number of soldiers on active or reserve duty measured on September 30 every year.

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[207] e.g., D. Armor, "Race and gender in the U.S. military," *Armed Forces and Society* 23, no. 1 (1996).
[208] J. Siemieniec, "Caldera stresses need for larger Army," *The Officer* 76, no. 11 (2001): 49.

All recruits must take the Armed Service Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), an exam that determines each recruit's quality. The Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) is a subset of the ASVAB, and scores on the areas within the AFQT actually determine the recruit's quality category. The military computes each recruit's quality by standardizing AFQT results against a 1997 sample and then placing the recruit into a quality category. Each recruit receives a score between 1 and 99. A score of 99 means that the recruit scored better than 99 percent of 18- to 23-year-olds who took the exam in 1997. Such a recruit is in the highest quality category, Category I. A score of 25 means the recruit scored better than 25 percent of 18- to 23-year-olds who took the exam in 1997. This recruit is considered Category IVA, almost the lowest quality. The Department of Defense limits the proportion of new recruits with scores below 31 to 4 percent of all enlistees. The Army for decades self-limited its intake of the lowest-quality recruits to 2 percent of all enlistees.[209] In the years following September 11, 2001, the Army adjusted its intake of quality recruits to meet recruitment demands.

Reaction to the September 11, 2001 attacks. In the year following September 11, 2001, the Army faced no difficulty reaching its recruiting goals; however, the Army did not experience a large increase in actual enlistments. Army officials and recruiters widely reported that the Army did not experience significantly increased enlistment because of an increase in expressed patriotism. Interest in enlisting into the Army peaked in early October. In September 2001, the Army had about eight

[209] F. Kaplan, "Dumb and dumber," *Slate on-line magazine* (accessed February 11, 2011); available from http://www.slate.com/id/2182752/.

more enlistment contracts signed per day than in September 2000. In October 2001, recruitment across all armed forces was actually lower than in October 2000. That outcome was significant because the United States slipped into recession after October 2000. Recruitment generally should have been better in the same month a year later. Wayne Sellman, Director of Accession Policy in the Department of Defense, stated that the belief that citizens enlist in droves following national emergencies was a myth, with patterns after September 11, 2001 following what he had experienced since 1980.[210] In October 2001, a Department of Defense survey found that 32 percent of 1,000 16- to 21-year-old males stated they probably or definitely would consider enlisting, an increase from 21 percent in August 2001. Interest in ROTC spiked as well, as applications increased for ROTC scholarships and calls to recruiters. Conversely, some of the increase occurred before September 11, 2001, as program managers cited increased advertising efforts as a reason for increasing interest in ROTC.[211] LTG John Van Alstyne, deputy assistant defense secretary for military personnel policy, stated that the increase in expressed interest in enlisting following September 11, 2001 was an expression of patriotism and not a sign of marked increase in intentions to enlist.[212] Paul Boyce, Army Public Affairs, in an interview stated that "the notion that the terror attacks and subsequent operation to root out

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[210] Crawley, "Sept. 11's impact on recruiting minimal."
[211] David Abel, "Campuses seeing ROTC revival," *Boston Globe* (October 8, 2001): B1.
[212] Rick Maze, "Recruit levels good, but services want more," *Army Times* (March 4, 2002): 15.

al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan produced a swell in recruitment" was "an urban myth."[213]

Recruiters reported that they received many phone calls but not higher numbers of youth enlistments. Many calls were from veterans too old to serve or from people expressing their support of the military.[214] Ray Dial, aged 32, was an example of someone spurred to enlist into the Army, but he was too old to actually enlist.[215] The maximum recruitment age in 2001 was 29. Many desiring to enlist were either not medically qualified for service, too old, or discouraged by a significant relation or family member.[216] According to a recruiter, the ineligibles fell into two categories: "There are older retirees hoping for a chance to serve in the military again and people who didn't graduate from high school or have histories of criminal conduct or drug use."[217] One recruiter mentioned in the same article that his upper-income recruitment area (Lapeer, Michigan) had actually become more accommodating than before September 11, 2001.

In short, enthusiasm to enlist was higher than it was before September 11, 2001, but reports suggested that actual recruiting increases were minimal. Some of those desiring to enlist after September 11, 2001 were incapable because of recruiting standards: age limits,

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[213] Greg Bluestein, "The assault on Iraq: Military revamps recruiting pitch," *Wall Street Journal* (March 31, 2003): A8.
[214] Vince Crawley, "Law grants recruiters more access to high schools," *Army Times* (February 4, 2002): 16.
[215] Jane McHugh, "Recruiters not being overwhelmed," *Army Times* (September 24, 2001): 30.
[216] Molly Williams, "Many Americans try to join the military, but not so many measure up," *Wall Street Journal* (October 25, 2001): B1.
[217] Rick Maze, "Patriotism fails to boost recruiting," *Army Times* (April 1, 2002): 36. Emphasis mine.

physical requirements, or criminal and moral issues. Still, the Army met its fiscal year 2002 recruiting goals without a large increase in financial incentives. The most significant changes this year included the introduction of stop-loss ordered on November 30, 2001 and its subsequent expansion over the next years. Stop-loss orders and stop-move orders prevented designated soldiers from leaving the Army at the end of their contracted service period (expiration, term of service, or ETS) or from moving to a new location in order to maintain unit strength and cohesion prior to and during deployments. Another significant change was the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 signed by President Bush on January 8, 2002. The act requires schools to provide names, phone numbers, and addresses for every student if the military requests the information. Failure to provide the information could cost the school its federal funding provided by the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. Parents can opt out of the disclosure, which prevents college and job recruiters from obtaining the same information. Intense debate about this "hidden" requirement began in fall 2002, nearly a year after the President signed the act.

Special operations forces were a focus of recruitment and retention. An array of changes occurred in January 2002. A new program allowed direct enlistments under military occupational specialty 18X and a $20,000 enlistment bonus. Active-duty soldiers were allowed to undertake Special Forces qualification with two years of active service instead of four.

A conflict that continued to draw attention into 2011 intensified following September 11, 2001: the military's ban on open homosexual service and law schools preventing military recruitment based on that discriminatory, in their view, policy. To address the problem of military recruiter access to law students, Congress passed the Solomon Amendment in 1996. The Solomon Amendment made federal research funding to colleges and universities contingent on those institutions allowing military recruiters to visit their students. On November 12, 2001, the Society of Law Teachers (SALT) circulated a memorandum to law school associate deans, warning the law schools that "the tragedy our country has suffered has created a delicate political climate that creates additional momentum to allow the military to recruit at law schools."[218] The Air Force sent letters to multiple schools stating that the schools were not in compliance with the Solomon Amendment and may be referred to the Department of Defense to begin the process of withholding federal funding.

In August 2002, Harvard Law School Dean Robert C. Clark lifted the school's ban on military recruiting on the law school campus.[219] A referral to the Department of Defense could have cost Harvard $328 million in federal funding. In October 2002, Yale announced that it would allow military recruiters at the Yale Law School's off-campus fall interview program. About $340 million in federal funding to Yale was at stake. By November 2002, at least Boston College, Boston University,

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[218] Andrew Morriss, "Law profs throw SALT on 9/11 wounds," *Wall Street Journal* (November 12, 2001): A22.
[219] Patrick Healy, "Despite concerns, law schools admit military recruiters," *Boston Globe* (November 12, 2002): A1.

Columbia, Harvard, New York University, the University of Southern California, Western New England College, and Yale had provided more access to military recruiters.

Numerous law school faculty and student groups were upset with the increased access given to military recruiters. These groups claimed that the military's "don't ask, don't tell" policy on homosexual service in the military was discriminatory and against school policy. On September 19, 2003, the Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR) and SALT filed suit against the Department of Defense for violating their First Amendment rights by forcing law schools to allow military recruiters on law school campuses. Both FAIR and SALT were not directly supported by institutions but were comprised of faculty and students. On March 6, 2006, the Supreme Court ruled for the government in favor of the Solomon Amendment. The ruling did not quash protests against recruiter access to students, as debate continued regarding the morality of the military's "don't ask, don't tell" policy. Very significant was the discussion of the topic and Elena Kagan's role as the Dean of Harvard Law School during her Supreme Court confirmation hearings.

Increasing strain, 2002–2004. As the Iraq War approached, the Army still faced no extreme difficulties in meeting its recruiting goals. However, some in Congress were concerned that the Army did not equally represent society, ensuring that all facets of United States society would not equally sacrifice in war. Representatives Charles Rangel of New York's 15th District and John Conyers, Jr. of Michigan's 14th District

introduced a bill on January 7, 2003, to reinstate the military draft. Rangel argued:

> I truly believe that those who make the decision and those who support the United States going into war would feel more readily the pain that's involved, the sacrifice that's involved, if they thought that the fighting force would include the affluent and those who historically have avoided this great responsibility.[220]

Both representatives were also outspoken opponents of the threatened war against Iraq. Rangel later wrote in the *New York Daily News* that he distrusted Secretary Rumsfeld's view that a war in Iraq would be speedy. Rangel believed that more ground forces would be required and a draft would promote "the principle of shared sacrifice in both the military and economic spheres." Rangel cited correctly that the percentage of veterans among Congressman had fallen for years before September 11, 2001.[221] He argued that elite detachment from military service and sacrifice made politicians more likely to vote for any war. As recruiting difficulties and troop shortages increased throughout 2004, discussion of the return of the draft increased. On October 5, 2004, the House Republican leadership brought Rangel's and Conyers' bill up for vote, knowing that the House would defeat it and provide evidence that the draft would not

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[220] *CNN Politics* (accessed January 15, 2011); available from http://articles.cnn.com/2003-01-07/politics/rangel.draft_1_military-draft-rangel-poor-fight.

[221] W. Bianco and J. Markham, "Vanishing veterans: The decline in military experience in the U.S. Congress," in *Soldiers and Civilians*, ed. Feaver and Kohn (Cambridge, MA; London: MIT Press, 2001).

be reinstated. The draft bill was defeated 402–2.[222] Undeterred, Rangel introduced another draft reinstatement bill in the House in 2006.

The Army's recruiting difficulties increased following the beginning of the Iraq War and accelerated about a year after the invasion. In December 2003, the Army introduced selective retention bonuses of $5,000–$7,000, lump-sum and tax-free for soldiers deployed in a combat zone tax exemption location, such as Iraq or Afghanistan. Through April 30, 2004, the Army was the only active-duty service that did not exceed its goal for initial and midcareer retention. The Army Reserve was also short of its retention goals. In March 2004, the maximum bonus increased to $10,000 for soldiers reenlisting for assignment to combat brigades just returned or returning from Iraq.[223]

The Army was preparing for the next year's combat deployments to Iraq and faced difficulties manning the reserve units it wanted to deploy in the place of active-duty brigades. The Army had stop-loss and stop-move orders in place, but it also turned to the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The IRR includes soldiers who have served their initial service obligation but less than their actual eight-year total service obligation.[224] The Army used the IRR pool to fully man deploying units. The Army could not contact about 34 percent (about 40,500 of 120,700) of the IRR. The Department of Defense requested that Congress allow the services to use Internal Revenue Service tax returns to locate the missing

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[222] Vicki Allen, "House crushes military draft bill," Reuters (October 5, 2004).
[223] Jim Tice, "Mo' SRB money," *Army Times* (March 29, 2004): 21.
[224] For active-duty Soldiers, their active duty service obligation, and for reservists, their reserve drill obligation.

reservists.[225] Congress balked and did not include the request in the 2005 defense authorization bill.

In late spring 2004, IRR members reported that they were contacted by local reserve recruiters and told to either volunteer (reenlist) or be involuntarily activated. The Army Reserve Command stated that recruiters were only told to encourage IRR members to volunteer.[226] The IRR activations were not far behind. By early July 2004, the Army called 5,674 IRR members to active duty with more to come.[227] While the National Guard was not meeting its recruiting goals, it needed to be prepared to account for 43 percent of the force deployed to Iraq in 2005. Many of the IRR activations targeted personnel vacancies in deploying National Guard units.

Concern in the Army and Congress about the use of stop-loss orders, reserve mobilizations, and IRR recalls motivated discussions about increasing the Army's end strength. The Army required more soldiers, but the Department of Defense did not readily support an increase. Congress would add an increase into the budget without a formal request from the Department of Defense.[228] Each additional soldier costs about $60,000 per year, so the Army would have to fund any manpower increase internally without a budget increase. A manpower increase of 2 percent of the force, about 9,600 soldiers, would

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[225] Vince Crawley, "Pentagon wants IRS help in finding reservists," *Air Force Times* (April 19, 2004): 24.
[226] "Be straight with the IRR," *Army Times* (June 14, 2004): 52.
[227] Michael Hirsh and T. Trent Gegax, "Needed: More Soldiers, more billions," *Newsweek* (July 12, 2004): 8.
[228] Rick Maze, "Help wanted, but unlikely," *Army Times* (March 25, 2002): 26.

have cost the Army about $576 million a year. Some members of Congress attempted to increase manpower in 2002 and 2003 but failed. Secretary Rumsfeld would not support manpower increases because manpower risked funds used for transformation projects. Secretary Rumsfeld also felt that the services could adjust their mix of unit types and soldier specialties to better reflect their actual needs. Bipartisan consensus on an end-strength increase began building as twenty-four of thirty-three active-duty brigade combat teams were deployed, stop-loss orders were in effect, and reservists were on extended active-duty orders in Iraq.[229] In February 2004, Congress increased the Army's end strength to 512,400 from 482,400, an increase of 30,000 soldiers. The 30,000 soldiers would help reduce operational tempo for some soldiers and fill eleven to fifteen new combat brigades.

The 30,000 soldier increase, the prospect of multiple twelve-month deployments to combat, the improving economy, and a shortage of about 400 recruiters across the country forced the Army to tap deeply into its pool of recruits in the delayed-entry program.[230] The delayed-entry program allows the Army to program enlistees for initial entry training anytime between one week and one year from the recruit's enlistment date. In October 2003, the Army had about 33,000 recruits in the program. The Army projected it would have 16,000 recruits in the program in October 2004. Also, the Army's recruitment target for 2005 was higher than its 2004 target. The 2004 target increased from 72,000

[229] William Mat, "Is the U.S. military too small?" *Defense News* (January 12, 2004): 1.
[230] Greg Jaffe, "Army recruiting faces a shortfall due to call-ups," *Wall Street Journal* (July 22, 2004): A3.

to 77,000, and the Army wanted 80,000 recruits in 2005. The Army knew it would face extreme difficulty in reaching the higher target.

In the midst of these recruiting difficulties, the Army commissioned GfK Custom Research Incorporated to conduct a survey of a representative sample of potential Army recruits, 1,828 youth ages 16 to 24.[231] Among the survey goals were: "What is the current image of the Army, overall and in comparison to other branches? … How do African-Americans and Hispanics, two groups of special interest, view the military?"[232] Regarding these questions, the survey found that "fear of death or injury is the major barrier to joining the military today" and that "more African-Americans identify having to fight for a cause they don't support as a barrier to military service."[233]

Overall, the survey found that 41 percent of the potential recruits strongly agreed that they would fight for the United States, "depending on the cause." Twenty-two percent of potential recruits would fight "for any cause." Ten percent agreed that "everyone should serve in the military."[234] Across all categories of propensity to serve, the tangible benefit of obtaining assistance in paying for a college education was a top five motivator for service. The high-propensity category placed greater importance on the intangible benefits of service, such as pride in service and serving one's country.[235]

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[231] GfK Custom Research Incorporated, *United States Army: U.S. Military Image Study* (Nuremberg, Germany: GfK Group, 2004).
[232] Ibid., 6.
[233] Ibid., 13-4.
[234] Ibid., 27.
[235] Ibid., 38.

When asked for their main reasons for not joining the military in the next few years, the difference in reasons between the lower-propensity cohorts and the highest-propensity cohort were statistically significant and different in many areas. The lowest-propensity cohort (of 1,828 respondents, the 548 who stated that they will definitely not serve in the military in the next few years) cited the possibility of killing or being killed as a barrier to service at a statistically significant higher rate than the highest-propensity cohort. The lowest-propensity cohort cited "Loss of personal freedom" and "I'm just not a military person" at a much higher rate than the other cohorts: 71 percent of the lowest propensity cohort cited "I'm just not a military person," compared to only 29 percent of the highest propensity cohort. This is of interest because it may relate to a general aversion of military service. Finally, the requirement to fight for a cause that the person doesn't support is among the many statistically significant differences between the propensity cohorts. Sixty-four percent of the lowest-propensity cohort cited the possibility of fighting "for a cause I don't support" as a major barrier to service; 45 percent of the highest-propensity cohort cited that reason as a major barrier.

Two questions related directly to young adults' views regarding the type of people who join the Army. Only 25 percent of respondents agreed with the statement that the Army is "for better educated people," and 50 percent agreed that the Army "is a last resort as a career choice."[236] The Army's advertisement campaign beginning in May 2005 reflected nearly

[236] Ibid., 74 and 76.

all of the themes that GfK found in this survey.[237] The Army also introduced numerous recruitment and retention incentives in summer 2004.

The Army announced that its retention bonuses in 2005 would amount to $204 million. Bonuses in 2004 were about $167 million, and in 2003 they were about $117 million.[238] The Army generally tied pre-Iraq War retention bonuses to number of additional years and Korean peninsula service. The Army shifted bonuses to target soldiers who were willing to move to a post standing up new combat brigades and soldiers who reenlisted overseas. Bonuses ranged from $5,000 to $40,000. More of each bonus was also authorized for lump sum payment rather than payment over the term of reenlistment, which decreased tax penalties if soldiers reenlisted in a combat zone tax exclusion area.

The Army did not find it difficult to convince soldiers to stay in the service. "[T]he diverse menu of new retention bonuses, a sluggish civilian job market, a new home-basing scheme, and a widely held sentiment among career soldiers that they [did] not want to leave the Army in time of war" all helped retention efforts.[239] By August 2004, the Army and National Guard were over their fiscal year retention goals, and the Army Reserve was at 99 percent of its goal. The Army was trying to meet the requirement to grow its end strength by 30,000 soldiers by September 2006.

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[237] Jane McHugh, "Recruiting ads pitch parents," *Army Times* (May 2, 2005): 12.
[238] Jim Tice, "Re-up and call the shots," *Army Times* (August 9, 2004): 14.
[239] Ibid.

The Department of Defense introduced Operation Blue to Green, a new recruitment program that aimed to help the Air Force and Navy downsize and the Army grow. The Air Force and Navy were under intense pressure to downsize personnel in order to pay for high-tech weapons programs. The Air Force was scheduled to lose 22,000 personnel and the Navy to lose 8,000 over the following two years. The Army planned to target those downsized volunteers for branch transfers into the Army.[240] Other recruitment incentives included a $3,000 "quick ship" bonus given to recruits willing to enter the service within thirty days.[241] The Army also increased its college loan repayment program from $50,000 to $70,000.

In September 2004, the National Guard announced that it would miss its annual recruitment goal. A major reason was the lack of prior-service soldiers willing to enlist in the National Guard and face near certain mobilization for a tour to Iraq. BG Frank Grass, National Guard deputy director, announced that the service would attempt to stabilize just-deployed prior-service soldiers for two years following an active-duty combat tour.[242] The active-duty Army met its recruitment goal with 77,587 recruits. MG Michael Rochelle, Army Recruiting Command Chief, noted that the war was having an uneven effect on recruitment. The recruits "are as close to a throwback to the World War II generation as anything we've seen since then, and the nation is very fortunate to have

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[240] Tice, "Re-up and call the shots."
[241] Christopher Cooper, "Black recruits slide as share of Army forces," *Wall Street Journal* (October 7, 2004): B1.
[242] "Stability sought to attract Guard recruits," *National Guard* (September 2004): 24.

that young cohort of Americans here at this particular time."[243] The war deterred some from enlisting and encouraged others.

A significant change in the ethnic makeup of recruits occurred after the Iraq War began.[244] In 2003, black Americans accounted for about 13 percent of the United States population. While still overrepresented among new soldiers, between October 2003 and September 2004 black recruits into the Regular Army dropped sharply to 12,103 (15.6 percent of the all recruits) from 16,695 (21 percent of recruits) between October 2001 and September 2002. The percentage of white recruits increased from 62.7 (49,846) to 65.2 percent (50,586).

All components faced recruiting difficulties in late 2004. The Marine Corps, for example, failed to meet its recruiting goal for the first time in 114 months. The Army fell short of its goal for the first time since May 2000. In November 2004, the Army had 11,428 soldiers under stop-loss orders.[245] The Army responded to these issues by increasing recruitment and retention incentives again.

On December 15, 2004, the National Guard and Army Reserve began offering up to a $20,000 bonus for a six-year enlistment, up from $5,000 in the Guard and $8,000 in the Reserve. Both services offered officer bonuses as well as increased student loan repayment amounts. They also, for the first time, offered $15,000 retention bonuses. All components increased their recruiter pools: the Guard by 51 percent

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[243] Sean D. Naylor, "Recruiting goal met," *Army Times* (October 11, 2004): 10.
[244] Cooper, "Black recruits slide."
[245] Tom Vanden Brook, "DOD data: More forced to stay in Army," *USA Today* (April 21, 2008).

(2,700 to 4,100), the Reserve by 27 percent (1,440 to 1,840), and the Regular Army by 6 percent (5,654 to 6,029).[246] General Peter J. Schoomaker, Army Chief of Staff, acted to head off looming shortages.[247] He requested an additional $537.5 million in funding for recruitment, retention, and initial entry training programs.

Changing resources, standards, and success, 2005–2007. Army recruiting difficulties did not ease through spring 2005. All three components struggled to meet their goals. Through April, the Regular Army was at 89 percent of its goal, the Reserve at 82 percent, and the National Guard at 77 percent. In response, the Army Reserve and National Guard both increased the enlistment age limit from 34 to 39.[248] Additionally, the Army Reserve began offering a three-year enlistment to recruits from the Eastern and Northeastern United States,[249] the toughest recruitment regions. The Army began offering a fifteen-month enlistment with significant college benefits under Senator McCain's National Call to Service Program.[250] To entice special operations soldiers to remain in the service and to compete against private security firms' wages, the Army offered up to $150,000 for a six-year re-enlistment commitment. Meanwhile, stop-loss orders persisted across the

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[246] Mark Thompson, "Where are the new recruits?" *Time* (January 10, 2005); Rebekah-mae Bruns, "Guardmen lining up in Iraq to re-enlist for new bonuses," *National Guard* (February 2005): 31.
[247] Jane McHugh, "Regular Army falls short of recruiting goal," *Army Times* (March 14, 2005): 10.
[248] "Army Guard boosts enlistment age limit," *National Guard* (April 2005): 23.
[249] Jane McHugh, "3-year tours," *Army Times* (April 18, 2005): 10.
[250] "15-month enlistment option goes nationwide," *Army Times* (May 23, 2005): 16.

components.[251] Congress also began debating a further 20,000 soldier increase in the Army's end strength. Both stop-loss orders and the end strength increase were designed to cover shortages in soldiers available for deployment.

The recruiter force bore a heavy burden throughout this period. In response to nationally publicized recruiter misconduct, MG Rochelle ordered a nationwide Army recruitment stand-down in May 2005.[252] During the day, recruiters discussed ethics and standards and finished by reaffirming their oath of service to the nation. MG Rochelle stated that the Army would not lower its standards for recruits in an attempt to meet its recruitment goals.

However, the Army needed young soldiers to remain in the Army in order to fill deploying units and reduce operational tempo. Around this time, the Army removed from battalion commanders the ability to separate soldiers for physical fitness, pregnancy, alcohol or drug abuse issues, or unsatisfactory performance. In 2010, the Army published a report that explicitly cited the risks involved with these changes:

> When standards slip, we begin to see dangerous trends in behavior. … [We] are creating and sustaining a high risk population that is a subset of the Army population. Several factors including an increase in enlistment waivers (e.g., misconduct) combined with a decrease in separations have led to a small cohort that may be more likely to abuse drugs and alcohol while engaging in increased levels of high risk and criminal

[251] Rick Maze, "Stop-loss will continue," *Army Times* (April 25, 2005): 26.
[252] Gordon Trowbridge, "Recruiting chief: 'We will not lower our standards'," *Army Times* (May 30, 2005): 18.

> activity.[253] … [We] are retaining sub-standard trainees in the generating force and moving them quickly into the operating force.[254] … At some point, the decision must be made either to accept the erosion of Army standards (entry and retentions) for the sake of manpower or enforce regulations to maintain order and discipline.[255]

In 2005, the Army now required brigade commanders to review and approve these separations at the same time brigade commanders were requesting soldiers to fill personnel shortages in their units. That put brigade commanders in the awkward position of defending actions that reduced their deployable strength and asking for personnel to increase their deployable strength. In March 2005, about 17 percent of all soldiers failed to graduate from initial entry training, and another 7 percent did not serve three years with their first unit following graduation. The Army wanted to reduce that 24 percent (total) to 17 percent.[256] Commanders were under greater pressure to meet the higher initial-term soldier retention goals.

In July 2005, the Army introduced new retention incentives. Soldiers prepared to leave active duty were eligible for a $10,000 bonus and a twelve-month deployment deferral if they enlisted into the Reserve or National Guard. The deployment deferral was available to soldiers if they had recently returned from combat. In an exchange of incentives to prevent an exodus from the Regular Army, Reserve and National Guard

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[253] *Army Health Promotion, Risk Reduction, and Suicide Prevention Report* (Washington, D.C.: United States Army, 2010): 40.
[254] Ibid., 60.
[255] Ibid., 69.
[256] Greg Jaffe, "To fill ranks, Army acts to retain even problem enlistees," *Wall Street Journal* (June 3, 2005): B1.

Soldiers were also eligible for up to $20,000 if they enlisted in the Regular Army instead of ending their service.[257] Furthermore, the Army significantly increased its retention bonuses.[258] As an example, under the new limits, a first-term infantryman could reenlist for $17,500 instead of $10,000.

The Army introduced new recruiting incentives in late fall 2005, shortly after all three components missed their fiscal year recruiting goals. The Army missed by 8 percent, the Army Reserve by 13 percent, and the National Guard by 20 percent. First, the Army began offering prior-service soldiers up to $19,000 and the possibility of retaining their former rank in exchange for returning to active duty.[259] Second, under a program called "Army Education Plus," recruits without a high school diploma or GED certificate could enlist into the delayed-entry program and gain Army assistance in earning their GED certificates. This program did not raise the official cap (10 percent) on the number of recruits allowed into the service without at least a high school diploma. Ten percent or more of all 16- to 24-year-olds are out of high school without a diploma, and they face extreme health and financial issues compared to those with at least a high school diploma.[260] The Regular Army broke the 10 percent cap on recruits without a high school diploma by recruiting 13 percent and broke the traditional 2 percent cap on recruits scoring in

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[257] Joseph R. Chenelly, "Reservists reap rewards for switch to active duty," *Army Times* (July 11, 2005): 18.
[258] Jim Tice, "Get thousands more to re-up, but don't delay," *Army Times* (July 25, 2005): 12.
[259] Mark D. Faram, "Bonuses target former Soldiers," *Army Times* (November 21, 2005): 20.
[260] Joseph R. Chenelly, "Open door for high school dropouts," *Army Times* (October 3, 2005): 8.

the lowest category on the aptitude test by recruiting 3.9 percent.[261] Army service and benefits are significant compared to expected earnings high school dropouts face in the civilian economy.

In November 2005, the National Priorities Project (NPP) released an extensive study of demographic data of recruits entering the Army in 2004. The NPP study used the same recruit home-of-record ZIP code information that this study uses to determine differences in recruiting trends across U.S. counties. The media extensively reported the NPP study's conclusions, which highlighted the general finding that "the military is leaning heavily for recruits on economically depressed, rural areas where youths' need for jobs may outweigh the risks of going to war."[262] The Heritage Foundation published counterreports in 2005, 2006, and 2008 that claimed that recruits were coming from wealthier ZIP codes in 2004 and 2005 than in 1999 and 2000[263] and wealthier neighborhoods in 2008.[264] The Heritage Foundation's reports, however, included every service's recruits in the analysis, not only the active-duty United States Army. Because Air Force and Navy recruits likely come from significantly different backgrounds than Army recruits,[265] it is impossible to conclude anything about Army recruits using the Heritage Foundation reports' methodology.

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[261] Ann Scott Tyson, "Youths in rural U.S. are drawn to military," *Washington Post* (November 4, 2005).
[262] Ibid.
[263] T. Kane, *Who are the Recruits? The Demographic Characteristics of U.S. Military Enlistment, 2003-2005* (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2006).
[264] Watkins and Sherk.
[265] e.g., GfK Custom Research Incorporated.

Over the next few years, the Army significantly increased recruitment and retention incentives and changed enlistment standards for new recruits. In December 2005, the National Guard began the Guard Recruiting Assistance Program (G-RAP), which paid soldiers up to $2,000 for referring someone to the Army: $1,000 when the referral signed an enlistment contract and $1,000 when the referral completed initial entry training.[266] In September 2006, the G-RAP program began paying Guard retirees for referrals. The Army increased the recruitment force to include the extensive informal recruitment network that exists outside of its specialized recruiters: former or retired military personnel and currently serving soldiers. Considering these policies, a community's veteran and military presence should have related to different recruitment rates.

The Army also made specialists (grade E-4) with six to ten years of service in certain specialties eligible for up to $40,000 retention bonuses.[267] In January 2006, the Army increased the maximum Regular Army enlistment bonus to $40,000 from $20,000 and the maximum Army Reserve enlistment bonus to $20,000 from $10,000. The Army increased the maximum enlistment age to 39 in January 2006 and to 41 in June 2006.

Certain recruits could have earned a considerable amount of money in bonuses.[268] The maximum was likely for a recruit with college loans and who was willing to enlist in a hazardous duty specialty, such

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[266] Michael Levenson, "Guard pays members for enlisting others," *Boston Globe* (January 5, 2006): A1.
[267] Julian E. Barnes, "U.S. plans to boost military, but draft unlikely," *Los Angeles Times* (December 24, 2006).
[268] "Enlistment incentives," *Soldiers* (February 2006): 18.

as explosive ordnance disposal (a bomb disposal technician). Such a recruit may have qualified for an enlistment bonus of up to $20,000, student loan repayment up to $65,000, and a monthly assignment incentive pay bonus of $400 (capped at $14,400 over thirty-six months). In exchange for four to six years of service, such a recruit could have earned $99,400 in *bonus* pay.

Operation Sergeant Major of the Army Recruiting Team (SMART) throughout the late 1990s and to 2006 tracked reserve units' referral of potential recruits to Army recruiters. The program pressured units to perform by tracking the number of referrals each year, but goals were generally small (one referral per month per 150 soldiers in a unit). In spring 2001, if a soldier had three or more referrals, he or she earned a coin from the Sergeant Major of the Army. In October 2001, every soldier with a referral earned a coin. In May 2006, the program expanded to give any soldier (Army, National Guard, or Reserve) a $1,000 referral bonus for each referral completing basic and advanced individual training.[269] In December 2006, it expanded to match the G-RAP program's $2,000 bonus.

The National Guard began a streak of recruiting success following its 2005 shortfall. The G-RAP program had a major impact: About 23 percent of all new Guard recruits came in through the program. One G-RAP participant, Sergeant Dana Kline, referred forty-seven people in eleven months and received a $94,000 payment. The Guard stated that the G-RAP program helped it enlist three of every four contacts, while

[269] Beth Reece, "Bonus: $1000 for referrals," *Soldiers* (April 2006): 42.

normal recruiting requires contacting about ten people for each recruit. Charles Moskos stated plainly that the program highlighted the fact that "personal contact is far more important than multimillion-dollar advertising."[270] In June 2007, the program expanded further to any civilian working for the Department of the Army.[271]

Regarding changing enlistment standards, the Army began accepting more recruits without high school diplomas and more recruits in the lowest-aptitude categories. The Army changed its tattoo policy to allow in most any recruit with tattoos except facial tattoos. The Army implemented a test to determine if obese potential recruits could enlist into the Army.[272] The test was called the Assessment of Recruit Motivation and Strength. If the recruit passed a stairstep and pushup test, the recruit could enlist and would have to meet height/weight regulations within his or her first twelve months in the service.

The Army increased its use of moral and physical fitness waivers in order to meet recruitment goals. Serious misconduct waivers increased from 630 to 1,017, and misdemeanor waivers increased from 4,587 to 6,542.[273] In 2007, over 13 percent of all recruits required drug use or conduct waivers to join the Army.[274] At the same time that many were concerned that the Army was lowering its enlistment standards too aggressively, the Southern Poverty Law Center released a study, then

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[270] Michelle Tan, "Star recruiting assistant nets big bonus," *Air Force Times* (April 23, 2007): 25.
[271] "Referral bonus extended to Army civilians," *Soldiers* (June 2007): 33.
[272] Michelle Tan, "Fat chance," *Army Times* (December 26, 2005): 14.
[273] Barnes, "U.S. plans to boost military."
[274] In 2008, 12 percent and in 2009, 7 percent required waivers. *Army Health Promotion*, 70.

widely circulated by the media, claiming that the military knowingly recruited and retained members of racist groups, such as neo-Nazis and white supremacists.[275]

The Regular Army achieved its enlistment goals in 2006 and 2007, but with a drop in quality of recruits while increasing benefits for enlisting. In 2006, 19 percent of its enlistees were not high school graduates, 39 percent scored in the lowest two categories on the services aptitude exam, and almost 4 percent scored in the lowest category. The National Guard and Army Reserve both barely missed their 2006 recruitment goals.[276] In 2007, 29 percent of Army enlistees did not have a high school diploma, 55 percent scored in the lowest two aptitude categories, and 4.1 percent scored in the lowest category.[277]

Some of the fall in quality related to the Army's need for quantity. In December 2006, GEN Schoomaker pushed for another end strength increase, reported in the media at nearly the same time that the American Enterprise Institute presented its proposal for a troop surge to Iraq.[278] In January 2007, the new Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates, proposed to increase the Army's end strength by 35,000 to 547,000.[279] Congress approved the increase. The Army needed to grow the force during an increasingly unpopular war and from a relatively strong economy. When MG Thomas P. Bostick, Army Recruiting Command

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[275] D. Holthouse, "A few bad men," *Intelligence Report* no. 122 (2006).
[276] Gordon Lubold, "Services hit active-duty recruitment goals for fiscal '06," *Army Times* (October 23, 2006): 10.
[277] Kaplan.
[278] Gordon Lubold and Rick Maze "Chief of staff calls for bigger Army," *Army Times* (December 25, 2006): 12.
[279] Bryan Bender, "Gates call for buildup in troops," *Boston Globe*, (January 12, 2007): A1.

chief, was asked to cite the major obstacles to enlistment in early 2006, they had not changed much from 2001: "The top three factors that affect recruiting include the war on terrorism, an improving U.S. economy and low unemployment rates, and waning support for military enlistment as a result of the first two."[280]

Summary of identified issues and trends. This analysis highlighted four relevant issues and trends related to United States Army recruitment and retention. First, military recruiters generally expressed that they experienced an increase in inquiries about enlistment but not an increase in enlistment contracts after September 11, 2001. Many of the inquiries were actually expressions of support for military service or were made by individuals who did not qualify for service because of regulations and restrictions, such as age, weight, or moral character. In later years, the United States Army eased many of the restrictions that earlier had disqualified individuals for service in the Army.

Second, black American propensity to enlist and remain in the Army began decreasing after September 11, 2001. This study and others identified numerous reasons for the drop. If black Americans identify with a political party, they are very likely to identify as Democrats. As discussed in Chapter Two, elite cue theory predicted that elite conflict would cause a cleavage in support for the wars, and black Americans self-identify as Democrats at very high rates. Black Americans also decreasingly qualify for military service. As mentioned in earlier, candidates for enlistment must take the AFQT. An analysis of the test

[280] Heike Hasenauer, "Bostick: Where we stand," *Soldiers* (February 2006): 12.

results from 350,000 candidates who took the AFQT at a military entrance station between 2004 and 2009 showed that minority candidates were much less likely to qualify for service than white candidates. While16 percent of white candidates for enlistment failed the test, 39 percent of black American and 29 percent of Hispanics failed the test.[281] A lower proportion of minorities are eligible for service in the United States Army. Because black Americans self-identify as Democrats at higher rates and are decreasingly eligible for military service, the proportion of black Americans enlisting or remaining in the United States Army would fall.

Third, the Army began increasing recruitment and retention bonuses following September 11, 2001, with the largest increases beginning in late 2004 just as the Army increased its recruiting goals following its authorized end strength increase. At the same time public opinion cleaved, Congress authorized the United States Army to recruit and retain more soldiers. Congress also authorized the Army to pay new recruits more to join and current soldiers more to stay in the ranks. As the literature review in Chapter Two noted, war has a varying effect on barriers to enlistment. Some avoid war for personal reasons, while others may enlist and remain in the service for entirely different reasons. Regardless, increasing benefits should increase enlistment even when perceived barriers to enlistment are high. The effect of increasing manpower demands and increasing pay and benefits on actual enlistment and retention are not easily separated.

[281] Theokas, 3-4.

Fourth, the Army expanded its recruiter pool by paying an informal network of veterans, retirees, Army civilians, and serving soldiers to recruit new soldiers. In addition to expanding its assigned recruiter pool, the Army introduced programs that used its employees' connections to society to bring in new recruits, such as the National Guard's G-RAP. The Army adopted a similar program in December 2006 and included payments to Army civilians in 2007. The program was popular and efficient. It made use of the Army's existing informal links to society and paid its recruiters well.

Fifth, high school students in a 2004 survey who were placed into groups (high, medium, or low propensity to enlist) gave significantly different reasons for joining or avoiding military service.[282] The lowest-propensity group expressed greater support (statistically significant compared to *both* the highest- and moderate-propensity potential recruit groups) for these factors as barriers to entering into the military: *I'm just not a military person. I have other career interests. I might hate it once I got in and then be stuck* (only significant compared to the highest-propensity group). *The long time commitment required. The loss of personal freedom. I'd miss my home and family. It would be hard on my family members.* While these factors suggest an aversion to a military career or lifestyle, the following suggest an aversion to combat: *I may have to fight for a cause I don't support. There is a good chance that I'd end up in combat. I might be killed in combat. I might be wounded in*

[282] GfK Custom Research Incorporated, 44.

combat. I might be captured and tortured. I don't want to kill people. I might have to kill innocent people.

The literature review also noted that the strongest influence on high school graduate military service was the graduate's parents. Many potential enlistees hold opinions similar to their parents. The review of Dempsey's study of United States Military Academy cadets and other propensity studies supports this assumption. The identified barriers to entry were very strong personal opinions regarding war. They also are reflected in some of the opinion questions, such as whether the wars have been worth it. The next chapters use the literature review and these reported issues and trends to examine the study hypotheses.

Chapter Four

Between-Group Differences in Expressed Public Opinion Regarding War

This chapter's task is to determine if and how public opinion regarding the Afghanistan and Iraq wars varied across numerous sociopolitical demographic factors. If public opinion varied across a factor, Chapter Five will determine if and how active-duty United States Army recruitment and retention varied across the same factor. The literature proposes seven general factors that may influence personal opinions regarding war. The seven factors—all possible dependent variables—are: stakes involved, principal policy objective, elite consensus, burden sharing or multilateral support, sociopolitical demographics, judgments of success, and perceived costs. This study considers these seven factors when analyzing public opinion regarding war.

This research does not conduct a contemporary public opinion survey. It relies upon completed surveys to determine which factors most clearly related to favorable opinion regarding the Afghanistan and Iraq wars between 2001 and 2008. The surveys did not explicitly test each of the seven factors. Public opinion questions, their answers, or respondents' expressed sociopolitical demographics clearly represent a few of the seven factors. The sociopolitical demographics factor is the most clearly present factor. A few questions hint at the other six factors. This study discusses results related to those factors as well; however, it is not clear that responses to these questions definitively represent a

singular expression regarding the wars' costs or elite consensus, for example. The public opinion trends found in this study tend to make detailed consideration of the other six factors less important (but not less interesting): *Between-group differences in expressed public opinion regarding these wars were clearly related to certain sociopolitical factors, were expressed early in the wars, and remained the trend throughout, regardless of the type of question asked*. The opinion trends help infer how the sociopolitical demographic and other factors should relate to between-group differences among active-duty United States Army recruitment and retention.

This chapter identifies differences in public opinion based on multiple factors (such as partisan political identification or education) and multiple factor levels (such as Republican, Independent, or Democratic self-identification, or education ranging from no high school diploma to a master's degree or more education). The factors may relate to consistent between-group differences in public opinion over time. Consistency implies that the same factors should relate to different recruitment and retention rates as well. The next chapter uses these factors to build the hypotheses relating differences in public opinion to different recruitment and retention rates. This chapter uses two means to identify these factors.

First, this chapter follows the analyses of influential sociopolitical factors identified in the literature on public opinion regarding war and sociopolitical representation in the Army and the examination of Army recruitment and retention issues between 2000 and 2007. Second, this

chapter reviews trends in expressed public opinion regarding the Afghanistan and Iraq wars between 2001 and 2007. The chapter identifies the existence and nature of opinion trends across potentially influential sociopolitical factors. Person-organization fit theory expects that between-group differences in recruitment and retention rates should relate to between-group differences in wartime opinion. The chapter ends with a summary of the factors that should relate to between-group differences in expressed public opinion regarding war.

Public opinion trends. This section seeks to describe the relationship that existed between sociopolitical demographic factors and expressed public opinion regarding the Afghan and Iraq wars. The section's purpose is to identify the factors that related to between-group differences in expressed public opinion regarding war between 2001 and 2007. Many public opinion polling results regarding the Iraq War were available for review. The polling results available were both aggregated and individual-level responses. Many fewer results regarding the Afghanistan War were available. Compared to the war in Iraq, relatively general consensus existed across sociopolitical demographic groups regarding the necessity of and support for the war in Afghanistan. The general consensus explains the relative paucity of Afghanistan war–related questions. For example, the 2004 Annenberg National Election Survey asked voters if the war in Iraq was an important part of their voting decision but did not include the war in Afghanistan as an option. Accordingly, it follows that opinions regarding the war in Iraq primarily drove conclusions regarding the polling results.

The review of polls conducted between 2001 and 2007 was comprehensive and considered 243 questions regarding Afghanistan, including fifteen concerning President George W. Bush, his administration, and the Afghanistan War. It also considered 1,254 questions regarding Iraq, including 1,176 about President George W. Bush, his administration, and the Iraq War. The polling results were from numerous sources. The sources included Gallup Brain, the ICPSR, and Polling the Nations. Each source presented their results in a different format. The different formats required extensive recoding and compilation. The recoding and compilation work was valuable because it revealed distinct between-group differences in the polling results. If person-organization fit theory is accurate, the same between-group differences should appear in active-duty United States Army recruitment and retention rates.

The aggregate-level trends depict the average United States citizen's and self-identified political partisan's opinions regarding war. Self-identified Republicans, Independents, and Democrats held starkly different opinions regarding the war on terrorism and Iraq War. These differences are representative of the between-group differences this study is most interested in analyzing. In addition to self-identified political partisanship, the individual-level analysis revealed that average responses differed according to many other expressed individual-level factors. The following two sections describe the aggregate- and individual-level opinion trends.

Aggregate-level opinion trends. This section discusses opinion trends for the average United States citizen and for three groups: self-identified Republicans, Independents, and Democrats. Political partisan self-identification is one of few demographic factors routinely included in polling results. Other demographic variables are important but were either not widely reported or not asked of respondents. Accordingly, between-group political partisan opinion differences are most widely available. The following section includes an analysis of other available individual-level factors.

This section examines aggregate-level trends (the average response) and trends based on the respondents' expressed partisan political identification. The aggregate-level trend is representative of the average United States citizen's response, which each company computes for each survey by comparing the respondent sample demographics to actual average United States citizen demographics. The average response represents the survey's approximation of the average United States citizen's response. This is the aggregate-level trend, and these results are typically reported when the news discusses polling results.

Every polling company requests demographic data from respondents. The polling companies adjust their final polling results based on how closely the survey sample population matches the actual distribution of demographic data across the United States. This method helps polling companies minimize errors in their estimation of the public's true opinion. These polls are probably accurate because they were conducted by reputable survey firms, but this research is also

concerned primarily with identifying trends across different demographic factors over time, not concerned with the existence or cause of a specific percent increase or decrease in expressed public opinion from only one period to the next. Because the polls are not based on panel data, any definitive statement about cause and effect would be highly speculative.

This research is also interested in identifying extremes revealed in the polling results. It is more interesting and important to know which two of three or more groups are most diametrically opposed than which groups are middling. These extremes, once identified, help create and test theory, according to Van Evera.[283] The implications of extremes in between-group differences are also important to policy makers.

The analysis of aggregate opinions regarding the wars reveals three distinct trends. First, average public support for both wars continually declined through 2007. Second, public support for both the war on terrorism and the Iraq War spiked upwards at the beginning of the Iraq War—March 2003—and then took months to drop below pre-Iraq War levels. Third, clear and consistent differences exist between the three political partisan groups' expressed public opinion.

Trend 1: Continual decline in average public opinion in favor of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars over time. The trend of decline in average public opinion in favor of the Afghanistan War was not as clear as the decline in favorable opinion regarding the Iraq War because of the relative paucity of questions regarding the Afghan War since 2002. Furthermore, by definition, the favorable opinion decline was not

[283] Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).

continuous because expressed public opinion fluctuated such that public opinion was higher in some later period than it was in an earlier period. The decline was by definition continual because favorable opinion generally decreased over time.

The percent of respondents approving of President Bush's handling of Iraq continually declined. Graph 3-1 displays the percent of political partisans and the U.S. average responding "yes." The graph's shape is typical of questions asked many times over many years and is included here as a prime example of this first trend. Over time, the



Graph 3-1

decline in percent approving was about 27 percent of Americans swinging their opinion against President Bush's handling of the situation in Iraq.[284] The decline from the highest average opinion was even greater. Near the beginning of the Iraq War, about 80 percent approved of

[284] September 13, 2002: 60; September 13, 2003: 51; September 26, 2004: 44; September 13, 2005: 36; September 13, 2006: 38; and September 12, 2007: 33 percent.

President Bush's handling of the situation in Iraq. By September 2007, about 30 percent approved, a decrease of about 50 percentage points. Opinion regarding President Bush's handling of the war on terrorism revealed the same trend. The percent of Americans who approved of President Bush's handling of the war on terrorism also declined continually.[285] Again, the decline was continual and large, with 54 percent of Americans changing their opinion across nearly six years.

As noted earlier, surveys regarding the Afghanistan War between 2000 and 2008 were scarce. What surveys exist demonstrate that favorable opinion regarding that war generally declined between 2001 and 2002. For example, in November 2001, about 93 percent of Americans believed that, for the United States, the war in Afghanistan was going either well or very well. By June 2002, that percentage dropped to 66 percent.

These responses represent a small proportion of questions asked regarding the Afghan and Iraq wars. Every other question asked elicited declining favorable responses over time. Regardless of the decline, *average initial favorable public opinion for both the war on terrorism and the Afghanistan War was extremely high* (85–90 percent), while *initial favorable public opinion regarding the Iraq War was comparatively low* (50–60 percent).

Trend 2: Spike upwards in Democratic and Independent favorable opinion regarding war following the March 19, 2003 beginning of the Iraq

[285] November 11, 2001: 89; October 31, 2002: 65; November 18, 2003: 59; October 6, 2004: 52; November 9, 2005: 42; December 6, 2006: 35; and October 3, 2007: 35 percent.

War. For a brief period, Democratic and Independent support rose above the base of support or opposition level, 40 percent for Democrats and 50 to 60 percent for Independents. The spike was evident across every question asked before and after the Iraq War began: the war on terror overseas;[286] perceived costs;[287] and President Bush's handling of the situation in Iraq.[288] However, depending on the survey question, average Democrat and Independent opinion returned to these levels. Opinion continually declined over time. The spike in favorable public opinion was evident before and shortly after the Iraq War began. Researchers considering the "rally-round-the-flag" effect will be interested in this broad spike in favorable expressions of public opinion regarding the Iraq

[286] The political partisan average percent answering "approve" to the question, "Do you approve or disapprove of President Bush's handling of the war on terror overseas?": February 19, 2002: U.S. average 81, Republican 92, Independent 78, Democrat 74; January 17: U.S. average 55 percent; April 14: U.S. average 79, Republican 94, Independent 74, Democrat 69 percent; June 9: U.S. average 63, Republican 89, Independent 61, Democrat 43 percent; September 15: U.S. average 56, Republican 86, Independent 57, Democrat 30 percent; October 27: U.S. average 51, Republican 83, Independent 50, Democrat 26 percent; August 17, 2006: U.S. average 40, Republican 73, Independent 33, and Democrat 13 percent.

[287] The political partisan average percent answering "yes" to the question, "Would removal of Saddam be worth the potential loss of life and other costs?": August 7, 2002: U.S. average 46, Republican 64, Independent 41, Democrat 37 percent; October 31: U.S. average 49, Republican 71, Independent 47, Democrat 31 percent; March 9, 2003: U.S. average 50, Republican 70, Independent 48, Democrat 35 percent; March 20: U.S. average 61, Republican 82, Independent 59, and Democrat 43 percent.

[288] The political partisan average percent answering "approve" to the question, "Do you approve or disapprove of President Bush's handling of the situation in Iraq?": February 2, 2003: U.S. average 58, Republican 92, Independent 54, Democrat 36 percent; February 25: U.S. average 52, Republican 77, Independent 47, Democrat 37 percent; March 16: U.S. average 55, Republican 81, Independent 52, Democrat 36 percent; April 3: U.S. average 74, Republican 91, Independent 71, Democrat 68 percent; July 9: U.S. average 58, Republican 74, Independent 55, Democrat 46 percent; September 29: U.S. average 50, Republican 82, Independent 49, and Democrat 27 percent.

War. Recruitment and retention rates may also reveal the spike, if, as hypothesized, they related to different opinions regarding war.

Trend 3: Average Democratic opinion was never more favorable than Independents' opinion, and average Independent opinion was never more favorable than Republicans' opinion. Of the many different questions asked hundreds of times over the years, clear and consistent differences existed between each partisan political group's opinions regarding the wars. However, only small differences between the political partisan groups' opinions existed at the beginning of the Afghanistan War. On December 10, 2001, 96 percent of Republicans, 92 percent of Independents, and 91 percent of Democrats expressed a favorable opinion regarding President Bush's handling of the Afghanistan War. Until September 23, 2002, Independents' and Democrats' opinions were nearly identical, while Republican opinion fluctuated between 15 and 25 percentage points higher than either.

August and September 2002 were important months. Beginning in late August 2002, President Bush, his administration, and other nations began to seek authorization to attack Iraq. On August 26, 2002, Vice President Dick Cheney stated to the Veterans of Foreign Wars National Convention in Nashville, Tennessee, that Iraq "no doubt" had weapons of mass destruction. On September 8, 2002, National Security Advisor Rice stated on *Meet the Press* that the administration was worried that the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction "smoking gun would be a mushroom cloud." Also on September 8, 2002, Vice President Cheney on *Meet the Press* stated that al-Qaeda member Mohammed Atta met with an Iraqi

agent in Prague and that Iraq was possibly using aluminum tubing in the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction program. On September 12, 2002, President Bush at the United Nations urged action to disarm Iraq due to Iraq's defiance of previous resolutions, arguing that Iraq presented a "grave and gathering danger." On September 24, 2002, British Prime Minister Blair released a dossier stating that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, could launch a chemical- or biological-missile attack within 45 minutes, could build nuclear weapons in five years, and had sought uranium in Africa.

The United States House of Representatives, with near consensus, on October 10 and the United States Senate unanimously on October 11 authorized President Bush to use military force against Iraq. On November 8, 2002, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1441, which demanded that Iraq disarm or face "serious consequences," which diplomatically means war. Likely following the rhetoric and diplomatic or political action regarding Iraq, in September 2002, public opinion surveys shifted focus from Afghanistan to the potential and then actual war with Iraq. The surveys established the *enduring bases of support for and opposition to the Iraq War based on partisan political identification*. The percentage approving of President Bush's handling of the situation in Iraq prior to the March 2003 invasion speaks to this point. Differences in favorable expressions of public opinion between August 2002 and March 2003 are telling. In this period, Democrats' average favorable opinion was about 40 percent, while Republicans' average favorable opinion was about 75 percent. The period

between August 2002 and March 2003 is noteworthy because it was *before the United States and its allies invaded Iraq*. Before the Iraq War began, Democrats expressed much less favorable opinions regarding the potential war than Republicans. Months after the Iraq War began, average favorable opinion across these different political partisan groups returned to these fractured levels. Regardless of the type of question asked, the political partisans held consistently different opinions. The review of the literature on public opinion regarding war identified seven factors that could influence personal opinions.[289] Some of the public opinion survey questions closely related to these factors.

I. Stakes involved and principal policy objective. Because the literature review identified that stakes involved and principal policy objective are closely related—almost tautologically—they are combined here. Favorable answers to the question "Is military action in Iraq part of or separate from the war on terrorism?"[290] revealed the political partisanship opinion pattern. This question, of all that this study reviewed, most clearly touches on the stakes involved in the Iraq War. If a person considered the Iraq War to be part of the war on terrorism, he or she likely also believed that the stakes were very high in the Iraq War, much higher perceived stakes than someone who believed it was

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[289] Stakes involved, principal policy objective, elite consensus, burden sharing or multilateral support, sociopolitical demographics, judgments of success, and perceived costs.

[290] The political partisan average percent answering "part of" to the question, "Is military action in Iraq part of or separate from the war on terrorism?": May 12, 2003: Republican 84; Independent 62; Democrat 49 percent. December 6, 2005: Republican 83, Independent 46, Democrat 35 percent. October 15, 2006: Republican 76, Independent 43, Democrat 24 percent. September 8, 2007: Republican 78, Independent 43, and Democrat 32 percent.

separate or, as commonly debated during the Iraq War, a distraction from the war on terrorism. According to their responses, Republican partisans likely believed that stakes involved in the Iraq War were much higher than did either the average Independent or Democrat.

Compared to questions regarding the perceived costs and benefits of the Iraq War, average favorable public opinion expressing that the Iraq War was part of the war on terrorism sometimes fell below 50 percent but generally remained at about that level. Fifty percent of Americans expressed a favorable opinion of a war involving high stakes and costs, a majority opinion. Majority opinions are very influential in the United States political system. The clearest evidence of this has been recent United States presidential election results. Recent elections have been very close, at nearly a 50–50 split. Regardless of how close the election is to a 50–50 split, the election winner does assume great political power and has perceived election results as political mandates. President Bush was reelected in 2004 when the majority opinion, although falling, was that the Iraq War was part of the war on terrorism.

Two other questions regarding the Iraq War relate to the stakes involved in the war and clear opinion trends based on respondents' partisan political identity. The first question asked respondents to declare whether they believed that President Bush or the Bush Administration did not mislead the United States regarding weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. This question may touch on other factors that influence opinion regarding war, but it clearly related to perceived stakes involved in the war. The greater the perceived stakes, the more

worthwhile the war effort. As discussed earlier, the Bush Administration argued strenuously that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and had used the weapons earlier on its domestic and foreign enemies. Iraq was dangerous. It was in the United States' interest to remove the threat before Iraq used weapons of mass destruction again. Opinion regarding the veracity of claims that compelled the United States to war declined and was clearly, as in every other question analyzed, divided based on partisan political identity.[291]

The second question asked respondents to look back and declare whether the United States did the right thing in taking military action against Iraq or whether the United States should have stayed out. The question at least minimally related to the perceived stakes involved. The cleavage between political partisan groups was clear and consistent. Republican sentiment for more than four years remained quite high, between 65 and 90 percent. Democratic sentiment was negative, dropping from 30 percent in early 2004 to 10 percent in the spring of 2008. Because Democrats favored the opinion that the United States should "have stayed out" at such high rates, Democratic self-identification, compared to Republican self-identification, must have been related to significantly lower rates of United States Army service, the service providing the majority of ground troops and incurring the most casualties.

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[291] The political partisan average percent answering "did not" to the question, "Did the Bush Administration intentionally mislead the U.S. regarding Iraq?": July 25, 2004: U.S. average 55 percent; December 4, 2005: U.S. average 46, Republican 83, Independent 43, Democrat 16 percent; September 8, 2007: U.S. average 36, Republican 70, Independent 30, and Democrat 10 percent.

II. Elite consensus. No survey questions explicitly asked respondents about their perceptions of elite consensus. Such a question would be helpful in the analysis. The relationship between respondent beliefs regarding elite consensus and other factors could be examined. The aim would be to determine if respondents who perceived greater levels of elite consensus also expressed more favorable opinions regarding the wars.

Although the opinion questions did not ask about elite consensus, it was clear that some Democratic elites were stridently against a possible war with Iraq. In an anti-war rally on October 2, 2002, then Democratic Illinois State Senator Barack Obama delivered a strong critique of the authorization for the use of force under consideration in the United States Congress.[292] This, along with other examples of

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[292] Senator Obama stated, "What I am opposed to is the attempt by political hacks like Karl Rove to distract us from a rise in the uninsured, a rise in the poverty rate, a drop in the median income – to distract us from corporate scandals and a stock market that has just gone through the worst month since the Great Depression. That's what I'm opposed to. A dumb war. A rash war. A war based not on reason but on passion, not on principle but on politics. Now let me be clear – I suffer no illusions about Saddam Hussein. He is a brutal man. A ruthless man. A man who butchers his own people to secure his own power. He has repeatedly defied UN resolutions, thwarted UN inspection teams, developed chemical and biological weapons, and coveted nuclear capacity. He's a bad guy. The world, and the Iraqi people, would be better off without him. But I also know that Saddam poses no imminent and direct threat to the United States, or to his neighbors, that the Iraqi economy is in shambles, that the Iraqi military is a fraction of its former strength, and that in concert with the international community he can be contained until, in the way of all petty dictators, he falls away into the dustbin of history. I know that even a successful war against Iraq will require a US occupation of undetermined length, at undetermined cost, with undetermined consequences. I know that an invasion of Iraq without a clear rationale and without strong international support will only fan the flames of the Middle East, and encourage the worst, rather than best, impulses of the Arab world, and strengthen the recruitment arm of Al

Democratic opposition to the authorization of the use of military force in Iraq in fall 2002, points to the beginning of elite conflict over the Iraq War.

Senator Obama's statement is useful because it is an example that highlights the numerous factors that Democratic politicians cited for opposing the Iraq War: the questionable stakes involved, an unworthy policy objective, the need for multilateral support, the difficulty of concluding the war successfully, and the potential costs to the United States. In short, this statement was an expression of domestic elite conflict that could influence individual opinions regarding war. The factor of elite consensus or elite cue theory, especially given that partisan political divides increasingly correspond with sociopolitical demographic divides in the United States, could explain between-group opinion differences regarding the wars.

As Berinsky's analysis of public opinion regarding World War II and the Iraq War demonstrated, broad elite consensus supporting a war practically guarantees that expressed public opinion will reflect the elite consensus.[293] Elite conflict regarding a war has guaranteed divided public opinion. Because individuals use elite conflict as a strong belief cue, individuals generally align their opinion with the elites with whom they politically identify. Even absent vocal, widespread Democratic political elite opposition to the Iraq War, individuals would draw strong

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Qaeda. I am not opposed to all wars. I'm opposed to dumb wars." B. Obama, "Against going to war with Iraq" (October 2, 2002); available from http://action.barackobama.com/page/share/2002iraqfull.

[293] A. Berinsky, *In Time of War: Understanding American Public Opinion from World War II to Iraq* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).

cues from the vocal Republican support and comparative lack of vocal Democratic support.[294]

Opinion polls conducted between August 2002 and March 2003 depict the base of support for the Iraq War that existed before the invasion. Although opinion did show a rally-round-the-flag pattern, average Democratic support was around 40 percent and average Republican support was around 75 percent. The cleavage in between-group expressed support for the wars was found in this study as predicted by elite cue theory. Berinsky, however, did not analyze between-group difference in public opinion beyond the sociopolitical factor of political partisan identity.

The literature review on opinion regarding war noted that individuals may use the level of international or allied support regarding war as a proxy measurement of elite consensus regarding war. The next factors relate directly to international or allied support.

III. Burden sharing or multilateral support. The literature review found that the presence of burden-sharing agreements or multilateral support could increase favorable opinions regarding war. Questions prior to the beginning of the Iraq War asked respondents about the necessity of securing other allies prior to war and the proper or necessary role the United Nations should have regarding Iraq.

Just after President Bush declared that Iraq was a member of an "axis of evil" and a year before the Iraq War began, Republicans, Independents, and Democrats expressed nearly the same beliefs

[294] Ibid., 102-3.

regarding the necessity of allied support before taking any action against Iraq.[295] As the Bush Administration and other nations began pressing for the authorization of military force against Iraq, a partisan political divide opened regarding the necessity of allied support.[296] Partisan political identity structured the opinion divide. Democrats most desired the United States to wait for its allies, followed by Independents and then Republicans. Every other question asked regarding the necessity of allied support exhibited the same partisan political divide.

The Bush Administration argued that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction in violation of U.N. Security Council agreements, but Iraq had refused access to U.N. inspectors who were tasked to search for, document the existence of, and destroy any discovered weapons of mass destruction. In December 2001, before President Bush's "axis of evil" speech and public pressure for the authorization of military force, Republican, Independent, and Democratic responses were very similar to Saddam's refusal to allow inspectors into Iraq. Seventy-nine percent of Republicans, 72 percent of Independents, and 71 percent of Democrats favored bombing Iraq immediately if Saddam refused to allow U.N.

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[295] The political partisan average percent answering "wait for its allies" to the question, "Which statement do you agree with more: Iraq presents such a clear danger to American interests that the U.S. needs to act now, even without the support of its allies; or the U.S. needs to wait for its allies before taking any action against Iraq?": February 26, 2002: U.S. average 72, Republican 71, Independent 72, Democrat 74 percent; August 7: U.S. average 68, Republican 62, Independent 72, and Democrat 67 percent.

[296] The political partisan average percent answering "wait for its allies": September 5, 2002: U.S. average 67, Republican 59, Independent 61, Democrat 80 percent; October 31: U.S. average 63, Republican 49, Independent 60, Democrat 72 percent; February 25, 2003: U.S. average 59, Republican 41, Independent 59, and Democrat 72 percent.

inspectors full access in Iraq.[297] Beginning in September 2002, the partisan political divide was apparent regarding the U.N.'s proper role vis-à-vis Iraq. For example, respondents were asked whether the U.S. should wait for U.N. inspections before taking any action against Iraq.[298] Partisan political identity structured the responses: Democrats most desired to give the U.N. time, followed by Independents and then Republicans. Other questions asked regarding the U.N.'s role demonstrated the same partisan political divide. The burden-sharing or multilateral support factor's relationship to favorable opinions regarding war was conditioned by respondents' partisan political self-identity.

IV. Judgments of success. Some theorists, most notably Feaver, Gelpi, and Reifler (2008), argue that the prospects of success are important determinants of favorable and negative opinions regarding war. Answers to multiple questions demonstrate the same continual decline of favorable opinions regarding the Afghanistan and Iraq wars

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[297] The question asked on December 10, 2001, was, "If Saddam Hussein does not keep his promise to allow United Nations weapons inspectors full access to look for weapons of mass destruction, would you favor or oppose the United States immediately using its Air Force to bomb targets in Iraq?"

[298] The political partisan average percent answering "more time" to the question, "Should the United States take military action against Iraq fairly soon, or should the US wait and give the United Nations more time to get weapons inspectors back into Iraq?": September 23, 2002: U.S. average 57, Republican 43, Independent 55, Democrat 71 percent; October 31: U.S. average 63, Republican 55, Independent 60, and Democrat 72 percent. Upon U.N. inspectors' readmittance to Iraq, the question became, "Should the United States take military action against Iraq fairly soon, or should the United States wait and give the United Nations and weapons inspectors more time?": February 6, 2003: U.S. average 61, Republican 45, Independent 65, Democrat 70 percent; March 5: U.S. average 60, Republican 38, Independent 64, Democrat 75 percent; March 16: U.S. average 49, Republican 30, Independent 49, and Democrat 64 percent.

and the distinct political partisan split in favorable opinion. Between November 2001 and September 2002, respondents were asked to declare how well the war in Afghanistan was going for the U.S: "What is your impression of how the war in Afghanistan is going for the United States right now: very well, somewhat well, somewhat badly, or very badly?"[299] The percentage expressing the favorable opinions "very well" or "somewhat well" declined continually.

Two questions regarding the Iraq War related to the judgments of success factor. For a few months after the Iraq War began, respondents were asked about the possibility that the U.S. would "be bogged down in long and costly war."[300] Beginning in January 2006, respondents were asked how well the effort to establish stability and order in Iraq was going.[301] Answers to these two questions demonstrate the clear difference in political partisan opinion regarding how well the Iraq War was progressing both early and later in the war effort. Respondents' political

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[299] U.S. average percentage answering "very well" or "somewhat well" to the question, "What is your impression of how the war in Afghanistan is going for the United States right now?": January 25, 2002: 89; May 14, 2002: 73; and September 5, 2002: 72 percent. The political partisan average percentage answering "very well" or "somewhat well": January 25, 2002: Republican 98, Independent 86, Democrat 84 percent; May 14, 2002: Republican 85, Independent 68, Democrat 65 percent; September 5, 2002: Republican 86, Independent 69, and Democrat 65 percent.

[300] U.S. average percentage answering "very concerned" to the question, "How concerned are you about the possibility that the U.S. will be bogged down in a long and costly war?": April 9, 2003: 24; April 30, 2003: 34; July 10, 2003: 44; and September 13, 2003: 53. The political partisan average percentage was reported once: October 19, 2003: Republican 28, Independent 43, and Democrat 56 percent.

[301] The political partisan average percent answering "very well" or "well" to the question, "How is the effort going to establish stability and order in Iraq going?": January 8, 2006: Republican 79, Independent 43, Democrat 29 percent; September 16: Republican 62, Independent 34, Democrat 18 percent; September 8, 2007: Republican 60, Independent 31, Democrat 12 percent.

partisan self-identity clearly related to opinion differences. Such distinct beliefs regarding war should relate to Army recruitment and retention differences.

V. Perceived costs. Responses to two questions are revealing. Between August and October 2002, respondents were asked whether the removal of Saddam would be worth the potential loss of life and other costs. Between 31 and 44 percent of Democratic partisans, between 40 and 55 percent of Independents, and between 65 and 75 percent of Republican partisans answered "yes." Between March 5 and March 9, 2003, just before the Iraq War, respondents were asked whether the removal of Saddam would be worth the potential loss of life and other costs. Between 34 and 38 percent of Democratic partisans, about 47 percent of Independents, and between 70 and 75 percent of Republican partisans answered "yes." Before the Iraq War began, self-identified political partisans clearly held different opinions regarding the worth of a potential war with Iraq.

Three questions were asked during the Iraq War that related to perceived costs of war. Answers of "yes" to the questions "Would removal of Saddam be worth the potential loss of life and other costs?"[302] and "Considering the costs versus the benefits, was the Iraq War worth

[302] U.S. average percentage answering "yes" to the question, "Would removal of Saddam be worth the potential loss of life and other costs?": August 7, 2002: 46; March 23, 2003: 66; April 1, 2004: 47; February 26, 2006: 41; and September 8, 2007: 35 percent. The political partisan average percentage answering "yes": August 7, 2002: Republican 64, Independent 41, Democrat 37; October 31: Republican 71, Independent 47, Democrat 31; March 9, 2003: Republican 70, Independent 48, and Democrat 35 percent.

fighting?"[303] followed the same trend. The trend across the questions related to perceived costs mirrored the same general trends in favorable public opinion regarding the Iraq War.

VI. Sociopolitical demographics. The final category of influential factors on opinions regarding war, sociopolitical demographics, is broad. Accordingly, it is organized by the six demographic factors tested by each subhypothesis. Those factors, listed at the end of Chapter Two, are ethnicity, exposure to military service, rural population proportion, educational attainment, personal income, and political partisanship. Of these demographic factors, this study could not determine the rural or urban nature of the respondents' communities. Information such as the respondent's ZIP code or county were not included in the opinion data. Therefore, this section will discuss the other five demographic factors. This section differs from the previous section by its use of individual respondent data to analyze the sociopolitical demographic factors' varying relationship to opinions regarding war. Polling companies traditionally collect and report these five demographic factors. Opinion analyses generally include some or all of them as control or study variables. Like the aggregate-level survey results, the individual-level survey results also reveal distinct opinion trends.

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[303] U.S. average percentage answering "yes" to the question, "Considering the costs versus the benefits, was the Iraq War worth fighting?": April 30, 2003: 70; December 14, 2003: 53; April 18, 2004: 51; June 20, 2004 to August 28, 2005: between 48 and 41; November 2, 2005 to November 4, 2006: between 45 and 38; and December 11, 2006 to April 13, 2008: between 39 and 33 percent. The political partisan average percentage answering "yes" was reported once: June 3, 2007: Republican 68, Independent 29, and Democrat 12 percent.

Public opinion survey data with individual-level demographic variables was available for CBS News/*New York Times* polls conducted between April 8, 2004 and December 10, 2006. The ICPSR provided the polling results. Individual-level response data from polls conducted earlier or later than these dates was not available. These individual-level responses are useful for examining the relationship between the various sociopolitical demographic factors and identifying the strong conditioning effect that political partisan self-identification had on respondent opinions. Between 2004 and 2006, the data included responses and demographics from up to 51,133 respondents, depending on database completeness and respondent willingness to supply demographic data. Results in this section are not weighted to portray United States average demographic data. This section's purpose is to compare different groups' opinions, not to compare a group's opinion to a national average opinion.

A description of the response trends of individuals grouped according to shared sociopolitical demographics is important for two reasons. First, groups' beliefs are analyzed across multiple questions according to different independent variables. These independent variables represent the potential factors that might influence the individual's response. If between-group opinion differences to the same question hold across time, then it is likely that the independent variable has some systemic effect on many respondents' answers. An approximation of that same factor should also relate to different recruitment and retention rates.

Second, Chapter Five examines county-level recruitment and retention rates by sorting counties according to their values on the factors related to opinion differences. If the same between-group trend in favorable opinion regarding war appears in the county-level recruitment and retention rate analysis, then this study's model has great explanatory power. If county-level trends do not appear or reverse, then the model must be adjusted or is inappropriate.

The analysis that follows includes the "change in odds" that a respondent would express a favorable opinion compared to a reference respondent. The "change in odds" is stated as the number of times higher odds that a respondent would express a favorable opinion compared to a reference respondent. For example, the odds that a Republican would approve of the way President Bush was handling Iraq were 27.2 times higher than a Democrat's; an Independent's odds were 4.2 times higher than a Democrat's. The Republican respondent's higher odds demonstrate that Republican respondents were many times more likely to approve of President Bush's handling of Iraq than either a Democrat or Independent respondent. Comparing "changes in odds" is a useful and clear way of identifying the most and least favorable opinion groups.

Ethnicity. The literature review identified that opinion regarding war has historically differed by the respondent's ethnicity. American minorities have generally expressed less favorable opinions than white Americans. Black Americans have expressed the least favorable opinions. The literature review and background chapter both support the

hypothesis that ethnicity was related to opinion and recruitment and retention rate differences.

Five of six questions analyzed demonstrated clear and consistent opinion differences by respondent ethnicity.[304] The analysis included political partisan self-identity, income level, education level, veteran status, and gender as control variables. Even with these strong control variables, white Americans had between 3.1 times higher odds (question 1) and 1.5 times higher odds (question 4) of giving a favorable response than a black American. Hispanic Americans had between 2.6 times higher odds (question 1) and 1.5 times higher odds (question 4) of giving a favorable response than a black American. Asian Americans had between 1.9 times higher odds (question 1) and 1.6 times higher odds (questions 3 and 6) of giving a favorable response than a black American.

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[304] The six questions that were analyzed for statistically significant different responses were:

- Question 1: Do you approve or disapprove of the way President Bush is handling Iraq? Answer: Approve.
- Question 2: Do you think the result of the war with Iraq was worth the loss of American life and other costs of attacking Iraq, or not? Answer: Worth it.
- Question 3: Looking back, do you think the United States did the right thing in taking military action against Iraq, or should the U.S. have stayed out? Answer: Right thing.
- Question 4: How would say things are going for the U.S. in its efforts to bring stability and order to Iraq? Answers: Somewhat or very well.
- Question 5: Regardless of whether you think taking military action in Iraq was the right thing to do, would you say that the U.S. is _____ likely to succeed in establishing a democratic government in Iraq? Answers: Somewhat or very.
- Question 6: Should U.S. troops stay in Iraq as long as it takes to make sure Iraq is a stable democracy, even if that takes a long time, or should US troops turn over control to Iraqis as soon as possible, even if Iraq is not completely stable? Answer: As long as it takes.

Question 5 did not evoke statistically different responses based on respondent ethnicity. Between Asian and Black Americans, different responses to Question 4 were not statistically significant.

Other ethnicities expressed significantly more favorable beliefs regarding war than black Americans.

Exposure to military service. Another sociopolitical demographic factor to consider is whether the respondent served in the military. The literature review found that many opinion and sociopolitical demographic factor differences exist between the average military member and the average United States citizen. The greatest differences in opinion and sociopolitical demographics existed between those with more rank and time in military service and the average United States citizen. Even so, the review also noted that some opinion differences, but especially those regarding the use of military force, existed between the newest military service members and the average United States citizen. A proxy measurement for military service is the respondent's veteran self-identification, "Veteran" or "Non-Veteran." Not every survey asked the respondents to reveal every factor every time; however, enough surveys included veteran self-identification to determine if trends existed.

Differences in the average opinions of veterans and non-veterans were so small that the analysis found that the different opinions regarding war were not statistically significant.[305] Only when control variables were dropped, five of the six questions evoked significantly different responses.[306] Even then, an analysis without control variables included is not a realistic examination of the relationship between personal demographics and opinions regarding war. Furthermore,

[305] Across all six questions tested, no statistically significant difference existed between the responses of veterans and non-veterans.
[306] No significant difference existed between the responses of veterans and non-veterans to question 5.

without control variables included in the analysis, the changes in odds of a favorable response were quite small: between 1.4 times higher odds (question 2)[307] and 1.2 times higher odds (questions 3 and 4)[308] that a veteran would give a favorable response compared to a non-veteran.

Educational attainment. The literature review did not provide clear support for the structuring of favorable opinion regarding war by respondent education level. If there was any support for opinions regarding war varying by education level, it was that more highly educated individuals tend to identify with the Democratic Party and that many individuals without high school degrees are minorities, who also tend to identify with the Democratic Party. Furthermore, understanding how educational attainment related to opinion differences regarding war is important, because some studies in the literature on sociopolitical representation in the Army argue that individuals from disadvantaged communities join the Army at very high rates.

The analysis found that responses to four of the six tested questions demonstrated statistically significant differences between respondents based on their education level.[309] In an analysis including all of the control variables, respondent favorable response rates were

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[307] Do you think the result of the war with Iraq was worth the loss of American life and other costs of attacking Iraq, or not? Answer: Worth it.
[308] Question 3: Looking back, do you think the United States did the right thing in taking military action against Iraq, or should the U.S. have stayed out? Answer: Right thing.
Question 4: How would say things are going for the U.S. in its efforts to bring stability and order to Iraq? Answers: Somewhat or very well.
[309] Questions 3 and 6 did not evoke different responses that were statistically significant. On question 2, favorable responses were statistically similar between respondents who were not high school graduates and respondents with some or more post-graduate education.

structured by the respondents' education level. Respondents who were not high school graduates had the highest favorable response rates, followed in order by high school graduates, respondents with some college education, and college graduates. Respondents with the most education—some or more post-graduate education—had the least favorable response rates.[310] Educational attainment, measured by respondents' education level, significantly related to opinion differences regarding war.

Personal income. The literature review also did not provide clear support for the structuring of favorable opinion regarding war by respondent personal income. Like educational attainment, though, this factor is important in studies of sociopolitical representation in the Army.

The analysis found that responses to five of the six tested questions demonstrated statistically significant differences between respondents based on their income level.[311] In an analysis including all of the control variables, respondent favorable response rates displayed an uneven pattern. The poorest respondents generally had the lowest odds of expressing a favorable opinion. The richest respondents had either the highest or second highest odds of expressing a favorable opinion. When

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[310] Compared to respondents with some or more post-graduate education, changes in odds were: not a high school graduate, 2 times (question 4); a high school graduate, 1.9 times (question 5); some college, 1.7 times (question 5); a college graduate, 1.3 times (questions 1, 2, 4, and 5).

[311] Question 5 did not evoke different responses that were statistically significant. Only on question 1 were favorable responses statistically different between the poorest respondents (income below $15,000) and the next poorest respondents (income between $15,000 and $30,000). Additionally, on question 4 favorable responses were statistically similar between the poorest respondents and the richest respondents (income above $75,000).

the richest had the second highest odds, respondents at the next richest level had the highest odds. Personal income alone did not consistently relate to increasing or decreasing rates of favorable opinions regarding war. Personal income, ceteris paribus, did not structure opinions regarding war; however, it is clear that political partisanship did structure opinions.

Political partisanship. The last sociopolitical demographic factor studied, and the most influential, was the political partisan group with which the respondent self-identified: Republican, Independent, or Democrat.[312] The examination of aggregated public opinion was of the polling corporations' best estimates of the national average of Republican, Independent, and Democratic responses based on individual Republican, Independent, and Democratic responses. This analysis, like the examination of the previous four factors, examines differences in individual responses.

The analysis without control variables (ethnicity, exposure to military service, educational attainment, and personal income) found that an Independent had higher odds than a Democrat of expressing a favorable opinion, and a Republican had the highest odds of the three political partisan groups. The odds that a Republican would opine that taking military action against Iraq was the right thing (question 3)[313]

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[312] These individual responses are not adjusted to reflect the distribution of Republicans, Independents, and Democrats in the population. Statistically, the results in this section cannot be compared to actual national averages.

[313] Looking back, do you think the United States did the right thing in taking military action against Iraq, or should the U.S. have stayed out? Answer: Right thing.

were 16.9 times higher than a Democrat's. An Independent's odds of expressing the same opinion were 3.5 times higher than a Democrat's, much less than the difference in odds between a Republican and Democrat (16.9 to 1). These odds establish that the probability a Democrat would express the opinion that taking military action against Iraq was the right thing was 20 percent, an Independent 43 percent, and a Republican 81 percent.

The same opinion pattern holds when respondents were asked to forget their personal opinion about whether the Iraq War was the right thing to do and predict whether the United States would be successful in establishing democracy in Iraq (question 6).[314] A Republican's odds of expressing that success was either somewhat or very likely were 5.4 times higher than a Democrat's. Compared to a Democrat's, an Independent's odds were 2.1 times higher. The probability that a Democrat would give a favorable response was 34 percent, an Independent 51 percent, and a Republican 73 percent.

Analysis that included control variables provided evidence that political partisanship was the strongest influence on the odds that a respondent would give a favorable opinion. As expected when the analysis included multiple control variables, the strength of a single factor's relationship to the odds of a respondent expressing a favorable opinion decreased almost universally. A male is not only a male, but also some variation of rich or poor, well-educated or not, Asian, Hispanic,

[314] Should U.S. troops stay in Iraq as long as it takes to make sure Iraq is a stable democracy, even if that takes a long time, or should US troops turn over control to Iraqis as soon as possible, even if Iraq is not completely stable? Answer: As long as it takes.

black or white, a veteran or not, and possibly a political partisan. A respondent's personal value on these independent variables conditions the relationship that a single other variable had on his odds of expressing a favorable opinion. For example, being a male related to increasing odds of expressing a favorable opinion compared to a female. In the analysis with control variables, the respondent's other characteristics decrease the effect of gender.

Partisan political self-identity's effect on other demographic factors. This analysis tests the importance of political partisan self-identification by statistically interacting it with respondents' expressed identification in the other sociopolitical factor categories (ethnicity, exposure to military service, educational attainment, and personal income). The analysis found that political partisan self-identification strongly affected the odds of expressing a favorable opinion. Average favorable responses vary in clusters determined first, by the respondent's political partisan self-identity and second, by the other demographic factor.

For example, the odds of a favorable response ("Worth it") to question 2 ("Do you think the result of the war with Iraq was worth the loss of American life and other costs of attacking Iraq, or not?") are illustrative. Without interacting political partisan identity and income, respondents with annual income between $50,000 and $75,000 had the highest odds of giving a favorable response compared to the poorest respondents, 1.5 to 1. Changing political partisan identity also had a much greater impact on the odds of a respondent giving a favorable

response. A Republican had much higher odds of giving a favorable response than a Democrat, while a richer respondent's (income between $50,000 and $75,000) odds were only smaller amount greater than the poorest respondent's (income below $15,000).

Interacting political partisan self-identification with income significantly changed the relationship that respondents' income had with the odds of giving a favorable response. First, income had no significant relationship with self-identified Democrats' responses. Regardless of income, all Democrats essentially responded similarly to the question. The trend differed slightly for responses to other questions, but changing income had very little effect on Democrats' opinions compared to Independent and Republican respondents' opinions.

Second, regardless of income, Independent respondents had lower odds of expressing a favorable opinion than Republican respondents. No group of Independent respondents had higher odds of expressing a favorable opinion than any single group of Republican respondents. The richest Independent respondent had 3.2 higher odds than the richest Democrat, but the poorest Republican had 8.1 times higher odds than the richest Democrat. This trend existed across all six questions tested.

Political partisan self-identity interacted with education level, ethnicity, and gender all revealed the same trends. A relatively small number of results included respondents' veteran status, and political partisan self-identity did not change the earlier result that veteran status was not significantly related to opinion differences. On the other sociopolitical demographic factors, *political partisan self-identity made*

some relationships statistically insignificant, and political partisan self-identity structured opinion. Education level had much less of an effect on Democratic responses than Republican responses. The opinion differences between political partisans with the same amount of education were dramatic and even more so for different education levels. Education level differences revealed without interacting political partisan self-identity were relatively small. On question 2,[315] no significant difference existed between the favorable responses of respondents with the least amount of education and those with the most education. After interacting partisan political identity with education, Republican and Democrat respondents who were not high school graduates had 16.8 and 3.3 times higher odds, respectively, than Democrats with the most education of declaring "Worth it" to question 2. Political partisan self-identity strongly conditioned the effect that education had on favorable opinions regarding war.

Political partisanship had the same effect on ethnicity and gender. The opinion differences between ethnic white Democrats, Independents, and Republicans were large. An ethnic white Democrat had 1.5 times higher odds than an ethnic black Democrat of responding "Right thing" to question 3.[316] An ethnic white Independent had 4.8 times higher odds, while an ethnic white Republican had 25.2 times higher odds. An Independent male had 2.8 times higher odds, and a Republican male had 14.2 times higher odds than a Democratic male of responding "Right

[315] Do you think the result of the war with Iraq was worth the loss of American life and other costs of attacking Iraq, or not? Answer: Worth it.
[316] Looking back, do you think the United States did the right thing in taking military action against Iraq, or should the U.S. have stayed out?

thing" to the same question. Before the interaction between partisan political self-identity and ethnicity, the range of changes in odds based on respondents' ethnicity was just 1.6 to 2 times higher, and males had just 1.5 times higher odds than females of responding "Worth it" to question 3. Partisan political self-identity strongly conditioned the effect that ethnicity and gender had on favorable opinions regarding war.

Other sociopolitical demographic factors and political partisan self-identity combine to provide a clearer understanding of how each factor related to opinion differences regarding war. The probability of a respondent expressing a favorable opinion varied in a tight range based on that respondent's political partisan identity, not on the other sociopolitical demographic factors. The probability that a Democrat would express a favorable opinion was about 20 percent, Independents about 40 percent, and Republicans about 70 percent.

Assessment of hypotheses. The analysis of opinion regarding war provides an opportunity to conduct a preliminary evaluation of this study's hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1: Many sociopolitical factors related similarly to different opinions regarding the Afghanistan and Iraq wars and different active-duty U.S. Army recruitment and retention rates.

- *Subhypothesis 1: Ethnicity*
- *Subhypothesis 2: Exposure to military service*
- *Subhypothesis 4: Educational attainment*
- *Subhypothesis 5: Personal income*
- *Subhypothesis 6: Political partisanship*

Ethnically white, military veteran, non-high school graduate, at least some college education but no post-graduate degree, highest personal income, and Republican respondents expressed the most favorable opinions regarding the wars. Conversely, ethnically black American, non-veteran, the most highly educated, the lowest personal income, and Democratic respondents expressed the least favorable opinions. However, it is apparent that respondent political partisan self-identity conditioned the relationship that the other factors had with favorable opinions regarding war. Accordingly, the political partisanship factor is included in the findings regarding each subhypothesis. If the model relating opinion differences to recruitment and retention is accurate, then the following findings should also apply to recruitment and retention rate differences.

Ethnicity. Given the clear and consistent opinion differences by ethnicity found in this analysis, recruitment and retention rates should vary by ethnicity. Across every question, an ethnic white respondent had much higher odds of expressing favorable opinions than a Hispanic, Asian, or black respondent, in order from least to most difference in odds. One exception was favorable responses to question 6, when Asian respondents had slightly higher odds than Hispanics of expressing that United States troops should stay in Iraq as long as it takes. The differences in odds when considering ethnicity were much greater than the differences in odds between respondents grouped by education or income. When ethnicity interacted with partisan political self-identity, the opinion differences between respondents of the same ethnicity with

different partisan political self-identities grew very large. Partisan political self-identity magnified the relationship that different ethnicities had with favorable opinions regarding war.

Exposure to military service. Taken alone, opinion differences between veterans and non-veterans do not support the subhypothesis that recruitment and retention should vary by individuals' exposure to military service. The analysis confirms what previous studies found. The strongest opinion differences regarding war existed between groups based on other sociopolitical demographic factors. Some of the differences in odds related to veteran status were statistically significant, but they were quite small. The relatively small between-group odds differences—between veterans and non-veterans—are not surprising. Although previous studies found that veteran status related to opinion differences, neither factor related to wide differences in public opinion. The analysis found that veteran and non-veteran opinions were different and significant without control variables, but they were, first, relatively small and, second, statistically insignificant when the analysis included control variables.

Educational attainment. This analysis of opinion differences supports a clear structuring of recruitment and retention rates by changing education levels alone. The relationship between different education levels and favorable opinions regarding war was straightforward. Those with the least education—not high school graduates—expressed the most favorable opinions. The most educated respondents—those with some or more post-graduate education—

expressed the least favorable opinions. When the analysis interacted partisan political self-identity with education level, differences between respondents with the same education level but different political self-identities were even more apparent. In almost every case, Independents of all education levels had higher odds of expressing favorable opinions than Democrats of all education levels. Republicans had higher odds than Independents of all education levels. Education level is another example of a sociopolitical factor that related to opinion differences but partisan political self-identity magnified the relationship.

Personal income. The analysis of respondents' personal income and their opinions regarding war supports the subhypothesis that personal income should relate to recruitment and retention rates. Higher personal income levels related to higher odds of respondents expressing a favorable opinion. However, the relationship between income and favorable opinions changed when the analysis considered the interaction between each respondent's partisan political self-identity and income. The analysis uncovered the strong conditioning effect that partisan political self-identity had on income, just as it had an effect on the other sociopolitical demographic factors.

Political partisanship. This analysis strongly supports the subhypothesis that political partisanship should relate to recruitment and retention rates. In magnitude, a respondent's partisan political self-identity was the strongest predictor of whether or not the respondent expressed a positive opinion. In the analysis that included all factors as control variables, partisan political self-identity decreased the effect that

the other sociopolitical demographic factors had on a respondent's odds of expressing a favorable opinion. When interacted with the other sociopolitical demographic factors, this self-identity magnified the relationship the factors had with favorable opinion differences. Partisan political self-identity also reversed the effect of one factor: income. The wealthiest Democrats usually expressed the least favorable opinions. The wealthiest Republicans expressed among the most favorable opinions.

Hypothesis 2: The difference in recruitment rates between communities with different measurements on the Hypothesis 1 factors changed between 2000 and 2007.

- *Subhypothesis 1: Recruitment rate differences narrowed following September 11, 2001.*
- *Subhypothesis 2: Recruitment rate differences expanded in response to the Iraq War.*

This analysis provides initial support for these hypotheses. Although it found a continual decline in average public support for the Afghanistan and Iraq wars over time, a major difference existed between initial opinions regarding these wars. Initial average support for both the war on terrorism and the Afghanistan War was extremely high, at between 85 and 90 percent. Initial average support for the Iraq War was comparatively low, at between 50 and 60 percent. This analysis found that favorable opinions regarding war fractured between the early stages of the Afghanistan War and war on terrorism and the Iraq War. If between-group opinion differences related to between-group recruitment

and retention differences, recruitment and retention rates should also display a cleavage around the time the Iraq War began.

Democratic and Independent favorable opinion regarding war increased following the March 19, 2003 beginning of the Iraq War. Democratic and Independent support rose above their initial level of support, 40 percent for Democrats and 50 to 60 percent for Independents. The increase was evident across every question tested. However, depending on the survey question, average Democrat and Independent opinion returned to these original levels within about a year of the Iraq War's beginning. Recruitment and retention rates may have changed sometime close to the invasion but then changed again as public support for war fractured a few months after the invasion of Iraq.

According to the model this study tests, if different opinions related to different recruitment and retention rates, then groups expressing the most favorable opinions should have enlisted and reenlisted at higher rates than groups who expressed the least favorable opinions. Opinions considered in this study were personal beliefs about the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. According to the literature review, people perceive how their personal beliefs fit prospective and current employers' beliefs. Perceptions of belief fit influence decisions to join and remain with employers. Service in the active-duty United States Army should have related to the factors that divided opinions regarding the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.

The factors identified in this chapter related to bases of favorable opinion regarding the Afghanistan and Iraq wars between 2001 and 2007

and, as noted in the initial review of hypotheses, should relate to differences in recruitment and retention rates. The most favorable opinions generally came from respondents who were Republican, were ethnically white, were military veterans, were not high school graduates, had at least some college education but no post-graduate degree, or had the highest personal incomes. The least favorable opinions generally came from respondents who were Democratic, were ethnically black, were not military veterans, had a post-graduate degree, or had the lowest personal income.

The preceding chapter analyzed Army recruitment and retention issues between 2000 and 2007. It included a general overview of Army programs, successes, and challenges. It was a useful transition from a detailed literature review to this chapter's analysis of opinion regarding war. Chapter Five identifies, in a similar fashion, factors that related to between-group recruitment and retention differences in the Regular Army.

Chapter Five

Regular Army Recruitment, January 2000–September 2007, and Retention, July 2003–September 2007

This chapter's task is to determine the relationship between active-duty United States Army recruitment and retention and the factors and issues identified previously as related to between-group opinion differences. To the extent that any relationships exist, the concluding chapter, Chapter Six, will discuss their sociopolitical implications. Chapter Four found that the most favorable opinions generally came from groups of respondents who were Republican, were ethnically white, were military veterans, were not high school graduates, had at least some college education but no post-graduate degree, or had the highest personal income. The least favorable opinions came generally from respondents who were Democratic, were ethnically black, were not military veterans, had a post-graduate degree, or had the lowest personal incomes.

These between-group opinion differences and the reported issues and trends in recruitment and retention from the previous chapters are used to develop expectations regarding differences in recruiting and retention rates in this chapter's analysis of active-duty United States Army recruitment and retention. This chapter determines how recruitment and retention rate differences related to the sociopolitical demographic factors that cleaved opinion regarding the Afghanistan and Iraq wars (Chapter Four). If between-group differences in recruitment and retention rates mirror opinion differences regarding these wars, then

the model that relates different opinion to different recruitment and retention rates through person-organization fit theory is a viable model for further research and informing policy discussion and formation.

Research approach. This chapter examines recruitment and retention using United States Army recruitment and retention data obtained from the Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis (OEMA), United States Military Academy, West Point, New York. Recruitment and retention data are this study's dependent variables. OEMA's recruitment and retention data includes demographic information on the population of 536,267 recruits who reported for active duty—each recruit's basic active service date (BASD)—between January 2000 and September 2007. The data also includes the population of 207,994 soldiers who were eligible for retention (had the choice to reenlist) between July 2003 and September 2007. Comprehensive retention data were not available for periods earlier than July 2003.

To have such comprehensive data on nearly the entire population of recruits and soldiers eligible for reenlistment is rare in a published study; therefore, this analysis alone is a unique and useful contribution to the existing literature. Furthermore, numerous studies have analyzed United States Army recruitment, but no study has analyzed retention with this number of cases, with the soldiers' available background information, and across this many years. Existing studies involve very small sample populations, making inferences about recruitment or retention highly subjective. This, with the model this study introduces, also makes this study a unique and useful addition to the literature on

wartime public opinion, person-organization fit, and sociopolitical representation in the United States Army.

Each recruit and retention file includes gender, ethnicity, and an accession home-of-record ZIP code—generally, the recruit's current residency ZIP code or his or her hometown ZIP code, whichever the recruit chooses. The recruitment and retention data are the dependent variables. The independent variables include the political, military, economic, and social proxies for the variables that the previous chapters identified as related to significant opinion and sociopolitical representation differences.

Each ZIP code corresponds with a county. Due to missing data for some recruits and active-duty soldiers, this study could determine the home-of-record county for 523,575 recruits (97.63 percent of all recruits in the database). 5,789 of those recruits were actually from United States territories or Puerto Rico, which left 517,786 recruits (96.55 percent of all recruits in the database) from identifiable United States counties.

This study determined the home-of-record county for 197,016 soldiers eligible for retention (94.72 percent of all eligible soldiers). 3,444 of those eligible soldiers were from United States territories or Puerto Rico, which left 193,572 eligible soldiers in this analysis (93.07 percent of all eligible soldiers). Some sociopolitical and economic data were not available for every county in every quarter or year.

It is impossible to determine the exact source of the home-of-record ZIP code reported by each recruit and recorded in the database. It is possible that some recruits reported a ZIP code with which they had

little historical relationship. An assumption is that the differing ZIP code source does not systematically affect the analysis of recruitment and retention against every independent variable in the same manner. This study assumes that the possible differing source does not introduce systematic bias in the analysis. This study's methodology also reduces bias by including almost the entire population of active-duty United States Army recruits and soldiers eligible for retention. The size of the population helps ensure that random errors related to the use of the recruit's ZIP code are truly random rather than consistently producing results that are either too high or too low compared to actual recruitment and retention from each United States county.

Graphical depiction of between-group recruitment and retention differences. Two example graphs included in this section depict between-group differences in recruiting and retention rates. Graph 5-1 depicts the recruitment representation gap, and Graph 5-2 depicts the retention representation gap. Graph 5-1 depicts the representation gap trend between the actual recruited population and the estimated recruitment-age population using per capita veterans' benefits as the independent variable sorted into recruitment-age population quintiles. The quintiles are the basis of this study's between-group analysis of recruitment and retention rates. Graph 5-2 depicts actual between-group differences in the retention rates of soldiers eligible for retention. Graphs related to the other subhypotheses' sociopolitical demographic factors are included in the appendix. Watkins and Sherk used this same method of



Graph 5-1



Graph 5-2

presenting between-group differences in recruitment rates in their widely cited 2008 Heritage Foundation study of armed services recruitment. The graphs depict a yearly running gap. The representation gap shown for December 2000 is for January–December 2000, and the gap shown for September 2007 is for October 2006–September 2007. The yearly running gap smoothes differences across individual quarters and clearly depicts trends in between-group differences better than graphing each quarter individually.

The quintiles are five groups, each containing nearly 20 percent of the recruitment-age population. The five quintiles cover 100 percent of the population the Army normally targets for recruitment. This study uses the estimated number of 15- to 24-year-olds living in every United States county as a proxy measurement of the Army's targeted recruit population. Although the Army cannot recruit 15-year-olds, this is the age range best represented in the available population databases and closest to the Army's targeted recruitment population (17- to 24-year-olds). The quintiles are built and labeled according to each individual county's value on the stated independent variable.

Graph 5-1 reads as follows: The 20 percent of the United States' population of 15- to 24-year-olds living in the highest per capita veterans' benefits counties provided 10.7 percentage points more recruits than the population's proportion in society. This 20 percent of potential recruits provided 30.7 percent of all recruits between January and December 2000. The 20 percent of the United States' population of 15- to 24-year-olds living in the lowest per capita veterans' benefits counties provided

6.1 percentage points fewer recruits than the population's proportion in society, 13.8 percent of all recruits between January and December 2000.

Graph 5-2 reads as follows: Between July 2003 and June 2004, of the soldiers who were eligible for retention and from counties with the highest per capita veterans' benefits, 57.8 percent chose to reenlist. Soldiers who were eligible for retention and from counties with the lowest per capita veterans' benefits reenlisted at a lower rate: 49.9 percent. With these different retention rates, counties with about 20 percent of the United States' population of 15- to 24-year-olds and the highest levels of per capita veterans' benefits had 13.0 percentage points more soldiers reenlist than the population's proportion in society. Thirty-three percent of all soldiers who chose to reenlist came from counties with 20 percent of the prime recruitment population and with high values of per capita veterans' benefits. Even four years after their initial enlistment, soldiers' exposure to military veterans, a proxy measure of social distance from military service, made some soldiers more likely and others less likely to reenlist.

The process used to determine between-group differences. This section describes this study's process of analyzing recruitment and retention rates. Detailing the methodology will help others understand the accuracy, simplicity, and power of this method. It will also help others replicate and test it. The process used to determine between-group recruitment and retention rate differences is detailed, repeatable, and precise. The process identifies very clearly the types of communities

with the highest and lowest proportions of citizens who chose to enlist and remain in the active-duty United States Army between 2000 and 2007.

The process arranges counties into quintiles based on each county's independent variable value, from highest to lowest, and each county's estimated total population of 15- to 24-year-olds. If the independent variable related to different recruitment and retention rates, the process detailed below would clearly display the relationship and help describe it. Other studies can easily replicate this process, and the output clearly depicts differences in recruitment and retention rates.

The process includes three major steps, each with minor steps. The three major steps are: 1) Determine the independent variable quintiles (the between-groups); 2) Determine recruitment and retention outcomes by quintile (each group's number of recruits or retention rate); and 3) Determine the representation gap by quintile (the measure of between-group differences). The process described below uses a recruitment example. Retention rate analysis ends with step two.

1. Determine the independent variable quintiles (the between-groups). First, determine the independent variable value for each county. Sort the counties from high to low based on that value. Between January and March 2000, the county with the highest per capita veterans' benefits was Fall River County, South Dakota ($578.02). The county with the lowest per capita veterans' benefits was Osceola County, Florida ($11.52).

Next, sum the total estimated population of 15- to 24-year-olds in every county. Divide that sum by five. The sum is the total estimated population of 15- to 24-year-olds in the United States. The result of division by five is the target population for building each quintile. Each quintile should contain about 20 percent of the total estimated population of 15- to 24-year-olds in the United States, this study's proxy measurement for a county's recruitment-age population. The total estimated population of 15- to 24-year-olds from April 2000 for counties with available per capita veterans' benefits data was 37,342,435. The target population value for each quintile was 7,468,487, 20 percent of the total.

Starting with the county with the highest independent variable value, continue adding the next lowest county's estimated total population of 15- to 24-year-olds until the sum comes as close as possible to the target population value. The target population value in April 2000 was 7,468,487, 20 percent value of the total estimated population of 15- to 24-year-olds (the result of the previous step). These counties are now the highest quintile—or highest 20 percent, or 81st–100th percentile counties. In the first quarter of 2000, the county with the highest per capita veterans' benefits was Fall River County, South Dakota ($578.02). The lowest county in that same quintile was Wright County, Missouri ($115.51). The total estimated population of 15- to 24-year-olds in the highest quintile (Fall River County, South Dakota, to Wright County, Missouri) was 7,467,515. This step is repeated for each lower quintile. The result is five quintiles with approximately 20 percent

of the estimated total population of 15- to 24-year-olds in the United States. For the first quarter of 2000, the highest per capita veterans' benefits value in each quintile was: $578.02, $115.50, $88.24, $67.07, and $48.66.

The final step in determining the quintiles is to calculate the percentage of the United States' estimated total population of 15- to 24-year-olds in each quintile. The target was 20 percent, but because the study uses county populations, not individuals, it is nearly impossible to have exactly 20 percent of the proxy recruitment-age population in each quintile. For example, in the first quarter of 2000, the percentages of the United States' estimated total population of 15- to 24-year-olds in each quintile, from highest to lowest, were 20.00, 19.97, 20.09, 19.99, and 19.96 percent.

2. Determine recruitment or retention by independent variable quintile (each group's number of recruits or retention rate). The recruitment data from OEMA included each recruit's BASD, the date on which the soldier reported to the military entrance processing station to begin serving in the active-duty United States Army. This study arranged all recruits into their BASD quarter – for example, January–March 2000 or October–December 2004. If it was impossible to identify the recruit's home county or independent variable data were not available for the recruit's county, the recruit was dropped from the analysis. In the first quarter of 2000, per capita veterans' benefits data were available for 95.25 percent (16,339 of 17,154) of recruits.

Second, using the recruit's home county and the BASD quarter, determine the number of recruits from each county in each quarter. For example, between January and March 2000, twelve recruits reported for duty from Osceola County, Florida ($11.52 per capita veterans' benefits). Thirty-nine recruits reported from Comanche County, Oklahoma ($474.69 per capita veterans' benefits), the county with the highest per capita veterans' benefits and actual recruits that quarter. Fall River County, South Dakota ($578.02 per capita veterans' benefits) had no recruits report for duty in that quarter.

Third, determine the total number of recruits from the counties in each quintile. In the first quarter of 2000, from the highest to lowest quintile, total recruits were 5,187; 3,475; 2,860; 2,585; and 2,232. In total, 16,339 recruits from counties with available per capita veterans' benefits data reported for duty between January and March 2000.

The next step is to determine the percentage of the Army's total recruits from each quintile's population. This is calculated by dividing the number of recruits from each quintile by the total number of recruits in that quarter. Between January and March 2000, the percentages of recruits from each veterans' benefits quintile, from the highest to lowest, were 31.75, 21.27, 17.50, 15.82, and 13.66 percent.

3. Determine the representation gap by quintile (the measure of between-group differences). The first two steps produce two numbers. First is the percentage of the United States' estimated total population of 15- 24-year-olds living in each quintile. This study uses that percentage to represent the percentage of total *potential* recruits

living in each quintile. The second number is the percentage of total *actual* recruits in each quintile. If recruitment was distributed evenly across the United States population of potential recruits based on per capita veterans' benefits, then the two percentages would be the same. Because of the methodology described above, both percentages would be approximately 20 percent. The process used to obtain these percentages determines the representation gap between the estimated percentage of the potential recruitment population living in each quintile and the actual percentage of recruits entering the Army from each quintile.

The result of subtracting the percentage of potential recruits from the percentage of actual recruits in each quintile is each group's representation gap. In the first quarter of 2000, the gaps (measured in percentage points, not percent) from the highest to lowest per capita veterans' benefits quintile were 11.75, 1.30, (2.58), (4.17), and (6.29). Parentheses or a negative sign indicate a negative number throughout this dissertation. These gaps mean that the highest quintile's percentage of actual recruits was 11.75 percentage points greater than its percentage of the total potential population of recruits in the United States: 31.75 percent - 20.00 percent = 11.75 percentage points. The lowest quintile was 6.29 percentage points lower: 13.66 percent - 19.96 percent = 6.29 percentage points, rounded.

Gap percentage points equate to actual numbers of recruits and are useful for determining each gap's physical magnitude. Determining the number of recruits to which the gap percentage points equate gives a better representation of underrecruitment and overrecruitment from each

quintile's potential recruit population. For example, in just the first quarter of 2000, the 11.75 percentage point overrepresentation of recruits from the highest quintile represents 1,920 more recruits than if recruits were spread evenly across the quintiles. Those 1,920 recruits were 37 percent of the total recruits in the highest quintile provided in the first quarter of 2000. The 6.29 percentage point underrepresentation in the lowest quintile represents 1,029 fewer recruits than if recruits were spread evenly across the quintiles. Those 1,029 recruits were 46 percent of the total recruits in the lowest quintile population provided in the first quarter of 2000.

This method is precise and repeatable. This method also allows for counties to move between quintiles as the counties' independent variable values change, which could happen if either total veterans' benefits change or the total estimated population changes. For example, Bibb County, Alabama had per capita veterans' benefits of $103.57 using April 2000 estimated total population and 2000's estimated total veterans' benefits, placing Bibb County in the fourth quintile (top 61st–80th percentile of all counties). By 2006, Bibb County's per capita veterans' benefits were $183.13, moving Bibb County to the top quintile (81st–100th percentile of all counties).

Between-group recruitment and retention rate differences. The yearly recruitment percentage point gaps and yearly retention rate gaps display distinct trends across all sociopolitical demographic factor groups.

Trend 1: Distinct high- and low- recruitment and retention rate populations. The approximately 20 percent of the potential recruit population who lived in the highest per capita veterans' benefits counties provided more recruits than any of the lower quintiles. Although approximately 20 percent of the 15- 24-year-old population lived in those counties between January and December 2000, those counties provided 30.7 percent of the active-duty United States Army's recruits during the same period. The 10.7 percentage point gap equates to 6,863 more recruits in that year from those counties than if between-group recruitment was even (20 percent of recruits from 20 percent of the population).

Trend 2: Distinct ordering of high-, medium-, and low-recruitment and retention rate populations. For example, across every twelve-month period, counties with increasingly higher levels of per capita veterans' benefits provided increasingly greater proportions of new soldiers. The highest quintile provided more recruits than the second highest; the second highest more than the middle quintile; the middle more than the second lowest; and the second lowest more than the lowest. In almost every between-group comparison based on other sociopolitical demographic factors, the percentage point gaps of a few quintiles cross, but it is extremely rare. When the quintile gaps cross, it indicates that some other factor in the population may influence recruitment more strongly or evenly than the independent variable in question. This does not happen with per capita veterans' benefits as the independent variable. Groups based on different levels of per capita veterans' benefits

clearly provide more or fewer recruits based on their populations' level of per capita veterans' benefits.

Trend 3: Between-group recruitment differences began narrowing before September 2001 and increasing about a year after the Iraq War began. In almost every between-group comparison based on other sociopolitical demographic factors, this same trend appears. At the year ending in December 2000, the representation gap between the highest and lowest per capita veterans' benefits counties was 16.8 percentage points, or 10,811 soldiers. The narrowest gap was for the year ending in June 2004, when the difference was 12.2 percentage points, or 8,113 soldiers. By the end of June 2007, the gap expanded to 18.8 percentage points, or 11,189 soldiers, greater than the gap before September 2001.

Trend 4: Retention eligibility differences depended on how the recruitment representation gap with respect to each particular sociopolitical demographic factor changed between 2000 and 2003. The average time in service for all soldiers eligible for retention was about four years. Therefore, if different quintiles provided more or fewer new soldiers between 2000 and 2003, ceteris paribus, more or fewer soldiers would be eligible for retention four years later from those same quintiles. As shown in Graph 5-1, overrepresentation of recruits from counties with the highest levels of per capita veterans' benefits decreased between 2000 and 2004, while the other four groups changed relatively less. Therefore, this change produced a clear decrease in overrepresentation of soldiers eligible for retention from the same quintile about four years later. The other quintiles slightly increased their proportions of new recruits, and

small increases in proportions for most quintiles are seen. However, counties with the lowest levels of per capita veterans' benefits do not show this same small increase in representation amongst soldiers eligible for retention. These counties' proportion of eligible soldiers actually remains flat and decreases between late 2005 and 2007 even though this group of counties provided an increasingly higher proportion of recruits between 2001 and 2003, the same cohort eligible for retention between 2005 and 2007.

Trend 5: General retention rates fluctuated depending on when the retention-eligible soldiers joined the Army. Through 2004 and ending in late 2004, retention rates dropped. Soldiers eligible for retention in late 2004 enlisted on average a little less than four years earlier, in late 2000 and early 2001, clearly before al-Qaeda attacked the United States on September 11, 2001. After the drop in retention rates in late 2004, soldiers eligible for retention increasingly came from cohorts enlisting after September 11, 2001 but before the United States invaded Iraq in March 2003. The second drop in retention rates occurred between June 2006 and March 2007. Soldiers eligible for retention between these dates originally enlisted, on average, between late 2002 and late 2003, after Congress approved President Bush's use of force against Iraq in October 2002 and until the period near Saddam's capture in Iraq. The period between June 2006 and March 2007 also saw significant violence in Iraq, debate over Congressionally mandated troop withdrawals and Iraqi government performance benchmarks, and President Bush's announcement of the troop surge to Iraq.

Trend 6: Retention rates magnified the overrepresentation and underrepresentation effects of different recruitment rates. For example, overrepresentation of soldiers from counties with high levels and underrepresentation of soldiers from counties with low levels of per capita veterans' benefits both increased over time. The trend occurred because of the interaction of between-group differences in soldiers eligible for retention and those soldiers' retention rates. Soldiers from counties with high levels of per capita veterans' benefits became relatively more abundant, and soldiers from counties with low levels became relatively more scarce. This happened because counties with higher levels of per capita veterans' benefits were overrepresented among potential reenlistees *and* potential reenlistees from counties with higher levels of per capita veterans' benefits reenlisted at higher rates than potential reenlistees from counties with lower levels. Soldiers from the population living in the lowest per capita veterans' benefits counties were relatively scarce as new recruits and became scarcer over time.

Assessment of hypotheses. The analysis of Army recruitment and retention rate differences provides the evidence for assessment of this study's hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1: Many sociopolitical factors related similarly to different opinions regarding the Afghanistan and Iraq wars and different active-duty U.S. Army recruitment and retention rates.

- *Subhypothesis 1: Ethnicity*
- *Subhypothesis 2: Exposure to military service*
- *Subhypothesis 3: Rural population proportion*

- *Subhypothesis 4: Educational attainment*
- *Subhypothesis 5: Personal income*
- *Subhypothesis 6: Political partisanship*

The clear and consistent differences between recruitment and retention from different populations of potential recruits provide compelling support for many of this study's hypotheses. Almost every factor considered related to a striking difference not only between groups with extreme values on the factor but also between groups with only slightly different values. For example, groups of counties with the highest personal income levels (the population of potential recruits living in the top quintile counties) provided fewer recruits than groups of counties with the next lowest personal income levels (the fourth quintile). Counties in the fourth quintile provided fewer recruits than counties in the third quintile, and so on.

The recruitment and retention rate trends identified in this analysis held clearly for many of the hypotheses' sociopolitical demographic factors. Each of the following statements is examined separately, but over the many months and hundreds of thousands of recruits and soldiers included in this study, the *consistently overrepresented groups* with respect to Army recruitment and retention were those that: had more veterans' benefits, had higher military employment, voted in higher proportions for President Bush in 2004, were more rural, had fewer with masters' degrees or more education, had more without high school degrees and not in high school, had lower personal income, or were from the South. Conversely, the *consistently*

underrepresented groups were practically polar opposites. They were groups of counties that: had fewer veterans' benefits, had lower military employment, voted in smaller proportions for President Bush in 2004, were less rural, had more masters' degrees or more education, had fewer without high school degrees and not in high school, had higher personal income, or were in the Northeast (strongly) and the West (in later quarters). Because the analysis of recruitment and retention included, essentially, the population of actual recruits and retention-eligible soldiers, the study has high confidence in its assessment of each hypothesis.

Ethnicity.[317] The analysis of opinion differences regarding war supported this subhypothesis, and the recruitment and retention analysis confirms the subhypothesis. With respect to ethnicity, there was a clear, continual decrease in recruitment from the other-than-white population spanning almost seven years. There was a nearly five-year decrease in recruitment from the black American population. While black, non-Hispanic Americans had very high individual reenlistment rates, they were increasingly a smaller proportion of total recruits and, therefore, reenlistees. White, non-Hispanic Americans were an increasingly larger proportion.

Black Americans as a percentage of total recruits declined from 23.7 percent (January–December 2000) to 14 percent (October 2006–

[317] County differences were tested using the following proxies for ethnicity: non-Hispanic white-alone percentage of the estimated total population, non-Hispanic black alone percentage of the estimated total population. Because the recruitment and retention data included individuals' ethnicities, this study also directly measured the percentage of various ethnicities who enlisted and reenlisted.

September 2007), and whites as a percentage of total recruits increased from 60.9 to 71.2 percent in the same period. While black Americans had among the highest retention rates after September 2005, black Americans as a percentage of total reenlistees dropped from 29 percent (July 2003–June 2004) to 19.3 percent (October 2006–September 2007), and whites increased from 55.9 percent to 63.8 percent.

The Iraq War was deeply unpopular among Democrats and black Americans, who identified as Democrats at very high rates. As discussed in Chapter Three, white Republicans had 61.5 times higher odds and white Independents had 10 times higher odds of expressing approval of President Bush's handling of the situation in Iraq. Each other ethnicity among Democrats also had higher odds of expressing approval. Black American Democrats expressed the least favorable opinions regarding the war across every question by a large margin. It was not surprising that Black American recruitment and representation among reenlistees fell during the period in this study.

Exposure to military service.[318] The literature on sociopolitical representation in the Army and this analysis of recruitment and retention provide strong support for this subhypothesis. Studies of sociopolitical representation in the Army found that Army recruits increasingly came from families and communities with ties to current and former military service. For example, across the enlisted ranks, 45 percent of blacks, 35 percent of Hispanics, and 30 percent of whites

[318] County differences were tested using the following proxies for exposure to military service: per capita veterans' benefits, military employment as a percentage of total employment, and the county's census region.

reported in 2004 having a sibling with military service, and 21 percent of officers and 11 percent of soldiers reported having a career military parent.[319]

For almost every twelve-month period, differences in recruitment and retention rates based on counties' veteran population and military employment were the greatest differences found in this dissertation. The differences were far from insignificant. If recruitment across the potential recruit quintiles was equal, between January 2000 and September 2007, 45,162 (31 percent) fewer recruits would have come from counties with the highest per capita veterans' benefits, and 31,276 (46 percent) more recruits would have come from the lowest per capita veterans' benefits counties between January 2000 and September 2007. Looking at the same gaps according to military employment, 28,450 (22 percent) fewer and 26,839 (37 percent) more recruits would have to come from, respectively, the highest and lowest military employment quintiles.

Retention rates followed the same pattern as recruitment rates. Retention rates between April 2003 and September 2007 increased with increasing per capita veterans' benefits and military employment. Sixty-one percent of retention-eligible soldiers from both the highest per capita veterans' benefits and military employment population quintiles reenlisted. Fifty-two percent of retention-eligible soldiers from both the lowest-populations quintiles reenlisted.

Rural population proportion.[320] America's rural population consistently produced more recruits and reenlisting soldiers than did

[319] Dempsey 2010, 40-1.

America's more urban population. President Obama recently mentioned overrepresentation of rural communities among Army recruits and casualties, although he likely overstated the percentage of recruits from purely rural ZIP codes.[321]

The most rural population quintile provided 25.8 percent of recruits in the year ending September 2007. The least rural population quintile provided 12 percent of recruits during the same year. Even representation among recruits between January 2000 and September 2007 would have meant 32,275 (48 percent) more and 24,761 (19 percent) fewer recruits from, respectively, the least and most rural populations. Reenlistment rates by quintile mirrored recruitment rate differences by quintile, with soldiers from the most rural population recording the highest reenlistment rate (59 percent between April 2003 and September 2007).

Educational attainment.[322] The analysis of opinion regarding war and this analysis of recruitment and retention support this subhypothesis. Counties with the lowest levels of educational attainment provided the most active-duty United States Army recruits, and soldiers from these counties reenlisted at the highest rates. The opposite was also true.

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[320] County differences were tested using the following proxy for rural population proportion: percentage of total population classified as rural.
[321] "White House overstates rural role in military," *NPR* (November 12, 2011).
[322] County differences were tested using the following proxies for educational attainment: Percent of 25-year-olds who are high school graduates or have more education; percent of 25-year-olds with a master's degree or more education; and percent of 16- to 19-year-olds who are not high school graduates and are not enrolled in school.

1. Percentage of 25-year-olds, high school graduates or more education. This proxy was a general measure of educational attainment within a population. Between January 2000 and September 2007, the most educated population quintile provided 26,171 (25 percent) fewer recruits than even representation would dictate. Together, the three least educated population quintiles provided 31,620 (31 percent) more recruits.[323] The recruitment gaps were not perfectly ordered by quintile,[324] which was not surprising. As discussed earlier, the lowest educational attainment population is the least likely to meet minimum enlistment standards. Finally, retention rates by quintile followed the same ordering as enlistment.[325]

2. Percentage of 25-year-olds with a master's degree or more education. This proxy was the clearest measure of high educational attainment within a population. The recruitment gaps were ordered by quintile. The most educated and second most educated quintiles provided 34,068 (34 percent) and 12,160 (12 percent) fewer recruits than even representation would dictate. The least educated and second least educated quintiles provided 27,443 (26 percent) and 19,430 (19 percent) more recruits. Retention rates were also ordered by quintile.[326]

3. Percentage of 16- to 19-year-olds, not high school graduates and not enrolled in school. This proxy was the clearest

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[323] The least educated, second least educated, and middle quintile provided 10,391, 12,501, and 8,729 more recruits, respectively.
[324] By quintile (most to least education population), the recruitment gaps were (26,171); (5,449); 8,729; 12,501; and 10,391.
[325] Retention rates by quintile, from most to least education, were 52.3, 55.6, 57.2, 59.2, and 58.8 percent.
[326] Retention rates by quintile, from least to most education, were 59.5, 58.7, 56.3, 54.8, and 52.9 percent.

measure of low educational attainment within a population. The most educated population quintile provided 17,918 (17 percent) fewer recruits than even representation would dictate. The least educated population quintile provided 13,151 (13 percent) more recruits.[327] Recruitment and retention rates were not perfectly ordered by quintile.[328]

Counties with the lowest proportion of population with high school graduates or more education had among the highest retention rates. Counties with the fewest master's degrees or college graduates with more education had both the highest recruitment and retention rates. Counties with the most youth population without a high school diploma and not in high school also had both the highest recruitment and retention rates.

Personal income.[329] Chapter Four found that the richest respondents generally expressed the most positive opinions regarding President Bush and the wars, while the poorest generally expressed the most negative opinions. However, it is clear that the population living in the poorest counties did provide the most active-duty United States Army recruits, and soldiers from the poorest counties reenlisted at the highest rates.

Between January 2000 and September 2007, the wealthiest and second wealthiest population quintiles provided 29,062 (40 percent) and

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[327] The representation gaps were not ordered by quintile. By quintile (most to least education population), the recruitment gaps were (17,918); (2,152); 5,857; 1,061; and 13,151.
[328] Retention rates by quintile, from most to least education, were 53.5, 55.8, 58.2, 58, and 58.5 percent.
[329] County differences were tested using per capita personal income as the proxy for personal income.

13,174 (15 percent) fewer recruits than even representation would dictate. The poorest and second poorest quintiles provided 21,572 (18 percent) and 15,487 (13 percent) more recruits. Between April 2003 and September 2007, the retention rate for each quintile increased with decreasing per capita personal income.[330]

Whereas the richest respondents expressed the most positive opinions regarding President Bush and the Iraq War, the population of potential recruits living in the richest counties provided the fewest recruits. Solders hailing from the richest counties reenlisted at the lowest rates. The poorest respondents expressed the most negative opinions regarding the Iraq War, yet the poorest counties provided the most recruits, and soldiers from the poorest counties had the highest retention rates.

Political partisanship.[331] The analysis of opinion differences regarding war and this analysis of Army recruitment and retention provide strong support for this subhypothesis. Self-identified Republicans expressed the most favorable opinions regarding war, and the population from counties with higher rates of voting for President Bush in the 2004 national election had the highest recruitment and retention rates.

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[330] Retention rates by quintile, from lowest to highest per capita personal income, were 59.8, 58.4, 57.0, 55.2, and 51.9 percent.

[331] County differences by political partisanship were tested by the proxy measurement percent of the vote for President Bush in 2004. Because few self-identified political partisans voted for competing parties in the 2004 election, this proxy is a very good measure of partisan political identity at the county level.

The significance of the overrepresentation gap by political partisanship is similar to that identified by per capita veterans' benefits and military employment. The population living in counties with the highest voting rate for President Bush in the 2004 national election produced 26,179 (25 percent) more recruits than its proportion of society. The lowest voting rate population produced 32,436 (33 percent) fewer recruits than its proportion of society. With retention rates following the same between-group cleavage,[332] soldiers recruited from the lowest voting rate population decreased over time at a faster rate than soldiers recruited from the highest voting rate population.

Hypothesis 2: The difference in recruitment rates between communities with different measurements on the Hypothesis 1 factors changed between 2000 and 2007.

- *Subhypothesis 1: Recruitment rate differences narrowed following September 11, 2001.*
- *Subhypothesis 2: Recruitment rate differences expanded in response to the Iraq War.*

Following September 11, 2001, the nation may have exhibited a rally-round-the-flag effect, a distinct increase in favorable beliefs regarding the President and military service. The Afghanistan War began shortly after September 11, 2001, so favorable beliefs regarding that war should have been very high if the nation rallied after the attacks on the United States. However, the literature reviews identified factors that

[332] Retention rates by quintile, from lowest to highest percent of the vote for President Bush in 2004, were 54.2, 55.8, 56.6, 57.1, and 59.6 percent.

could divide personal opinions regarding war, especially as the rallying effect decreased and elite, partisan conflict increased regarding war.

Recruitment representation gaps began narrowing before September 11, 2001, so it would be difficult to determine that September 11, 2001 caused a difference in recruitment or retention rates in quarters following September 11, 2001. However, recruitment representation gaps narrowed between the most extreme quintiles in every factor other than ethnicity. Black American representation amongst recruits continually declined, while white American representation increased. A broad and consistent increase occurred amongst recruits from the underrepresented populations between the year ending December 2000 and the year ending June 2004. For example, the 20 percent of the population of potential recruits living in counties with the lowest military employment increased its representation amongst recruits by 2.4 percentage points, from 13.8 percent to 16.2 percent of all recruits. Representation amongst recruits of the population living in the highest military employment population decreased by 3.4 percentage points, from 28.1 percent to 24.7 percent of all recruits. Data were not available to analyze retention rates between 2000 and 2003.

Following the beginning of the Iraq War, between-group recruitment differences increased across every sociopolitical demographic factor, again, other than ethnicity. The gap was most narrow across factors about a year following the invasion of Iraq. Around spring 2004, between-group differences increased for almost all factors considered.

The same trends cannot be determined for retention rates using this study's methodology. The next and final chapter summarizes this dissertation's research and presents suggestions for further research.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

This study sought to explore the relationship between opinion regarding war and Army recruitment and retention between 2000 and 2007. How did peoples' opinions differ? Who served in the Army? Were opinions and Army service related? This dissertation proposed a straightforward model to study these questions.

When people's beliefs fit well with a potential or actual employer's beliefs, those people choose to work for and remain with that employer at higher rates than people whose beliefs fit poorly. Employee recruitment and retention rates differ between groups whose beliefs fit relatively well and poorly. This study finds clear evidence that different groups of people held different beliefs regarding the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. It finds that different groups of people served and remained in the Army at different rates. It concludes that opinion differences and Army service differences were closely related. The sociopolitical demographic factors related to different beliefs regarding the Afghan and Iraq wars also related to different Army recruitment and retention rates. A limitation of this model, though, is that it does not survey individuals who actually joined or reenlisted in the Army. Other surveyed research has accomplished that. Those findings apply to this study, but not perfectly. Suggestions for future research will address this limitation.

This study demonstrates the value of a simple model that tracks between-group differences in Army recruitment and retention rates according to person-organization fit theory's predictions. Furthermore, it

is the first study in the civil-military relations and opinion literature that has analyzed retention outcomes across many sociopolitical factors. The literature deemed each factor relevant and influential according to the link between different individual beliefs regarding war and different Army service choices.

This chapter discusses two themes regarding opinion and Army service. First, Army service between 2000 and 2007 showed both recruitment and retention effects that followed person-organization fit's expectations. Second, social distance between the Army and society was large and significant. This chapter concludes with suggestions for future research.

Recruitment and Retention Effects Related to Person-organization Fit

Recruitment and retention effects related to person-organization fit's expectations were apparent. The review of person-organization fit literature identified three interdependent processes that drive differential recruitment and retention: self- and institutional selection, socialization, differential attrition.

1. Self- and institutional selection. Self-selection is differential entry by people into organizations that fit people's sociopolitical views. Institutional selection is differential hiring of people based on the fit between people's and organizational sociopolitical views. Many between-group sociopolitical differences related to consistently more or less favorable opinions regarding the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. Between-

group opinion differences existed across many different questions and many months.

The most favorable opinions generally came from respondents who were Republican, were ethnically white, were military veterans, were not high school graduates, had at least some college education but no post-graduate degree, or had the highest personal incomes. Conversely, the least favorable opinions generally came from respondents who were Democratic, were ethnically black, were not military veterans, had a post-graduate degree, or had the lowest personal incomes. These differences betrayed the existence of consistent and strong sociopolitical views regarding war. The analysis further found that partisan political self-identity had a very strong, conditioning influence on respondents' opinions regarding war.

To test the hypotheses that related different opinions regarding war to Army service, this dissertation analyzed the personal and home-of-record county demographics of 536,267 recruits who reported for duty in the United States Army between January 2000 and September 2007 and of 207,994 soldiers who were eligible for retention between July 2003 and September 2007. The study of hundreds of thousands of recruits and soldiers, practically the entire population, found consistent and distinct sociopolitical recruitment and retention rate differences. The overrepresented population groups with respect to active-duty United States Army recruitment were those who had more per capita veterans' benefits, had higher military employment, voted in higher proportions for President Bush in 2004, were from the South, were more rural, had

fewer with master's degrees or more education, had more without high school degrees and not in high school, or had lower per capita personal income. Conversely, the consistently underrepresented groups were the counties that had fewer veterans' benefits, had lower military employment, voted in smaller proportions for President Bush in 2004, were from the Northeast (strongly) and the West (in later quarters), were less rural, had more master's degrees or more education, had fewer without high school degrees and not in high school, or had higher per capita personal income.

Almost every sociopolitical factor related to recruitment rate differences between groups with slightly different values on each factor. For example, the population of potential recruits living in counties with the highest proportion of the vote for President Bush in the 2004 national election (the top quintile population) had the highest Army recruitment rates. The population living in counties with the next highest vote proportion for President Bush had the next highest Army recruitment rates. The pattern continued for the next three population quintiles: As the voting proportion for President Bush decreased, the Army recruitment rate decreased. The same relationship held for decreasing connections to military service, decreasing rural population, increasing educational attainment, and increasing income. This study did not expect to find such clear evidence of each factor's relationship to recruitment and retention rates, but the model effectively did find it in the population of recruits and retention-eligible soldiers.

Income was the only sociopolitical factor related to between-group opinion differences that did not translate in the same manner to Army recruitment rate differences. This result was not surprising. Students from high socioeconomic status families and students with the greatest academic achievement tend to select college over Army service. Furthermore, studies of USMA and ROTC cadets found that cadets overrepresent high-income and educational attainment quintiles, which follows the finding that such students tend to prefer college to enlisting into the Army. Finally, the other armed forces' recruits must greatly overrepresent high-income and educational attainment quintiles, the only explanation for Watkins' and Sherk's finding that *total* armed forces recruits come from such quintiles. Surveys of high school students support the finding that such recruits would select into the other services. The Air Force and Navy were identified as being for educated people, and the Marine Corps was identified as being the most elite combat service. The Army was identified as being an employer of last resort.

Self-selection played a role in the Army's recruitment outcomes over groups of people who held different sociopolitical views regarding war. More people selected into the Army from groups who expressed more often that the wars were going well, were going to be successful, were the right thing for the United States to pursue, or were worth the costs than people from groups who held the opposite views. Previous studies and this study's methodology support the implication that more individuals who held sociopolitical views favorable to war and military

service joined the Army at higher rates than individuals who held opposite views.

This study's research approach does not provide evidence of institutional selection at work in Army recruitment rates. The Army operates with resource constraints, such as limited enlistment incentives and recruiters. Although both expanded greatly between 2000 and 2007, this study does not examine the allocation of the Army's still limited resources across the potential recruit population. Such information could begin to address institutional selection effects, but it would also require a means of determining whether the Army selected different recruits based on their actual and probable sociopolitical views. For example, evidence that the Army successfully recruits from certain sociopolitical demographic populations is not evidence that the Army denies or avoids recruits from other populations. Filling the ranks of the post-draft Army requires that the Army use its scarce resources wisely. Differential recruitment may only be evidence that the Army acts to maximize its limited resources by focusing those recruiting resources at the nation's highest-propensity populations. Any less information could provide only very weak, circumstantial indications of institutional selection.

2. Socialization and differential attrition. Socialization is the formal and informal shaping of organizational members' sociopolitical views by organizational rules, incentives, norms, and peer pressure. This study's research approach does not examine the Army's formal or informal socialization practices, but it does uncover an artifact of

organization socialization:differential attrition. Differential attrition is the lower organizational exit rate of individuals whose sociopolitical views better fit with the organization's and other organizational employees' sociopolitical views. This study found that different sociopolitical views regarding war related to different recruitment rates and also different retention rates. Retention rate differences mirrored recruitment rate differences across sociopolitical factors. Overrepresented populations became even more so, while the opposite was also true. Furthermore, small differences in sociopolitical factors structured retention rates, just as they structured recruitment rates.

Self-selection, at a minimum, caused more or fewer people to join the Army from different groups of people based on their views regarding war. On average, about four years after they initially enlisted, more soldiers from the highest-recruitment-rate populations than the lowest-recruitment-rate populations chose to remain in the Army. This result was consistent across thousands of cases and more than three years of war. This result is differential attrition related to a group's sociopolitical views.

This finding comports well with previous research regarding the sociopolitical views of all Army ranks, its officers, warrant officers, senior sergeants, sergeants, and junior soldiers. The constant finding across studies was that of attitude or belief convergence, a function of socialization and subsequent differential attrition. With increasing rank or time in Army service, beliefs became less diverse and converged toward what the Army's leaders—its senior officers, warrant officers, and

sergeants—believed. Self-identified liberals, Democrats, and Independents became an increasingly smaller proportion of the Army's ranks, while conservatives and Republicans became a larger proportion.

Attitude or belief convergence begins with differential selection into the Army. Fewer young people of low socioeconomic status or educational attainment have developed a partisan political self-identity compared to their high socioeconomic status or educational attainment peers. The former desired to attend college but were more likely to enlist into the Army or join the general workforce. The latter tended to be the Army's junior officers, who have gained entrance to college or a military academy and are more likely to have developed a stronger political self-identity. This explains why junior soldiers appear to be more moderate and independent than junior officers. But junior soldiers tended to be more male, rural, and Southern than the average citizen. Those characteristics are also predictive of developing a more conservative, Republican self-identity with age. Because these Americans select into the Army at the highest rates, it is no surprise that increasing rank and time in service—increasing age—also shows increasingly Republican, conservative self-identities.

This fact does not explain why soldiers from the lowest-recruitment-rate populations exit from the Army at the highest rates. This study's research approach cannot answer this question because it did not question soldiers who decided to remain in the Army and soldiers who chose to leave the service. The research approach provides evidence of differential attrition across sociopolitical factors, but not evidence, for

example, of ingroup versus outgroup socialization that specifically caused differential attrition rates. However, other very recent studies have shown socialization and differential attrition effects based on conflicting individual liberal or Democratic self-identities and the Army leaders' normal or average conservative, Republican self-identity. The average self-identity would be different if recruitment and retention rates were different. Decades of research on Army service, and now this study, highlight how much recruitment and retention would have to change to shift the average identity to a moderate, independent average.

Social Distance Between the Army and Society

Social distance is the frequency and intensity of interactions and feelings of mutual understanding between communities. Social distance, generated by sociopolitical demographic differences, affects opinions regarding war and, as this study has shown, relates to different Army recruitment and retention rates. This study uncovered numerous examples of social distance in prior research. A prime example was found in the results of the 2004 survey of high school students. The low-propensity students did not simply remark that they would rather go to college or find a local job. They appeared to wholly separate themselves from potential military service. They agreed that they were "just not a military person," that they "might hate it once [they] got in and then be stuck," and that the "'loss of personal freedom" was a significant personal barrier to enlistment. They further agreed with statements that separated them distinctly from the highest-propensity students: "May have to fight for a cause I don't support," "there is a good chance that I'd

end up in combat," "I don't want to kill people," and "I might have to kill innocent people." These were examples of social distance based on individual beliefs regarding military service and war.

A second example was Kriner's and Shen's study of Army recruitment and wartime casualties over four previous wars. Social distance between those who serve and die during wars increased from World War II through Vietnam to the Iraq War because of disproportionate service rates. Citizens from the top educational attainment and socioeconomic status quintiles simply served in the Army at lower rates over time, especially since the military draft ended in 1973.

A third example was the long-term effect of disproportionate service the Department of Veterans Affairs identified in its report of the United States' veteran population. A steady and cumulatively large shift occurred in the United States' veteran population between 1960 and 2010. Because more veterans living in low-recruitment and retention rate quintiles are pre-Gulf War veterans, as those veterans pass away, social distance from the Army will increase. Because more veterans living in the highest recruitment and retention rate quintiles are the Nation's newest veterans, they will live longer and require proportionately more veterans' services as the other quintiles' older veteran population passes away. Those close connections to military service and veterans' benefits requirements could influence the allocation of government resources—such as base closures and realignment, Veterans Administration facilities, and veteran hiring programs—for many years.

This study's sociopolitical factors that split opinion regarding war add to existing research by proposing and testing many measures of social distance between communities who had the highest and lowest Army recruitment and retention rates. Social distance between the Army and society decreased between 2000 and about mid-2004. This study's research approach could not determine that patriotism following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States caused more people from previously underrepresented communities to enlist because social distance was decreasing at the time of the attacks. However, people from underrepresented communities did enlist at higher rates until shortly after the Iraq War began.

The run-up to the Iraq War revealed sharp opinion differences based on sociopolitical factors, but these same sociopolitical factors related to disproportionate service before September 11, 2001 and through the Iraq War. They are also similar to the factors that previous research had identified as relating to disproportionate Army recruitment and retention rates. Social distance shrank between January 2000 and about June 2004 and expanded greatly until September 2007, the end of this study's recruitment and retention data. Between January 2000 and June 2004, the most underrepresented populations by every sociopolitical factor increased as a proportion of total recruits, while the most overrepresented population decreased. Between June 2004 and September 2007, the pendulum swung in the completely opposite direction. The proportion of recruits from the most underrepresented communities increased and vice versa.

Social distance, as measured by between-group recruitment and retention differences, was significant between January 2000 and September 2007. For example, the top two income quintiles provided about 32 percent of the Army's recruits, which was 42,236 fewer recruits than if these quintiles had provided 40 percent of the Army's recruits. The bottom two income quintiles provided 37,060 more recruits. By 2005, when the Army missed its recruiting quota by 8 percent, enlistment incentives had already increased, enlistment standards were dropping, and thousands of soldiers were under stop-move and stop-loss orders. By 2007, the Army increased its maximum enlistment age and body fat enlistment limits, granted thousands of moral or criminal enlistment waivers, reduced separations of new recruits, and further increased enlistment incentives.

Given that history, it is difficult to imagine how the Army could have met its recruitment goals during the Afghan and Iraq Wars under a policy that demanded more proportional representation across the nation. Dropping enlistment standards would not have attracted more recruits from high educational attainment or socioeconomic status communities: They were already more than qualified according to Army enlistment requirements. As discussed earlier, high educational attainment and socioeconomic status communities are also the healthiest communities and have fewer young adults in jail or prison. Increasing obesity rates over the last decade would make proportionately more of their population eligible for Army service. Increasing enlistment incentives might have attracted more, but enlistment incentives are

difficult to target at specific populations, especially low-propensity sociopolitical demographic groups.

It is apparent from previous recent research and this study's findings regarding retention rate differences that differential attrition is actually related to individuals' sociopolitical differences. Because certain sociopolitical groups enter the Army at very low rates, they are *de facto* minority groups. This study did not examine informal or formal socialization processes that would turn those minority groups into outgroups, a limitation of its research approach. However, previous research, such as Dempsey's *Our Army* and Urben's dissertation, and this study provide evidence that those groups feel and act as person-organization fit explains and predicts. Minority groups hold distinctly different beliefs, join the organization at the lowest rates, are less satisfied overall with the organization, and leave the organization at the highest rates. These effects cause belief or attitude convergence widely reported in previous research.

Suggestions for Future Research

The model requires further testing. The model does provide strong theoretical support for explanations and predictions of Army recruits' and current soldiers' beliefs, service intentions, and behaviors. It explains and predicts human behavior observed across many studies in different but ultimately interdependent fields. Future research regarding the military in the person-organization fit and civil-military relations disciplines should focus on testing this model with different populations or different periods. For example, it is likely that the other

services' recruits are from somewhat different sociopolitical backgrounds than the Army's recruits. How different are they, and why? Another example is an extension of this study through the end of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. How did beliefs regarding war change, especially with the end of large-scale Iraq War deployments? Did Army recruitment or retention rates also change?

The model applies to different population levels. Different population levels include U.S. state, county, county subdivision, Census place, tract, block group, block, and individual. To minimize errors of ecological inference, the model should test opinions—beliefs regarding war—and behaviors—enlistment or retention decisions—at the lowest possible level. It should then gather sociopolitical demographic data at that level. This study was at the county level, a limitation of its research approach determined by the combination of available opinion, demographic, and Army service data. However, its use of nearly the entire population of Army recruits and retention-eligible soldiers was a great methodological benefit: Studying the population minimized the likelihood of inaccurate findings based on an unrepresentative sample of recruits and soldiers.

Future research should not check sample populations against gender, ethnicity, and rank alone. For example, if a sample population underrepresents or overrepresents recruits and soldiers from military families, the sample population is not representative of the Army. Another factor that could determine how representative a sample is of the Army population is the geographical origin of each recruit or soldier

in the study. For example, if 30 percent of the study sample hails from the Northeast region, the sample population is not representative of the Army.

The model describes and reports civil-military or sociopolitical gaps. This study's method of describing and reporting sociopolitical gaps between the Army and society was developed prior to its review of Watkins; and Sherk's and Kriner's and Shen's work. It is no coincidence that three major studies have used population quintiles to describe and report disproportionate Army service or wartime casualties. The results are clear, with any sociopolitical gaps immediately evident. Future research should use this same method but include all of the sociopolitical factors this study identified as consistently related to recruitment and retention rate differences: partisan political identity, rural population proportion, income, educational attainment, connections to military service, and ethnicity. Future studies should consider in-depth personal interviews with two representative samples, one of soldiers opting to remain in the service and the second of soldiers who decide to leave the service.

Different groups of people held different beliefs regarding the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. Different groups of people also served and remained in the Army at different rates. The study's model, based on an extensive review of interdependent literatures, explains and predicts that opinion differences and Army service differences should have been closely related. The study found that sociopolitical demographic factors related to different beliefs regarding the Afghan and Iraq wars also

related to different Army recruitment and retention rates. It is not surprising that differences existed between groups of individuals holding different beliefs regarding the wars, but that recruitment and retention differences followed practically the same trends across so many relevant factors was shocking. It signals the value of the model this dissertation tested. It also shows the existence of strong selection and socialization or attrition effects across numerous sociopolitical factors. When people's beliefs fit well with an organization's beliefs, those people choose to work for and remain in that organization at higher rates than people whose beliefs fit poorly. The Army's recruitment and retention experience between 2000 and 2007 was no different.

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